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ABSTRACT
This report dealt with the relevance in the Philippines of the
Multiobjective Approaches to Project Appraisal (MOAPA), approaches
which purport to provide a basis for more rational resource allocation
through a framework in which all the relevant sonsequences of investment
projects can be considered in a consistent and systematic manner.
The study showed that the development objectives and policies
of the Philippine Government conflicted with each other and did not
provide much help to investment decision-making. The inability of
public and private sector projects to support the national objectives,
the deficiencies observed in the practice of project planning, and
the difficulty of establishing real project priorities were attributed
to the absence of a viable procedure for designing, evaluating, and
selecting projects in the light of the competing development objectives.
An assessment carried out on the feasibility of alternative
mechanisms to project selection for addressing the national objectives,
particularly the "non-efficiency" objectives was unfavorable. The
Philippine tax system was not an effective mechanism for redistributing
income and wealth, much less for penalizing negative externalities
(e.g., pollution). The Government's experience in the use of regulation
had not been satisfactory. With respect to social development programs,
the corresponding benefits foregone elsewhere for the use of resources
ere unknown and the administration of these activities had been poor.
The problem of determining priorities among beneficiaries and program
types was very difficult. An analysis of the major credit programs for
small industry revealed the promotion of capital-intensive enterprises and
of spatially concentrated investment, and the emphasis on collateral and
debt-equity requirements rather than project desirability.
The benefits of the MOAPA were shown to outweigh the costs. The
MOAPA was argued to permit a comparison of project impacts in a compen-
satory and coherent fashion, to expedite priority setting among projects,
to encourage citizen participation, and to minimize political conflicts.
The costs of the MOAPA, e.g., institutional reforms, manpower training,
data collection, were claimed to be justified. Most of the costs would be
incurred by the Government even without the MOAPA. The adoption of the MOAPA
was asserted as feasible within the current politico-institutional set-up.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: DR. ALAN M. STROUT
To my Nanay and Tatay
". . . Some people believe that one particular
attribute of life such as the silence of the
countryside, is of absolute importance. For
them (project evaluation) is easy: the value
of all other benefits and costs is zero. More
problematical are those people who believe in
the absolute importance of two or more items,
for they are doomed to intellectual and spi-
ritual frustration."
Richard Layard (1972)
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author
and do not reflect the thinking of the National Economic
and Development Authority or of the Government of the
Philippines.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
By and large, governments throughout the world employ project
planning and programming as vehicles for promoting and guiding develop-
ment. Many developing countries pursue such an approach either as a
component of a comprehensive planning process or a somewhat isolated
activity based on a loosely coordinated framework of national and
regional goals. Others utilize project development to meet specific
needs or to take advantage of special opportunities. In the final
analysis, this activity is directed towards minimizing sporadic
and misdirected public investment through a rational system of pro-
ject identification and evaluation.
Investment project planning is a complex and recursive set of
activities involving, broadly, project identification, design, eval-
uation, selection, and programming. Each of these stages requires
different inputs, techniques, participants, and processes. The
nature of bottlenecks, the setting, and the issues for each phase
are different and therefore the steps entail different treatment.
Ideally, the outcome of such a planning process should be a
package of investment projects that could contribute most to the
various development objectives of the country. Practical experience
tells us, however, that governments do not always implement projects
to achieve the highest net benefits (defined by the different objec-
tives) for society. We may argue that such decisions on resource
allocation merely reflect what maybe called political pragmatism.
Decision makers have to make many people happy (particularly the in-
fluencial ones) or at least appear to do so.
However, the political aspect is not the only factor. Many
planners would argue that the deficiency of the planning process is
an equally important explanation. For example, the practice of pro-
ject identification, design and appraisal cannot guarantee the at-
tainment of the development objectives.
In this connection, many analytical tools had been developed to
rationalize the process of decision-making. The earliest methods
suggest that, for a given income distribution, investments decisions
based on market prices of goods and factors or production would re-
sult in an optimal allocation of resources. To the extent, however,
that market distortions exist (e.g. monopolies, taxes, externalities),
market prices would not reflect the social value of commodities that
were used and produced. This recognition of the divergence between
market and social prices led to the use of "shadow" prices (i.e.,
prices that indicate relative resource scarcity) in project analysis.
Over the years, however, many people have expressed the opinion
that focusing on economic efficiency, which these traditional modelsI
did, is not an adequate procedure for making investment decisions.
It is argued that other aspects such as the project's impact on per-
sonal and spatial income distribution are equally relevant to the
decision-making process and thus should be explicitly considered in
the analysis.
To date, there are a number of techniques that seek to systema-
tically address the problem of multiple objectives in project ap-
praisal. We shall refer to these methods as the Multiobjective
Approaches to Project Appraisal (MOAPA). This study is an attempt
These refer to "efficiency-oriented" models, whether using market
or shadow prices.
to assess the relevance of the MOAPA to the Philippines.
1.1 Scope of the Study
This report deals with the MOAPA which purports to provide a
basis for a more rational decision-making process through a framework
in which all the relevant consequences of proposed projects can be
considered in a systematic and consistent manner. The study was un-
dertaken upon the request of the NEDA-UNDP/IBRD Assistance to Regional
Planning Project of the Philippines, as one of the research projects
designed to come up with mechanisms by which to improve the planning
process in the Philippines. The agency is particularly interested
in the applicability of such an approach to the Philippines.
In the conduct of this study, the author defined the relevance
of the MOAPA in terms of necessity and practicability. The necessity
for the MOAPA is analyzed on the basis of the nature of the develop-
ment objectives and policies; that is, the extent to which the
national goals (and policies) conflict with one another and how mean-
ingful they are in terms of project analysis and selection. The ne-
cessity of the MOAPA is also looked into from the perspective of pro-
ject development. The practice of formulation and evaluation of
public and government assisted private projects is therefore investi-
gated.
The practicability of the MOAPA to the Philippines is evaluated
by studying the prospects of alternative schemes for dealing with the
This is an on-going research and training project of the Philippine
ministry on development and planning (i.e., National Economic and
Development Authority) which is sponsored and assisted by the United
Nations Development Programme and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank).
problem of resource allocation for assessing the feasibility of ad-
minstrating the MOPA.
The aforementioned analysis strongly indicated that some form of
MOAPA1 could be useful to the Philippines. It was necessary there-
fore to survey the literature in order to have an idea of the types
of techniques that could be adaptable to the country.
Organization of the Report
This report is divided into two-parts. Part I, consisting of
Chapter 2 and 3, provides the theoretical framework for multiobjec-
tive project planning and appraisal. It defines the term "project"
as used in the study and reviews the concept of project appraisal
(Chapter 2, sections 2.1 and 2.2). It also deals with the reasons
for project evaluation and the place of project evaluation in the
overall and project planning processes (Chapter 2, sections 2..3 and
2.4). Having justified the exercise of project analysis, it then
discusses the controversy between "single" (or efficiency-oriented)
and multiple objective approaches to project appraisal (Chapter 3).
In Part II, a case study on the relevance of the MOAPA to the
Philippines is presented. Chapters4,5, and 6 attempt to assess
the necessity of the MOAPA on the basis of the development objectives
and the practice of project development in the public sector. Chap-
ter 4 contains an analysis of the nature of the development objec-
tiyes and policies and their implications to project level decisions
making. The next chapters discuss the practice of project development
1Needless to say, the MOAPA is irrelevant if there is only one objec-
tive.
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in context of the national goals. Chapter 5 deals with public invest-
ment while Chapter 6 focuses on the major incentives system that pro-
motes private industries. In Chapter 8, the practicability of the
MOAPA is examined in terms of what it can offer vis-a-vis the alterna-
tive approaches, which are discussed in Chapter 7 to achieving the develop-
ment goals. Some criteria for choosing the specific method(s) are
suggested and some preliminary conclusions are offered in connection
with the alternative techniques surveyed (Chapter 8, section 8.4).
For those who may be interested, the various Appendices have been
organized to provide more detailed imformation on the interregional
development (Appendix B), the National sectoral development objectives,
policies, and investment strategies and programs (Appendix C), the
BOI investment incentive system (Appendix D). Appendix A is a map
of the Philippines with its regional boundaries.
1.2 Summary of Findings and Conclusions
The study indicates that the multiobjective approach to pro-
ject appraisal is necessary and practicable and therefore could
be useful in guiding resourceallocation in the Philippines. The
findings are summarized below.
1.2.1 The Necessity of a MOAPA
The development objectives (as well as policies) of the Philip-
pines conflict with each other and do not help project planners in
their appraisal of projects. The inability of public and private
investments to support these development objectives and policies,
the confusions associated with the practice of project appraisal,
and the difficulties involved in establishing priorities among "pre-
ferred" projects may be attributed to the absence of a systematic
procedure for designing, evaluation and selection projects in the con-
text of the national development objectives.
Development Objectives and Policies
A. Contrary to what the national plans and political declarations
seem to imply, many of the development objectives in reality often
conflict with one another. The same is true for development policies.
We can demonstrate how at the project level, the maximization of ef-
ficiency may conflict in the short-run with either equity or environ-
mental objectives.
B. The relative values of the broad development objectives and
policies are not made explicit. The national plans therefore do not
offer much help in terms of project design and appraisal.- These plans
may in fact lead project formulators and analysts and also the deci-
sion-makers to the promotion of socially less desirable, if not un-
dersirable, projects.
Development Strategies and Public Investments
C. The current practice design and selection in the public sector
does not ensure that the various national objectives are considered.
Many investment projects have been formulated on a "piecemeal" ap-
proach in which projects are developed to meet certain problems with-
out considerations of the projects' impacts on other objectives.
Even for other projects that were designed to achieve selected ob-
jectives in addition to their principal objective, by no means have
all objectives been considered. More importantly, the sacrifices
involved in generating secondary objectives could indeed have
been more than what society was willing to forego,
D. The priority setting scheme in the public sector is deficient.
Priority has often been based solely on either economic or social
criteria. It is also not clear how the order of priority will be
determined among the "priority" projects. For priority locations,
the plans are unclear about the operational meaning (say in terms
of budgetting and programming) of "priority."
E. Although regional development was introduced as an explicit
objective of the development plan as early as 1971, public invest-
ments have not been significantly dispersed into the regions. Even
the 1978-82 plan does not indicate that this regional mal-distribu-
tion of public investment will be improved.
Influencing Private Investments
F. The framework of policies that guides the execution of the
Investment and Export Incentives Act incorporates many but not all
of the objectives set forth in the development plan. Moreover poli-
cies that relate to some objectives,e.g., regional industrialization
have been stated in such a way that diminishes the chances of achiev-
ing these objectives.
-G. With respect to the formulation of Investment and Export Pri-
orities Plans, the provisions of the perfinent laws limit the effec-
tiveness of the incentives systems in attaining the national objec-
tives that the system seek to achieve.
1) In the identification of preferred investment activities,
commercial profitability is considered critical. Projects
that are socially desirable but not financially viable
owing perhaps to market distortions are not eligible.
(The literature has extensively discussed the other
problems in the use of this commercial indicator as a
determining measure of project worthiness.)
2) The.criteria adopted by the Board of Investment (BOI)
which administers the incentive systems do not reflect
all the policies set forth in the Acts, For example,
the objective of employment generation under the
Export Incentives Act is not considered in determining
the priority of export activities that will be promoted.
3) The Priorities Plans of the BOI contain recommended
plant capacities. While the capacity suggested may
achieve economic efficiency, it also discriminated
against smaller industries and hence indirectly de-
terred the achievement of social goals.
4) The Priorities Plans, being silent as to which projects
should be established in the less developed regions of
the Philippines, appear to be indifferent to the
location of the preferred activity. Coupled with
the strong economic pulling force of Metro-Manila and
the centralized operation of the BOI, the absence of
preferred locations for projects creates doubts as to
how regional dispersal of industries can be achieved
through the incentive system.
it is important to mention that the demand-supply projections repre-
sent total national estimates.
5) The Annual Priorities Plans of the BOI do not appear
to contribute much to solving the employment problems.
For example, projects under the Eight Investment and
the Sixth Export Priorities Plans are estimated to
have an average,capital-labor ratio of P500,000 (US
$71,000) at 1974 prices per worker which is deemed
to be very high for a capital-scarce and labor-abun-
dant Philippine economy.
H. The BOI methodology for project appraisal leaves much to be de-
sired:
1) The BOI treats commercial profitability as one of the
essential attributes of proposed projects.1 We have
argued about the limitations of this indicator as a
measure of project worthiness from society's viewpoint.
2) The provisions of the laws do not explain what indica-
tors should be used to measure the impact of projects
with respect to each criteria. They are also silent
as to the framework by which the different project
consequences may be compared and consolidated.
3) The Project Evaluation Manual of the BOI describes
the indicators that are suggested for each criteria.
However, the Manual is not clear about the interpreta-
tion of the results. It leaves the responsibility to
the five-men Board of Investment of deciding on the
specifics. Unconsolidated and non-comparable informa-
tion makes the job of project selection very difficult
1See (G) above.
and runs the risk that the Board will be inconsistent
in its decisions. Meanwhile, the Manual also contains
indicators of worthiness (such as foreign exchange in-
flow and outflows and the social rate of return) which
are either misleading or less adequate when taken by
themselves, than alternative measures (e.g., present
value of net aggregate benefits).
I. The system of granting incentives and the nature of the incen-
tives themselves make the achievement of non-economic objectives
doubtful. For instance, in connection with the regional development
objective, the Investment Incentives Act does not provide any addi-
tional incentives to regionally dispersed enterprises. The Export
Incentives Act grants two special incentives for this purpose but
they have been found to be inadequate if not totally ineffective.
Furthermore, the incentivesystems allow fixed packages of incentive
benefits thereby ignoring the peculiar needs of each industry. This
study suggests a different balance between an administratively ex-
pedient system that does not take into account the minimum incentives
required by each industry and an administratively complex system
that grants incentives on a project by project basis. Meanwhile, the
nature of the incentives granted promoted higher capital-intensity
among projects. This is inconsistent with the country's resource
endowments and employment objective.
J. An examination of the projects actually registered by the BOI
reveal that the social objectives of the Government are not always
effectively met. There is a glaring concentration of projects and
investments in the Metro-Manila Area and its neighboring regions.
Likewise, the BOI accepted projects have, on the average, a high
capital to labor ratio. This suggests that the employment criterion
is not properly addressed.
1.2.2 The Practicability of the MOAPA
The Multiobjective Approach to Project Appraisal shows greater
promise in comparison to the other alternative tools for meeting
the Philippine development objectives, particularly the "non-effi-
ciency" objectives.
Dealing with "Non-Efficiency" Objectives in the Philippines: -Alter-
natives to Multiobjective Project Appraisal
K. The Philippine tax system does not appear to be a viable alter-
native for redistribution income and wealth, let alone for penalizing
negative externalities (e.g., pollution). Owing to the absence of
a strong central coordinating office that oversees taxation planning,
legislation, and enforcement, the system suffers from considerable
confusion, overlap, and general inefficiency in taxation administra-
tion. The system is also highly regressive due to personal and cor-
porate income taxes and indirect taxation policies that are full of
loopholes and have many regressive features. Tax enforcement has
been inadequate, resulting in rampant tax evasion and cheating.
Meanwhile, the Government , recognizes the potential negative effects
of taxes on entrepreneurial initiative, on tax payment, and on the
The tax systemdoes not deal with environment-related objectives.
2In this report, "Government" and "Philippine Government" refer to
the national government of the Republic of the Philippines, unless
otherwise specified.
flow of foreign capital.
L. The past and recent experiences of Government make one less
confident about the use of regulations in addressing some of the
development goals. For example, the revised pollution control law
focuses largely on the Metro-Manila area. This law is also not con-
cerned about the magnitude of socio-economic benefits contributed by
polluting industries. Similarly, the Presidential directive banning
the establishment of industries within the 50 kilometer radius of
Manila and the Central Bank circular requiring banks in the regions
to invest 75% of all deposits in their respective areas of operations
have not been successful in achieving their fundamental objectives.
M. While not discounting the redistributive benefits of Philippine
social development.programs, we are not totally sold to the idea
of using these programs as the principal tool in achieving the
social objectives of the Government. We are unsure about the oppor-
tunity costs of these expenditures and therefore are unaware of wheth-
er the Government or society as a whole, had it known the sacrifices
involved, would have allowed these programs. Moreover, social pro-
grams are poorly administered and generally unsuccessful because of
reasons such as the tendency of Filipinos to abuse these programs,
the graft and corruption in the purchase and use of supplies and
equipment, and misappropriations of funds. More importantly, there
is an observed tendency for the value of benefits received by fami-
lies to increase in proportion to income and to decrease with distance from
Greater Manila. Furthermore, the problem of evaluation and priority
setting is more difficult with social programs than with economic
investment programs because the impacts are often not easy to quan-
tify, let alone translate into monetary terms, There is also no
consistent and defensible procedure for selecting program beneficia-
ries (location and people). In the isolated cases where certain
priority-setting schemes are used, the methods have been conceptually
deficient.
N. Development programs for smaller industries that are designed
partly to improve the distribution of income among persons and regions
have been disappointing. Despite the lending programs for small industries,
particularly those in the less developed regions, the interregional
distribution of projects and loans approved by the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) and the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund
(IGLF) still favors the Metro-Manila Region and the two regions
closest to it. The projects assisted by DBP also have an average
captial-labor ratio of about V144,000 per worker which is high for
the Philippines.
Relevance of the MOAPA
0. The MOAPA offers many advantages to the process and outcome of
resource allocation in the Philippines. The MOAPA permits a compari-
son of project consequences in a systematic and compensatory manner.
It enables decision makers to have relatively easier comprehension
of the trade-offs involved in the selection of projects. This multi-
objective approach also provides a mechanism for determining, in a
consistent fashion, the relative priorities among projects. Depend-
ing on the specific technique, a multiobjective evaluation methodol-
ogy may encourage wider citizen participation, particularly in iden-
tification, design and appraisal of projects. In doing so, much more
information that is relevant in making decisions is generated. In
addition, the use of the MOAPA may lessen the pressure from special
interest groups on politicians to approve socially undesirable pro- 14
jects. It may help minimize political conflicts by providing a
mechanism for reaching mutually acceptable compromises as in the
case involving environmental and efficiency-oriented individuals.
P. The MOAPA is expected to benefit the Filipino people, in general,
in terms of resource allocation that more effectively address the
various development objectives. Through the MOAPA, the low income
families as well as the people in economically depressed areas
(town and regions), in particular, will receive more benefits from
public investments than they would otherwise.
Q. The adoption of the MOAPA will entail certain costs because of
the necessary institutional changes, manpower training, and data
collection, and also the longer time in project appraisal. We argue,
however, that part of these costs will be incurred by the Government
whether or not the MOAPA is adopted. We also suggested that the
costs of administration of the MOAPA can be made commensurate to the
size and nature of the projects.
R. The adoption of a MOAPA appears feasible in the Philippines
from the institutional viewpoint. The continuation of martial law
(which has made possible the implementation of controversial pro-
grams such as land reform), the presence of project planning offices,
the enthusiasm shown by Budget commission in entertaining proposed
priority setting schemes, and the fact that the national planning
office, NEDA, has published a number of papers on multiobjective
project appraisal and project ranking are strong indications that
the Philippines may be heading towards a more systematic and rational
resource allocation process.
S. When selecting the appropriate MOAPA, the following criteria
are suggested in the evaluation of these different methods;
1) Soundness of the theoretical framework;
2) Comprehensiveness;
3) Extent to which citizen participation is promoted;
4) Cost of administration; and
5) Complexity (or ease of application).
In addition, it is suggested that the hierarchy of decision-makers,
the capability of the technical staffs, the inadequacy of data col-
lected in the field as well as the nature of the projects be con-
sideredin the choice of technique.
T. Some preliminary conclusions are made with regards to the various
alternatives:
1) The Government would need more than one type of
multiobjective approach. Simpler methods seem
advisable for subregional government units while
more sophisticated tools are recommended at the
national level.
2) Some methods are clearly superior over the others.
It is argued that techniques based on the principles
of social benefit-cost analysis are the most defensi-
ble around.
3) The choice of the "best" method is partly a matter of
political judgement. For example, the use of either
the Squire-van der Tak or the Little-Mirrlees approach
is considered equally desirable and may just be a matter
of taste.
PART I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR MULTIOBJECT
PROJECT PLANNING AND APPRAISAL
A study on the practice of project planning and
evaluation has to start with a presentation of a theore-
tical framework that can guide the reader towards a common
theme. Accordingly, Part I, consisting of Chapters 2 and 3,
presents a theoretical discussion that provides the frame-
work for the ensuing case study on the relevance to the
Philippines of the multiobjective approach to the project
planning and appraisal. In Chapter 2, the definition of
a "project" and the concept of project evaluation is pre-
sented (Sections 2.1 and 2.2). The rationale for project
appraisal and the place of project planning and analysis
in the whole development process are also discussed (sec-
tions 2.3 and 2.4). The interesting controversy between
the single "and the multi-objective approaches to project
appraisal is reviewed in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 2 FRAMEWORK FOR PROJECTION PLANNING AND EVALUATION
The terms "project" and "project appraisal" may mean different
things to different people. For example, research studies, politi-
cal campaigns,"advertizing', housing, and a variety of other activi-
ties have been described as "projects." This chapter therefore
serves to clarify our use of these terms. It is also intended to
explain six ways in which project evaluation is helpful.
2.1 Project Defined
In.the development literature, various attributes have been
given to the term "project." Gittinger calls a project "the cut-
ting edge of development."1 King considers a project to be "a pro-
posal for a capital investment to develop facilities to provide
goods and services."2 Cukor describes a project as "a set of nume-
rical or other data and calculations, on the basis of which the
consequences, costs, and earnings and more generally, the advantages
and disadvantages of the production of specific goods and services
can be reviewed and appraised."3
For our purpose, we shall use "development project" or "project"
to mean the smallest unit of investment activity for which capital
JP. Gittinger, Economic Analysis of Agricultural Projects, John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, pp. 1-2.
2 J.A. King Jr., Economic Development Projects and Their Appraisal,
The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967, p.3 .
3G. Cukot, "Project Evaluation and the Consistency of the Plan,
Evaluation of Industrial Projects, United Nations, 1968,p. 17.
resources are expended to create an asset from which benefits will be
derived over a certain period -of time. A project is "a package of
interrelated activities blended to form a coherent and self-contained
entity."' It produces a flow of benefits and costs (usually) over
an extended period of time either through the creation of additional
productive capacity or the improvement of the efficiency of existing
capacity, or both.2
Projects have several other attributes. To name a few, they
have a geographic sphere of influence, target beneficiaries, time-
table or schedules, independent administrative machinery, and a set
of accounts. They also operate with different institutional arrange-
ments: soley public sector undertaking, joint public-private ac-
tivities, investment incentives (e.g. tax holidays, tariff protection,
and other forms of subsidies) or a combination of these. In Part II
of this report, we shall study precisely these types of projects.
Note, however, that our "project" does not include proposals for
changes of laws or tariff schemes and the like.
Food and Agricultural Organization, General Guidelines to the Analy-
sis of Agricultural Production Projects, Rome, 1971, p. 11. In
practice, it is difficult to determine whether a proposed investment
is made-up of various separable projects which should be analysed
individually and perhaps also as one investment package, or of seve-
ral interconnected processes of a single project which require a
single appraisal.
*2
This time span creates some difficulties for the project analyst.
He must find a way to compare not only one year's benefits and costs
with another for the same project but also the different streams of
future costs and benefits for different projects. For a discussion
of this issue, see P.A. Sassone and W.A. Schaffer, Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Handbook, Academic Press, New York, 1978, pp. 97-129.
A collection of important papers on the subject by M.S. Feldstein
(1964,1973), A.K. Sen (1967) and S.A. Marglin (1960) is presented in
R. Layard, (ed.) Cost-Benefit Analysis, Penguin Press, England, 1972.
2.2 Concept of Project Appraisal
Public expenditure has become an important feature of today's
economy, even among highly developed countries. Governments have
used this fiscal device to guide and stregnthen their respective
economies. Considering that the mix of investment projects should
reflect the development objectives and since resource constraints
may be quite severe, it has become incumbent upon decision makers
to consistently make intelligent choices in their use of public
funds.
Since the post-war era, project appraisal has become a major
tool for dealing with this public management problem. In retro-
spect, this should not be suprising. Government budgets have grown
enormously over the years. It has evidently become increasingly
difficult for public administrators to al-locate funds to the best
interest of society. In this environment, project appraisal offered
a systematic and logically structured way of presenting and analys-
ing alternative investment activities.
In its broadest sense, project appraisal refers to the assess-
ment of the technical,management (or administrative), financial, and
economic aspects of the investment proposal. That is, the analyst
attempts to study the technical and operational feasibility as well
For a historical discussion, see P.G. Sassone and W.A. Schaffer
Op. Cit. pp. 3-5.
as the cost and returns to society of investment projects.
In this report, however, we shall use project appraisal to
refer only to the process of evaluating the effects of investment
proposals from the viewpoint of the national economy.2 We shall
3
use the term interchangeably with project analysis and evaluation.
The fundamental objective of project analysis is the determina-
tion of the net effect (whether favorable or unfavorable) or proposed
investment activities. The outcome of the appraisal forms a solid
basis for accepting, rejection,or modifying projects. Some practi-
tioners, however, are more ambitious and undertak project evaluation
with the end in view of ranking projects in their order of importance
1Project appraisal should not be confused with valuation, project
selection, programming, or decision-making. Valuation, a process
of measuring the actual or relative magnitude of benefits and costs
of projects, is just one stage in the whole evaluation process which
encompasses a framework for analysis, the principles of assessment,
the tools employed for measuring, and the substantiation of assump-
tions. Project appraisal is only a basis for project selection.
Other considerations come into play in the final selection of pro-
jects. We often encounter projects getting implemented without for-
mal evaluation or inspite of the evaluation. Project programming
considers not only the outcome of the selection of projects but also
the external constraints such as budget, administrative capability,
manpower, time, and project divisibility (i.e., feasibility of phas-
ing implementation). Project evaluation is clearly not decision-
making but simply an assistance to it. Evaluation provides some
rationale and, hopefully, some objective basis for making investment
decisions that could minimize the likelihood of inappropriate choices.
2Onecan always expand or narrow down the geographic perspective but
there are practical problems in doing so. Project analysis froma sub-
national standpoint can be extremely difficult because of the paucity
of regional parameters. International project analysis has limited
application.
3These words are used differently in the literature and in practice.
At the World Bank, for instance, "evaluation" refers to "ex post
facto" analysis of investment projects, or simply, the analysis of
implemented projects.
with respect to the development goals. It is worth mentioning that
some techniques are more suitable for appraising the worthiness of
any one project than they are for comparing projects.
Project evaluation may be applied to problems of choice among
substitutable or mutually exclusive investments as in the case of
alternative ways of developing a specific tract of land. The selec-
tion of activity is impprtant because the implementation of one will
mean the automatic rejection of others. Project appraisal, nonethe-
less, may also be applied to problems of choice among independent
projects, whether complementary or not, designed io meet one or a
variety of needs. Since resources are scarce, the task of the plan-
ner is to suggest the project that would generate, from these re-
sources, the highest net benefit to society with respect to the de-
velopment goals.
In its usual form, project analysis entails many distinct and
successive phases. It generally involves the translation of develop-
ment goals into a set of criteria or decision variables that may not
always be in complete harmony with each other. These criteria may
be given equal or unequal weights depending on the relative importance
of the objectives and the philosophyof the office doing the evalu-
ation. Indicators or indices by which the impact of projects may be
measured are also identified. This is followed by an assessment of
project contributions to each of the identified criteria.
An essential feature of project evaluation is the use of a con-
sistent and generally acceptable set of weights by which various out-
puts could be compared. The most widely recommended approach is the use
of "shadow" or "accounting" price which is the price that would prevail
in a perfectly competitive economy in equilibrium. The shadow
prices which may or may not be the same as the "normal" or market
prices, are proposed to minimize any inherent bias of market prices
which might otherwise introduce significant errors in the analysis.
This technique is better known as cost-benefit analysis. (It is not
our purpose here to present the specifics of this method of evaluation.
Interested readers may refer to the vast amount of literature on the
subject. ) Later on, we shall be touching on refinements to this
technique in an attempt to incorporate non-economic variables.2
Some evaluation techniques use scales, instead of monetary
units, to compare project contributions to development objectives.
Project outputs, both benefits and cost, are measured in terms of
a range of numbers, say one to ten or one to one hundred, with the
For representative works on the subject, see E.J. Mishan, Cost
Benefit Analysis, Praeger, New York, 1976; United Nations Industrial
Development Organization Guidelines for Project Evaluation, United
Nations, New York, 1972; I.M.D. Little and J.A, Mirrlees, Project
Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries, Basic Books, Inc.,
New.York, 1974; D. Lal, Methods of Project Analysis: A Review,
World Bank Occassional Paper No. 6, The John Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1974; L. Squire and H.G, van der Tak, The Economic
Analysis of Projects World Bank Research Publications, The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975; and A.K. Dasgupta and P.W.
Pearce, Cost Benefit Analysis Theory and Practice, MacMillan, London
1972. United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Guide to
Practical Project Appraisal: Social Benefit-Cost Analysis in Develop-
ing Countries, United Nations, Vienna, 1978. For case analysis, see,
A.P. Gittinger, op.cit.; Roemer and Stern, op.cit.; L.A. Mears,
Economic Project Evaluation (with Philippine Cases), University of
the Philippine Press, Quezon City, Philippines, 1969, S. Anand, "Ap-
praisal of a Highway Project in Malaysia: Use of the Little-Mirrlees
Procedure," World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 213, International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July, 1975. C. Bruce and
Y. Kimaro, "An Economic and Social Analysis of the Chao Phya irriga-
tion Improvement Project II, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 299,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Oct. 1978.
2 See Chapter 3,
highest or the lowest number representing the maximum absolute or
relative output with respect to each criterion (objectives). Other
methods rank projects in terms of their contributions to each of the
objectives being considered. The most sophisticated technique, apart
from Cost-Benefit Analysis, involve optimization of objectives func-
tions. This means that certain development objectives (say, in-
creased per capita income) are maximized subject to a number of con-
straints (e.g., budget, income distribution, divisibility of projects,
environmental considerations, etc.)
The theoretical origin of project evaluation is found in wel-
fare economics which deals with the impact of policies on individual
and societal well-being.2 Many of its basic principles (e.g. Pareto
Optimality for a given income distribution) are unverified (perhaps
unverifiable) theories. These principles form the basis for a wide-
ly accepted discipline. Nonetheless, some differences in its theore-
tical structure have produced more than one alternative for making
Consistency is required in all cases. If there are 10 variables
outputs to be measured, then the meaning of a scale, say 100, should
be the same for all criteria.
2 See, A.C. Harberger, "Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare
Economics," Journal of Economic Literature Vol. IX. No. 3 (Septem-
ber 1971) pp. 785-797.
investment decisions.^
One important characteristic of project analysis that tends to
be forgotten is that it is still as much of an art as a science.-
No matter how sophisticated the technique may be in its totality,
many of the small decisions require a great deal of judgement.
"Imagination is usually required in the use of data, since only in
rare circumstances will statistical raw material match concepts-of
pure theory. And, because it is the essence of an investment pro-
ject that all benefits and some costs occure in the future, an in-
tutive feel for future economic development is often required.. .The
analysis of specific project can be intricate and different analysts
will use different shortcuts, approximations, and other simplifica-
tions. Project analysis requires estimates of future events and such
forecasts are bound to be subjective."2 For these reasons, it would
be quite rare and perhaps only coincidental that two experts in this
game will come out with exactly the same calculations, although the
outcome (e.g., relative ranking, desirability) may be the same.
Notwithstanding its limitations, project appraisal offers a
rational basis for investment choice. It allows a systematic and
more objective assessment of benefits and costs thereby avoiding a
totally random or subjective decision-making process. In the section
that follows, we will discuss the ways in which project analysis is
helpful.
For an excellent review, see D. Lal, op.cit.
2Roemer and Stern, op.cit., p. ix.
2.3 Rationale for Project Appraisal
The importance of evaluating investment proposals must not be
underemphasized. Economies are challenged by various problems, con-
straints, and potentials. Given the scarcity of resources and the
long process of development, theprobl-ems iarrows down to the choice
and programming investment alternatives that could achieve the most
in terms of development goals within a given time frame. Hopefully,
if the limited resources are utilized to the best interest of society,
the momentum of development can increase rapidly. Conversely, if
the selection of the projects is poor, the development may be slow
and future efforts may be sever.ly handicapped. Clearly, project
appraisal and selection are critical functions of a prudent govern-
ment.
Project appraisal serves many different purposes. These
purposes may be explained in terms of: 1) multiplicity of develop-
ment objectives; 2) multiplicity of strategy options; 3) impact on
development planning; 4) effects on project proponents; 5) effects
on project evaluators, and 6) political consideration.
2.3.1 Multiplicity of Development Objectives
In an ideal state, all public investments are ultimately directed
towards improving the general well-being of its population. For this
reason, national and subnational plans generally refer to this as the
goal of the development process in the long run.1
For instance, the long term plan of the Philippines states: "A sce-
nario of a much-improved Filipino well-being is envisioned as a cul-
mination of a number of economic, social and demographic revolutions
of the coming decades." National Economics and Development Authority,
Long Term and Five-Year (1978-82) Development Plan: Draft Summary,
Manila, 1977, p. l-1 .
Unfortunately, such an objective does not provide much practi-
cal help to those who have to chose which projects to undertake.
This is principally because there is no single measure of welfare
that could serve as. a workable benchmark for investment evaluation.
Inevitably, increments to human well being will have.to be trans-
lated into increases in income; improved transportation, better edu-
cation, clean air, self-reliance, employment, peace and order, and
other heterogenous types of benefits that accrue to society as a
consequence of projects.
Evidently, there is not one but a host of development objectives
which are sought by public expenditures. However, with a limited
budget the government cannot maximize benefits for all objectives.,
i.e., simultaneously provide the most education, environmental pro-
tection, goods and services, etc. Choices must have to be made as
to how much of each objective should be satisfied.
The corollary to this is the fact that some objectives may be
conflicting. 2 The classical example of these are efficiency and
lProject "objectives" should not be confused with project "purposes."
Objectives refer to development goals or ends, with social welfare
connotation. Examples are the equitable distribution of wealth and
increasing the national product. Project purposes such as the pro-
vision of water supply or roads, etc., are merely the means to
achieve the objectives. Admittedly, some project purposes may also
be the objectives as in employment generation through self-employment
projects.
2A part from the examples given here, the reader may be familiar with
the famous Phillip's Curve which suggest a tradeoff between inflation
and employment. For a brief exposition of the various conflicting
goals and strategies, see J.H. Cumberland, Regional Development Ex-
periences and Prospects in the United States of America, Mourton
& Co. pp. 6-20.
equity objectives. Equity consideration generally requires the
"worst first" approach, i.e., priority should be given to benefit
the areas of persons in greatest distress in order to reduce the
severest socio-economic disparities. Efficiency objectives, on the
other hand, generally suggests the "most promising" rule, i.e., in-
vesting where the potential for high productivity is greatest in or-
der to maximize economic benefits per unit cost. While these objec-
tives may not be mutually exclusive in some cases, invariably, they
may be extremely difficult to reconcile.
Another widely recognized dichotomy is that involving economic
and environmental objectives. Historically, public policy had been
directed almost exclusively to the achievement of sustained and ac-
celerated economic growth. In the more recent past, however, there
has been growing pressure to place increasing if not equal emphasis
on the preservation of the environment. It has become widely accep-
ted that economic growth will very often result in irreversible eco-
logical imbalance and other types of negative environmental impacts
(eg. visual, social impacts). This is definitely a serious problem
that has to be handled with great care by decision makers.
Resolutions of this and similar conflicts betweenobjectives are
usually not accomplished by selecting one objective and ignoring the
-other. Since these objectives are important in varying degrees to
society, decision makers may have to strike the most acceptable com-
promise. Such a tradeoff normally occurs as a subjective political
An attempt to reconcile this particular conflict is made in H. Chenery
et.al. Redistribution with Growth, 1974 and also in Mr. Ahluwallas's
"Inequality, Poverty and Development," Journal of Development Econom-
ics, No. 3, 1976.
process. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later a formal frame-
work for appraising projects with respect to multiple objectives
may be very helpful to decision-makers.
2.3.2 Multiplicity of Strategy Options
As many as there are development objectives, there will be many
more means of achieving these objectives.1 Consider the objectives
of "sustained economic growth." This objective may be pursued through
intensive argiculture or industrialization or perhaps a balanced two-
pronged approach involving both agriculture and industry. Within
agriculture, one can decide to promote food production or commercial
crops. Pushing the issue further, agricultural development may be
achieved through irrigation projects, extension services, credit
facilities, farm-to-market roads or some combinations of the same.
The list of investment activities that may be undertaken to achieve
this economic objective can undoubtedly be very long.
The issue is clear: how to choose from the various alternatives
in order to best achieve the objectives for the economy. The ques-
tion of choice although clear is not as simple as it may seem. What
complicates the matter again is that each course of action will have
1The distinction between objectives and strategies (means) may not be
very critical in practice. Objectives may be considered as strate-
gies and vice-versa. For example, "dispersing industries" may be an
intemporal strategy and one of the short-term objectives. Similarly,
'maximizing GNP" may be the objective of the economy or the means to
increase economic independence. What is being stressed here is that
whatever the objective may be, be it very general (e.g. "maximizing
welfare"), or quite specific (eg. "developing trade between one is-
land and the Mainland"), there will almost always be more than one
means of achieving it.
numerous secondary consequences.
One may be tempted to agree that development plans should con-
tain clearly stated strategies and policies so as to make investment
decisions easier. However, the statement is "begging the question,"
for not all contries prepare national development plans that encom-
pass the major public investment areas. For countries that do have,
the development plans are often not too definitive with respectto
priorities. Very often, there are too many "priority" projects that
they tend to surpass all reasonable estimates of funds available.
Planners appear to be more certain about which activities should not
or cannot be promoted for one reason or the other (e.g., establishing
a port inland) but not which among those "need" to be done should come
first and for what reason.
In this regard, project evaluation offers a quite rigorous
methodology for comparing different ways of accomplishing specific
objectives. It is infact,suggested that the principles of project
evaluation be applied at all stages of the process of project develop-
ment in order that the project may have the best possible design.
1The suggestion that sectors and subsectors be lined up in their or-
der of priority as a means towards project selection will not work.
How do we select the sectors? In practice, the sectors are loosely
defined such that overlapping occurs, and project-to-sector associa-
tion becomes difficult. Even should a mutually exclusive categori-
zation be possible, it is still difficult to determine the relative
importance of sectors and subsectors. While plans may contain pre-
ferred activities, it is not easy to ascertain the relative impor-
tance of certain activities in relation to others. More importantly,
it is incorrect to presume that any project falling under a high
priority subsector will always generate a greater net benefit in
comparison with the projects under the lower priority subsector.
2.3.3 Impact in Development Planning
Project Analysis also serves as a mechanism for relating pro-
ject proposals to the development objectives of the area. Through
such an exercise, projects that are inconsistent with the development
thrusts are not recommended for implementation no matter how appeal-
ing they may be on other grounds. This is important since plans
are generally so general that any proposed project may seem to be
justified. A local government executive may suggest the construc-
tion of tennis courts in an area where only he and his friends play
the game on the premise that sports development is a priority need as
reflected in the national plan. Hence, while a given need may be
true at the national level, the interpretation of statements on
priority may in fact be clouded by personal interest or pressures
frompowerfulgroups. In this respect, project analysis will allow
more rigorous evaluation of projects in terms of the development ob-
jectives not only at the national level but also at the regional and
subregional levels.
Furthermore, project analysis can exercise a strong influence
in development planning and programming activities. The more projects
are appraised, the greater the information that becomes available on
the actual development problems and prospects. With this information,
the formulated policies and priorities can be appropriately reviewed,
and as a result thereof, sound development plans and programs can be
adopted.
1I am grateful to Dr. Alec Rosenthal for introducing to me this idea
as well as some arguments at 2.3.5. and 2.3.6.
From a different perspective, the feasibility and avaibility of
development may be tested at the project level. For example, the
limitations of an inward-looking policy can be shown through the ap-
plication of project appraisal to the recommended import-substituting
industries.
2.3.4 Effects on Project Proponents
A well-defined basis for project selection likewise imposes an
element of "intellectural discipline" on the part of the investment
proponents and planners. The existence of such screening process
tends to discourage "irrelevant" proposal, i.e., projects that clearly
do not make sense (such as a multimillion dollar museum for an iso-
lated and poor community). At the same time, improved project selec-
tion methods may have a favorable influence on the package of pro-
jects generated at the local level. Justifications of projects will
tend to be better prepared; more information needed by decision
makers will be provided, and project goals will be better related to
the overall development objectives and to the resources available.
This is bound to happen since once the evaluation criteria are set,
local planners know that they should have substantive justifications
for their proposals to avoid losing their budget to better marketed
projects in other areas. In short, through a rigorous evaluation
scheme, ill-concieved projects may be minimized while proper project
planning is encouraged.
2.3.5 Effect on Project Evaluators
In at least two ways, a method of project appraisal affects the
analysts who have to compare projects. On the technical side, it
helps them in evaluating a large number of proposed projects. While
evaluators may quickly determine which ones in a small set of proposed
projects are the most desirable, they may be less certain when they
consider hundreds of proposals. From another angle, a formal pro-
ject methodology serves as a safeguard against the strong prejudices
of the project analysts. Without a specific method of evaluation,
decisions become highly subjective and may be biased by the evalua-
tors' background and preconceived notions about impact of projects
types.
2.3.6 Political Consideration
Apart from assisting in the judgement of investment proposals,
project analysis can help the political image of decision makers.
On the part of the decision makers, it may be politically necessary
to justify a rejection decision through an "objective" technique of
evaluation no matter how obvious the outcome of an evaluation pro-
cess may initially be. An evaluation technique may also be used as
a political instrument to support project programming decisions.
Without it, it is not unlikely for proponents of projects that have
been scheduled for later implementation to imagine that some anoma-
lous practices may have been going on.
More importantly, external pressures on policy makers may be
minimized by imposing an explicit evaluation mechanism. Without
such tools, elected local executives may be reluctant to decide in
favor of public interest (especially if there is lack of visible sup-
port) for fear that some special interests may generate adverse
publicity or withdraw campaign funds and other financial supports.
In summary, project appraisal is helpful in reconciling conflict-
ing development objectives at the project level, in providing a sound
basis for selecting the best alternative courses of action, in improv-
ing the outcome of the planning process, in encouraging better pre-
pared project proposals, in guiding project analysts in the evaluation
of projects, and in supporting political decisions. As a complemen-
tary discussion, we shall describe in the next section the place of
project appraisal in development planning.
2.4 Place of Project Appraisal in Development Planning
Development Projects should not be conceived and implemented
in isolation. They should generally be integral parts of sets of
investmentswithin a sector or subsector and to the overall develop-
ment plan. This means that the implemtation of any project should
not be based on political or intuitive considerations. As we showed
earlier, even if a project may have been directed towards alleviating
particular societal ills, the scarcity of investment funds require a
broader view of existing conditions and hence proper project evalua-
tion. Nevertheless projects cannot always- be expected to be deriva-
tive of an established plan or program.
In the Philippines, this is sometimes referred to as a program, i.e.,
"a package of inter-related projects within a definite area of action
and oriented towards a common objective." NEDA, Provincial Planning
Manual, 1976. In some countries (e.g. USA) the term "program" tends
to be associated with activities that do not require capital outlays
such as welfare programs.
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2.4.1 Overall Planning
Where the development planning exercise is a recursive set of
activities that ties the projects with the objectives, the place of
project evaluation in the planning process be gleaned from the flow
diagram in Figure 1.1 Prior to the evaluation of project proposals,
two types of information are generated: national parameter values
are derived. These parameters then serve as criteria and weights
which may be used for valuing output contributions of projects in
projects appraisal. The other planning steps,meanwhile, provide
the background data and support information that facilitate a search-
ing analysis of project proposals. Among these kinds of information,
the most important are the identified major development issues or
constraints, the supply prospects of strategic resources and the
determination of their opportunity costs to the society, the strate-
gies and policy measures formulated for the short and long run, the
desired future scenario, the sectoral targets, available and expected
resources for investment and their spatial and functional patterns
of allocation, and the present and future relationship between in-
vestment and the growth or development of the sectors and physical
areas of the economy.
1For similar description of the planning process, see, M1. Meyerson
and E.C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest,
The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955, pp. 303-329; Also, J.L.
Cohon, Multiobjective Programming and Planning, Academic Press,
San Francisco, 1978, pp. 15-17.
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2.4.2 Project by Project Planning
In certain circumstances, project appraisal is based on a
more loosely coordinated framework of national goals or is designed
solely to meet specific needs or to take advantage of special oppor-
tunities. This occurs when, for one reason or another, there is no
overall planning or when project preparation cannot wait for the
completion of a comprehensive development plan.
Under this project by project planning approach, an investment
proposal normally undergoes three broad phases before funds are com-
mited and the project implemented: identification, feasibility stud-
1
ies and appraisal. In each stage, numerous activities with varying
depth and precision are undertaken to meet the requirements of the
subsequent operation until project preparation is completed. The
interlocking nature of the many operations embodied in all three
phases can be gauged from project planning process described in Fig-
ure 2.
Project identification is undertaken in order to ensure that the
projects: are in consonance with the overall and sectoral thrust;
will neutralize or minimize the inhibiting effects of development
constraints or barriers within the total or sectoral systems; and will
contribute to the socio-economic betterment of the country.
Investment proposals are conceived in various forms. Several
alternative projects may be lined up for the same specific objective.
This division is only for analytical convenience. In practice, the
distinction among the steps are not so clear and some projects may
bypass any of the steps.
Figure 2. Activity Flow Diagram of Project Planning
General Objective
of Planning
Projtect Area
(Resovrces ard Utilization)
Fro jec Dceign
(Location, Production
Process, Size)
Market Analysi.
(Demand and Frices
Phasing
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization, General Guidelines to the Analysis of
Agricultural Production Projects, Rome, 1971.
It is therefore necessary that, a second major operation is undertak-
en: the preparation of feasibility reports. Put simply, the feasi-
bility study examines whether the proposed projects are suited to
the needs and environment of the planned area and can be implemented
without causing greater harm than benefits to the people.'
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we presented various concepts, principle, issues,
and theories related to project planning and evaluation. Our objec-
tive was to provide the basic theoretical background and terms of
reference which could enable the readers to tie into a common frame-
work the lengthy case discussion that follows.
We defined what we meant by the term "development project," say-
ing that it is a minimum unit of investment in which resources are
expended to create a stream of benefits over time. We discussed the
various attributes of project appraisal which is an important tool
for making sound investment decisions. We enumerated what we think
are the six major reasons for conducting project analysis. We also
dealt with the broad steps in development planning, placing emphasis
on the role of project evaluation in the process of project and over-
all development planning. With this background information,we are
now ready to discuss a specific issue of project appraisal: the con-
troversy between the efficiency-based and "multiobjective" approaches
to project evaluation.
For fuller discussion, see V. Muro, How to Study and Finance Philip-
pine Enterprises, Alemars, Manila, 1968; Also, Presidential Economic
Staff, Preparation of Feasibility Studies, Manila, Feb. 10, 1966
(Second Edition).
CHAPTER 3 SINGLE1 VERSUS MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO PROJECT
ANALYSIS
To the dismay of the purists, project evaluation has not de-
veloped into one universally accepted and adopted approach. Concep-
tual differences remain unsettled. Among the issues that have plagued
project analysis, the controversy that has attracted considerable
attention during the past decade involves the question of whether the
Multiobjective Approach to Project Appraisal (MOAPA) should be adopted.
This chapter is intended to discuss the arguments for and against
the sue of this more comprehensive approach. Bear in mind that we
shall reexamine the relevance of the arguments when we discuss the
case study on the applicability of the MOAPA to the Philippines
(Part Two).
3.1 Evolution of the MOAPA
The MOAPA is a product of a series of attempts to rationalize the
process of resources allocation. Traditionally, project analysis was
concerned soley with the objectives of securing a more efficient use of
resources. Conceptually founded on theoretical welfare economics, this
model assumes a perfectly competitive economic environment in which the
maximization of individual welfare leads to the optimum allocation or
2
resources. In its early form, such a "single-objective" model measured
the benefits and costs of projects on the basis of "nominal" or market
prices. The assumption was that market prices would equal both the marginal
The term "single" may not be an accurate description of what may be
a sophisiticated and multidimensional methodology and is used only
to distinguish it from what is now known as the "multiobjective"
2approach.See W.J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, Prentice
Hall, New York, 1971, pp. 206, 246-275.
social cost of producing and the marginal social benefit of using
goods and inputs. Nominal prices, however, did not always indicate
the real relative value of commodities as when monopolies, taxes,
subsidies or externalities exist. Where appropriate, therefore, the
"efficiency shadow prices" (i.e., prices that would prevail in a per-
fectly competitive economy in equilibrium) should replace market
prices to "compensate for the rigidities and defects of the market
which prevent market prices from being reliable."2
Whether it uses market or shadow prices, this traditional ap-
proach to project analysis ignored the aspect of income distribu-
tion.3 In the spirit of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, the decision
rule dictates the acceptance of projects in which the gainers can
compensate the losers, even if they do not. Hence, as Harberger's
third basic postulates for applied welfare economies states, "when
evaluating the net benefits or costs of a given action (project,
program, or policy), the costs and benefits accruing to each member
of the relevant group (e.g., a nation) should normally be added with-
out regard to the individual (s) to whom they accrue. Implicitly
For elaborations, see C.R. Blitzer, On the Social Rate of Discount
and Price of Capital in Cost-Benefit Analysis, Economic Staff Work-
ing Paper No. 144, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, February 1, 1973, pp. 5-8.
2US Federal Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources, Sub-Committee
on Evaluation Standards, Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis
of River Basin Projects, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. No.,
144,p. 158, p. 7.
3 The model implicitly assumes that the present distribution of incomeis
opti smal. See C.R. Blitzer, op.cit. p. 7.
4A.C. Harberger, op. cit. p. 785.
therefore, in this model, we value a unit of benefit or cost to a
poor man (or depressed regions) as much as a unit of benefit or costs
to a rich man (or developed region). Furthermore, it is believed
that the use of the "efficiency" criterion could enlarge the size of
the "economic pie" which could then be reallocated "equitably' Re-
distribution is also assumed to be more effectively addressed through
cash transfers than through the project choice.
The traditional cost-benefit analysis has also been criticized
for dealing inadequately with other development objectives such as
self-reliance, employment, environmental quality, and other "merit
wants."1 A variety of reasons have been raised to justify this
traditional practice ranging from measurement difficulties to the
problem of incorporating value judgements into a relatively objective
but already complex methodology. (We will elaborate on this point
later in this chapter.)
In response to these various problems associated with the so-
called "single" objective (or efficiency-based) technique, a number
of methods have been developed. These methods, which we broadly
call the Multiobjective Approaches to Project Appraisal (or MOAPA),
claim to offer better ways of explicitly and systematically dealing
with the different development objectives, particularly the non-
economic ones (e.g., income distribution, regional development, em-
ployment, environmental quality).
It should be noted that the distinction between "single" and
"Merit wants" refer to goods and services whose "national impor-
tance is greater than what consumers think it is." See, UNIDO
Guidelines: op.cit., p. 33., UNIDO Guide op.cit. pp.75-77.
"multiobjective" project appraisal is made more for analytical con-
venience than to reflect a real dichotomy. [Apparently,] there is
in fact a continuum of approaches to project analysis from the pure
commercial profitability technique to the "most comprehensive" meth-
ods that incorporate unquantifiable ideals or objectives. Strictly
speaking, the only single-objective project evaluation technique is
the financial profitability analysis which uses market prices in
calculating the net income of a project. Of course, anyone can un-
dertake on analysis of an investment in terms of any other single
objective such as employment.
A project appraisal methodology that makes use of shadow prices
and discount rate is technically "multiobjective" because it may pro-
mote employment (via the shadow wage of labor) and deals with the
issue of present versus future impacts. The basic principles of
this technique (i.e. willingness to pay) has in fact been extended
to take explicit account of aspects such as the values of wilderness
and recreation which traditionally had not bee quantified. Moreover,
practioners who employ this efficiency measure often discuss other
development concerns (e.g., spatial and interpersonal income distri-
bution) in the text of project evaluation reports. Obviously these
considerations do not make this method a single objective technique.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this report, we have treated
benefit-cost techniques that use market or shadow prices as "single"
objective methods of project evaluation. Take note,that with res-
pect to techniques using shadow prices, our definition of MOAPA
Using the same argument, the commercial profitability method becomes
"multiobjective" when a social rate of discount is applied to the
stream of benefits and costs.
begins when we consider objectives other than aggregate consumption,
as when the social value of investment relative to savings and the
social value of income across income groups are introduced in the
analysis.
Typology of MOAPA's
For a better understanding of this more comprehensive methodology,
we shall attempt to develop a typology of MOAPA's on the basis large-
ly of their choices of numeraire and framework of analysis. It is,
however, beyond the scope of this report to describe and analyze in
detail the various techniques we will survey.2
Nevertheless, where necessary, we will highlight the basic
features of the methods if not the text, at least in the footnotes.
The MOAPAs either use monetary or non-monetary numeraires or both
to express project benefits and costs. The "money-based" MOAPA may
be broken down further. Some techniques use market prices (e.g.
14
This is consistent with the terminologies (or categorization) in
current use. See W.A. Ward, op.cit., N. Lichfield, et al., op.cit.
M. Hill, op.cit., H. Schwartz, op.cit.
2For comparative analysis of some of these techniques, see H. Schnei-
der, National Objectives and Project Appraisal in Developing Coun-
tries, Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, Paris, 1975, pp. 22-67; N. Lichfield, P. Ket-
tle, and M. Whitbread, Evaluation in the Planning Process, Pergamon
Press, New York, 1975, 48-97; E. Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer
for Policy Analysis W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1978, pp.113-158; M.
Hill, Planning for Multiple Objectives: An Approach to the Evalua-
tion of TransportationPlans, Monograph Series No. 5, Regional Sci-
ence Research Institute, Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 9-50; W.A. Ward,
Cost Benefit Rules for Industiral Incentives: A Proposed Technique
for Establishing Criteria for Industrial Grants: Paper discussed
during a Seminar at the Center for Metropolitan Affairs and Public
Policy, Nov. 1971, pp. 5-15, and H. Schwartz and R. Berney (eds.)
Social and Economic Dimensions of Project Evaluation, Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank, Washington, D.C., 1977; D. Lal, op.cit.
Prou-Chervel's "Indirect Effects Approach" 1 ) while others use shadow
2 3 4prices (UNIDO, Little-Mirrlees , Squire-van der Tak , and Schydlow-
sky 5). Among the MOAPAs that adapt shadow pricing,, there are three
major procedures:
1) the Shadow Exchange Rate Approach (UNIDO, Schydlowsky)
which calculates the domestic currency value of each
6
commodity being measured ;
2) the Foreign Currency Approach (OECD, Little-Mirrlees,
Anand ) values output and inputs in world prices 8; and
3) the "New" IBRD approach (Squire-van der Tak, Bruce-
Kimano 9) replicates the Foreign Currency Approach and
converts the world prices to domestic prices at offi-
cial exchange rate.
1This method defines project benefits in terms of increment in domes-
tic value-added in the project's production of goods and in the
domestic production of the project'-s inputs. For theoretical
discussion and practical discussion, see M. Chervel, "Project Evalu-
ation of the 'Effects' Method in Developing Countries; M. Chervel,
"Exercise in the .application of the Effects Method," and M. Chervel,
M.T. Courel, and D. Perreau, "Case Study: Industrial Fishing Com-
ple' in Bulletin No. 20, United Nations, New York, 1974. For a
critical analysis of this approach, see B. Balassa, "The Effects
Method' of Project Evaluation," Oxford Bulletin of Economic and
Statistics, (39)4, Nov. 1976, pp. 219-231.
2Unido Guidelines, op. cit.
3OECD Manual, op.cit.
4L. Squire and H. van der Tak, op.cit.
5D.M. Schydlowsky, Methodology for the Empirical Estimation of Sha-
dow Prices, Center for Latin American Development Studies, Discus-
sion Paper No. 2, Boston University, 1973.
6The shadow exchange rate is applied to the international prices of
tradeables.
7S. Anand, op.cit.
8Non-tradeable domestic inputs are valued at their foreign exchange
opportunity cost.
9C. Bruce and Y. Kimaro, op.cit.
From another perspective, MOAPAs that use shadow prices may also
be broken down into:
1) those that present a convenient summary of quantifi-
able benefits and costs by incidence groups (e.g., by
sectors by income groups, and/or by regional break-
down) as well as the unquantifiables and intangible
(Lichfield's "Planning Balance Sheet Analysis"1
Echenique's Approach 2); and
2) those that incorporate other objectives in the analy-
sis by extending the application of shadow prices,
(thus called "social shadow pricing") thereby permit-
ting the possibility of consolidating all benefits
anc cost into a single number.
Methods applying shadow prices to address objectives other than
efficiency (as traditionally defined) are of two types;
a) The "constraint" approach in which one or more objec-
tives are maximized subject to the other objectives
that act as constraints (Vellin, Mount and Poleman ,
1N. Lichfield, et.al. op. cit.
2Echenique's Approach (which has been applied to transport projects)
presents quantifiable costs and benefits by sector, income and re-
gional grouping and uses indicators or signs for other project pur-
poses such as environmental preservation and control of city size.
This method does not apply shadow prices in calculating cost and
estimates an "average" annual rate of return of investment for one
or two specific future years. For details, see, Applied Research
of Cambridge Limited, Land Use and Transport Model Pilot Study:
Final Report, Tehran Development Council Secretariat, 1976. Mar-
chial Echeniques and partners, Transport Study of Sao Paulo Metro-
politan Area, 1975.
3J.L.C. Vellin, T.D. Mount and T.T. Poleman, "Multi-Criteria Plan-
ning for Agricultural Development: A Full Employment Strategy for
Maurituis," Cornell International Agricultural Development, Mimeo-
graph No. 39, Department of Agricultural Economics: Cornell Uni-
versity, Ithaca, New York, November.
1 2 3 4
Choski and Meeraus , Candler , Goreaux , Marglin ,
and Cohon5 ).
b) The "multi-objective function" approach in which
weights are attached to each of the selection ob-
jectives and the different project impacts may be
converted into a single numeraire which could be
optimized (UNIDO, Little-Mirrlees, Squire-van der
Tak).6
The MOAPAs that do not use monetary units as numeraire, may be
classified into:
1) those that do not actually estimate the magnitude of
project contribution to the various objectives
(Kreditor's "Policy Evaluation Matrix 7 , NEDA's
This "sectoral programming" model focuses on selected aspects of
the investment planning problem in the presense of economies of
scale. A.M. Choski, A. Meeraus and A. Stoutjesdijk, A Planning
Study of the Fertilizer Sector in Egypt, Working Paper No. 269,
1977.
2
In this model, two (a policy and a behavioral) objective functions
are simultaneously maximized through an algorithm similar to the
simplex approach. W. Candler, Multi-level Programming and Develop-
ment Policy, World Bank Staff Paper No. 258, May 1977.
3This model attempts "to assess the implications of different objec-
tives and to measure trade-offs between conflicting objectives"
L.M. Goreaux (ed.) Interdependence in Planning: Multi-Level Pro-
gramming Studies of the Ivory Coast, IBRD Development Center, July,
1975.
4W. Ward, op.cit.
5J.L. Cohon, Multiobjective Programming and Planning, Academic Press,
New York, 1978. This is an excellent book on the mechanics of max-
imizing several objectives, subject to many constraints.
6For example, the Little-Mirrlees deals with the growth as well as
the employment objective through the shadow wage rate formula.
OECD Manual, op.cit., pp. 42,94,168. Similarly,the UNIDO and the
OECD defines how the social value of savings relative to consump-
tions and the relative social value of income across income groups
will be estimated.
A. Kreditor, "The Provisional Plan," Industrial Development and
the Development Plan, An Foras Forbartha, Dublin, 1967, Chapter 8.
NEDA's Parsimonious Approach to Project Selection ,
Holmes ); and
2) those that use indices to measure project benefits
and disbenefits.
Methods in which projects are evaluated by the use of indices
are of four types:
a) those that require a conjunction of minimum attribute
levels that all projects must possess to be considered
and approved (conjunction technique3 );
b) those that set priority rankings on the basis of
the following formula:
n
SP = E R W.
1 11
where Sp = score of project P
R = rank of project p with respect to
objective i (with the number of
projects representing the highest
rank)
W. = weight assigned to objective i
n number of objectives
lNEDA Region XI, Prioritization of Regional Development Projects
in Southeastern Mindanao, NRO XI Staff Paper No. 77-1, Feb., 1977;
A. Rosenthal, A Parsimonious Method of Subregional Project Selec-
tion, Paper for Workshop on Integrated Area Development Planning,
June, 1977, A. Santos, Priorization of Integrated Area Development
Projects, Paper presented on workshop on Integrated Area Develop-
ment Planning, April, 1977.
2J.C. Holmes, "An Ordinal Method of Evaluation' Urban Studies; 4,
1972, pp. 179-191.
3Also known as the Minimum Attribute Technique and as the Satisfying
Technique, see E. Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, op.cit. pp. 124-125.
(Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project , -McGaughey-Thor-
becke 2, Keeney 3, and checklist criteria );
c) those that allow differences in the relative impor-
tance of objectives and the project contribution
with respect to each objective (Schimpeler-Greeco's
"Effectiveness Matrix,",5 Hills "Goal Achievement
D.E. Boyce, N.D. Day and C. McDonald, Metropolitan Plan Making, Mono-
graph Series No. 4, Regional Science Research Institute, University
of Pennsylvania, Philiadelphia, 1970, pp. 197-221.
2
In this model, project contribution to the income objective is as-
sessed in terms of the benefit-cost ratio and the social marginal
productivity of investment; for the balance of payments objective,
the measure is foreign exchange earnings-investment ratio; and la-
bor-investment ratio is the indicator of employment effects. Pro-
ject rankings are based on a weighted linear function of project
rank with respect to each objective. See McGaughey and Thorbecke
"Project Selection and Macroeconomic Objective: A Methodology Ap-
plied to "Peruvian Irrigation Projects, "American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics',' Vol, 54, No. 1 Feb. 1972, pp. 32-40.
Similar to the -McGaughey-Thorbecke method, this model identifies
the optimum location of a new airport for Mexico City on the basis
of selected attributes such as total cost, capacity, etc. R.L.
Keeny, "A Decision Analysis with Multiple Objectives: The Mexico
City Airport," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,
4 (1) Spring, 1973, pp. 101-117.
4 This model makes the dubious assumption that all criteria (i.e. W.)
are equally important to society. This method was employed in the
evaluation of four alternative sites (selected by the Roskill Com-
mission) for the Third London Airport and on the Central Lancan-
shire Study (for a city). See, N. Lichfield, et.al., op.cit.,
pp. 50-51.
5Developed for transportation project evaluation, its procedure is
to assign a numerical "utility" value ranging from 0 to 1 to repre-
sent the relative importance of objectives as well as the relative
magnitude of project impacts with respect to each objective. The
total utility (U) of the project p is:
n
UP= C W. , where C = utility of project p with
1 1respect to objective i
W. = weight assigned to objec-
1 tive i
n = number of object use
See C.C. Schimpler and W.L. Greeco, "Systems Evaluation: An Approach
Based on Community Structure and Values," Highway Research Record,
No. 238, 1968, pp. 123-152.
1
Matrix" (GAM) , and Sevilla's "Operational Goal System
Evaluation" 2); and
d) those that rank criterion or objective in their order
of importance and compare projects in terms of the
most important criterion first and then using the
succeeding criterion to break the tie (Lexicograph-
ic Ordering 3
The foregoing typology shows the wide range of techniques that
have been developed to address the multiple development objectives
more effectively through project appraisal and selection. Each of
these methodologies obviously has its own strengths and limitations.
For example, Hill claims that his "Goal Achievement Matrix" is more
comprehensive by incorporating explicitly in the analysis "ideals,"
such as health and nutrition, happiness, selfreliance, and other
intangeables.' However, the absence in this model of a consistent
set of measurement principles and standards comparable to the "wil-
lingness to pay" criterion of benefit-cost analysis is considered
by economists as untenable. Conversely, the UNIDO, Little-Mirrlees,
Squire-van der Tak and optimization techniques are widely accepted
as the most rigorous and most coherent. Nevertheless, many aspects
lIn this model, goals and their weights.are taken as given. Every
goal is translated into measurable objectives. Project costs
and benefits are defined in terms of indices of goals achievement.
Hill proposes several strategies for presenting the results of the
goals achievement analysis, e.g., a weighted index of goal achieve-
ments. See Hill, op. cit.
2An applicaiton of Hill's GAM to the Philippines, this model pro-
poses an optimizing technique by which the results of the GAM
exercise may be used to determine the "best" project selection
and fund allocation pattern. See J. Sevilla, An Operational
Goal System Evaluation for Project Selection, Nasteral Thesis (un-
published), Asian Institute of Technology, Division of Community
and Regional Development, Bangkok, November 26, 1976.
3E. Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, op. cit., pp. 125-126.
(e.g., difficult-to-measure objectives) are said to be dealt with
inadequately. Also, the complexity of the procedures raise doubts
about the applicability of these models to countries that have few
trained planners and highly deficient data base. Meanwhile, simple
consensus-seeking approaches that do not actually measure the extent
of project impactshave been suggested as cost-effective and easily
understood methods that are most appropriate for determining priori-
ties in data deficient countries. These methods are said to permit
greater citizen participation and do not require highly accurate sta-
tistics. Criticisms to these parsimonious techniques include most
of those that had been said about the GAM. In addition many contend
that what is simple is not necessarily correct.
Evidently, as there are tradeoffs involved with respect to ob-
jectives,\ there are also tradeoffs in the use of MOAPA. In any event,
the selection of MOAPA should depend on factors such as technical
feasibility as well as the cost and benefits of each technique. It
is not the purpose of this paper to undertake a detailed evaluation
of the different MOAPAs. We shall nevertheless discuss the issue of
choosing the specific MOAPA in Chapter 7. For now, let us step back,
for a moment and review the arguments for and against the MOAPA.
3.2 Criticisms to the Multiobjective Approach to Project Evaluation
Followers of the conventional school give a host of reasons for
clinging to the efficiency cost-benefit analysis. These reasons are
summarized below.
First, as neo-classical economists believe, there are more effi-
cient vehicles for redistributing income than by incorporating poli-
tical factors into the decision-making framework at the project level.
Transfers through taxes and subsidies may be used effectively if the
government is truly serious about pursuing the equity objective. The
use of project analysis as a tool for redistributing development
benefits will involve considerable cost to society since efficiency
will generally not be achieved.
A related criticism to the multi-attribute approach is its ad-
ministrative cost. Consider the distributional aspect for example.
We may analyze the equity impact of a project across income groups,
across geographic areas, among ethnic groups, or among the age groups.
Detailed disaggregation of benefits and costs may be possible. How-
ever, the cost and difficulty of generating these detailed data grow
as the number of subdivisions increases. For the sake of illustra-
tion, assume that the Philippine government on the.basis of the
1978-1982 development plan, decides to present data for each of the
income classes, 1.3 regions, and by urban-rural location (i.e., a sur-
rogate for intraregional income inequality). This will require a
table with 130 cells. Even for planning personnel that are trained
on project evaluation, the job requirements could be overwhelming.
From these two efficiency perspectives, it is argued that it is
not beneficial to rely on micro instruments such as project selec-
tion for changing the income distribution pattern.
Second, critics of MOAPA argue that the inclusion of non-econo-
mic criteria is unnecessary. In connection with equity as-
pects, three reasons have been given.1 One the marginal utility
B.A. Weisbrod, "Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analy-
sis," in S.B. Chase, Jr. (ed.) Problems in Public Expenditure Analy-
sis, The Brookings Institute, 1968, pp. 183. A fourth possible jus-
tification is "where the bulk of the benefits are paid for in cash by
the beneficiaries, and where machinary exists for the compensation
of any substantial losers." See A.K. Dasgupta and P.W. Pearce, "The
Siting of London's Third Airport," Cost Benefit Analysisop.cit., p. 233.
of income and costs is believed to be essentially equal for all peo-
ple, i.e., an additional unit of benefits (or of costs) for the rich
is equal to that of the poor. Two, the effect of any particular pro-
ject on the distribution of income is generally too insignificant
to warrant special attention. Three, the overall distributional
consequence of all public investments will be neutral and thus can
be ignored. That is, the summation of benefits and costs for all
projects will not favor the rich more than it will favor the.poor.1
Third, following the neo-classical argument, critics argue that
the multiple objective methodology is not practical. First of all,
social, political, and other non-efficiency impacts of projects should
be analyzed outside of the conventional project analysis because they
will only add to the complexity of what is presently a complicated
but manageable and relatively objective technique. In addition,
(as Harberger points out), the value system in society are very
complicat.ed. Adopting the MOAPA could therefore obtain (through
sacrifices in aggregate consumption) an income distribution that
"may not even be that which the community wants (or may be less ful-
ly what it wants to warrant sacrificing as much output as is given
up)." Three, it is extremely difficult to operationalize a
'No empirical evidences have been given to support this assumption.
H. Schwartz, op.cit., p. 8; p. 24. Harberger suggest that if non-
economic criteria are to be introduced, it should be undertaken
after the results of the economic analysis are clear with the ar-
guments for non-efficiency considerations being presented subsequent-
ly, on a case-by-case basis.
3ibid. See also, A. Harberger "On the UNIDO Guidelines for Social
Project Evaluation "In H. Schwarts Y.R. Berney (eds.), Social and
Economic Dimensions of Project Evaluation, Inter-American Develop-
lopment Bank, Washington, D.C. 1977, pp. 75-82; 246-248.
multi-objective approach to project analysis because there is no
single best way of assigning relative weights to the various objec-
tives. Politicians are unwilling to make judgements on the relative
importance of objectives for fear that their values will be criti-
cized and cause them to loose their "shirts." Still more difficult
would be the task of letting the public decide what the weights will
be. Policy-makers find it impossible to define what the public in-
terest is along this line: Should it be the rule of the majority?
Are the elected and appointed officials to decide? Should the ex-
perts' opinion hold?1 Meanwhile, Harberger argued that it is not
easy to ascertain the gap between the prevailing and the desired in-
come distribution.2 He also contended that for most projects (par-
ticularly those that have long life spans), there is no reliable
technique determining what the incidence of benefits and costs will
be.4 Thus~, the MOAPA is to complicated to implement.
Finally, one school of critics denies the existence of a con-
flict between efficiency and other objectives. Neo-classical eco-
nomists insist on the use of the concept of "willingness to pay"
when dealing with environment-related objectives. In this way, the
environmental costs of a project may be measured in terms of dollars
and avoid adding ap-ples and oranges in an arbitrary manner.
.lSeveral interesting works have been devoted to this issue. Unfor-
tunately, these efforts appear to have raised more questions than
answers. See Wheaton and Wheaton, "Identifying the Public Interest
Values and Goals," in Erber (ed.), Urban Planning Transition, pp.
152-164; J. Friedman, "The Public Interest and Community Participa-
tion," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, January, 1973,
pp. 2-12; Meyerson and Banfield, op, cit. pp. 303-329.
21H. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 8.
3Ibid., p. 10.
Similarly, increasing employment is argued to be subsumed in the
objective of efficiency, or growth in national income. This popular
argument is founded on a long-term view of development. Myrdal, one
of its prominent advocates and hardly a neo-classicist, claims that
greater economic equality is a condition for rapid and sustained
economic growth. He gives several reasons:
"1. Malnutrition and undernutirtion, lack elementary
health and educational facilities impairs pre-
- paredness and ability to work intensively;
2. Social inequality by decreasing mobility... is
generally detrimental to development (because)
...greater equality would lead to higher pro-
ductivity;
3. Higher savings of the wealthier through economic
inequality is of less relevance in countries with
conspicuous consumption and investment and some-
times capital flight; because of extreme deficien-
cies in the assessment and collection of taxes
inequality of incomes and wealth cannot contri-
bute to public savings either-
4. Great and growing inequality is a serious obsta-
cle for national consilidation;
5. Social reforms have shown to be productive in the
most advanced welfare states; this should a for-
tiori apply to poor and inegalitarian countries."
A similar view could be derived from neo-classical (modelling)
assumption of the world. Assuming that any capital stock may be
utilized at any level of employment (variable factor proportions),
1The following section derives much from, OECD, op. cit.
G. Myrdal, "The World Poverty Problem," Mondes en developpement,
1, 1973, pp. 117-161.
then employment and output can go together since "every machine can
be associated with any amount of employment."
These two views have a common denominator; time. In the Myrdal.
proposition, the current use of less efficient labor-intensive methods
of production will result in later production that is greater than it
would be otherwise. In the neo-classical case, on the other hand, in-
vestment in highly efficient capital intensive industries now will
cause later employment to be greater than it would be otherwise. Cer-
tain assumptions, however, will have to be fulfilled for the second
proposition to hold. They are: a high percentage of profits is
saved; savings are invested; and capital intensity and wage rates
remaining constant. With these assumptions and the correct time
horizon and social rate of discount, there may indeed be a harmony
between output and employment. In support of this view, Thorbecke
and Stoutjesdijk showed that in Peru and Guatemala, the "Agricul-
tural expansion path giving the highest growth rate of output among
the three alternatives selected is also the one to provide the high-
est growth of employment."2
3.3 Incorporating Non-Efficiency Criteria: The Multiobjective
Approach to Project Analysis
What led to the growth of the conflicting views of efficiency-
oriented project appraisal? Proponents of the multiobjective approach
Paul Streeten (with Frances Steward), "Conflicts Between Output and
Employment Objectives in Developing Countries," The Frontiers of
Development Studies, London, 1972, p. 324.
E. Thorbecke and E. Stoutjesdijk, Employment and Output, A Methodolo-
gy Applied to Peru and GuaLemala, OECD Development Centre, Paris,
1971, pp. 11-12. The observation is only true for that sector.
to project analysis cite a number of important arguments.
/ First, while in theory there were indeed more efficient ways
of achieving the various non-economic objectives, it is argued that
in practice they had not been utilized as often and as effectively
as may be expected.1 In most countries it was observed that fiscal
policies (i.e., taxes and public expenditures) had not in fact changed
the income distribution pattern significantly. Similarly, pollution
control measures, for example, havenot been very successful, if
implemented at all. Efforts to make these policies more effective
have beendwarfed or defeated through the pressures of the small
minority who stand to loose. The problem appears to be chiefly a
function of institutional constraints: the strong attachment be-
tween political and economic power, the power of the military, a
lethargic bureaucracy, or inept government officials. Consistent
with this view, the authors of the UNIDO Guidelines states:
"To assume that the desired redistribution of consumption
is to be achieved independently of projects is to place
undue reliance on fiscal policy-taxes and subsidies-and
on the pricing policy used in the distribution of the
outputs of public enterprises. In the first place, tax
systems in most developing countries are weak. Political,
institutional and administrative obstacles prevent taxa-
tion of the rich to the point necessary to reduce consump-
tion inequalities substantially. (There is also) the
widespread objection to increasing the consumption of the
poor through direct subsidies. Critics of subsidies,
ranging from conservative to radicals in their politics,
argue that the enhancement of the self-respect that ac-
companies active participation in the process of increas-
ing one's standard of living is worth some sacrifice of
aggregate consumption, even if direct subsidies would be
less costly." 2
From excellent discussions, see A.K. Sen, "Control Areas and Account-
ing Prices; An Approach to Economic Evaluation," Economic Journal, 1972.
2UNIDO, op. cit., p. 76. For comparative analysis of employment and
fiscal policy approaches, see pp. 92-94.
Second, proponents of the MOAPA argue that the efficiency-biased
method of project analysis is indifferent to the incidence of bene-
fits and costs. Consequently, a high-return project which will
benefit the rich for the most part will be favored over a project
promising lower returns but which will have substantial positive ef-
fect on income distribution. Clearly, the said approach ignores a
social objective that is perhaps as important to society as much as
pure economic goals.
The very technique of economic-based project analysis is also
inherently biased against lower income people. Costs and benefits
are measrued according to the principle of consumers' "willingness
to pay" which derives from an aggregation of individual demand curves.
This means that a rich man's consumption is valued as much as that
of a poor man. Accordingly, if someone is willing to pay $2 for
a unit of commodity X and $1 for commodity Y, then the former is
twice as valuable as the latter. Hence, to the extent that the con-
sumption pattern of the rich is different from that of the poor, the
evaluation methodology indirectly favors the higher income people
whose willingness to pay for less essential and luxury goods could
outbid the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor. For these
reasons, it is contended that a project selection mechanism that
incorporates non-economic goals should be adopted, at the same time
that people press for the first best means of achieving these objec-
tives.
Third, it is pointed out that although project appraisals focus
on economic efficiency, actual investment decision nevertheless takes
into account the social, environmental, and other non-economical
considerations. A formalized multiobjective appraisal methodology
therefore enables the policy makers to understand the magnitude of
the tradeoffs in a more objective and systematic manner. Without
such a tool, investment analysis becomes repetitive and wasteful
since substantially identical conflicts will undergo the same process
of bargaining and brainstorming. With it, chances of contradictory
decisions are minimized and arbitrary judgement in the comparison
of project impacts is avoided.
From the professional standpoint, it can be disastrous to ignore
the fact that distributional consequences of projects are important
to political leaders and policy makers. Weisbrod, for example warns
economist that if they refuse to examine the equity aspect of govern-
ment projects, for whatever reasons, decision makers may in the long
run loose their appreciation of the former's recommendations.1 Per-
haps a more critical impact is that such a practice "will retard the
development of positive models for predicting actual political-
economic behavior, and they will retard the development of normative
decision rules for determining appropriate choices."2 Furthermore,
to say that economists should concentrate on the efficiency measure
because they are "no good" in dealing with the equity issue, as
Harberger does, "is to fall to the pathetic falacy that the universe
was created to keep economists busy at something or other."3
Fourth, carrying out project analysis with all impacts consid-
ered simultaneously helps decision makers in capturing the important
1Weisbrod, Op. Cit., pp. 183,
2ibid.
3P. Samuelson, "Comments on 'Principles of Efficiency'," American Eco-
nomic Review (Papers and Proceedings) LIV, 1964, pp. 94.
dimensions of an investment proposal, not in isolation but, in rela-
tion to each other. Proponents of the MOAPA contend that allowing
project appraisal to focus on the economic aspects increases the
probability that projects will be decided upon on purely economic
grounds. Marglin, for instance, maintains that certain factors
which could influence decisions become real areas of consideration
when they are spelled out at the project level. Yet, he argues that
owing to the emphasis on economic efficiency, these aspects tend to
be forgotten. He also contends that a multiple objective technique
provides critical decision variables, particularly those related to
tradeoffs between efficiency and equity, i.e., how much is the cost
in aggregate consumption of the desired income distribution pattern.
It also enables the political leaders to understand the implications
of the weights that they place on non-economic factors vis-a-vis
the economic benefits and costs, irrespective of whether these
weights are predetermined or are implicit via project choice. Fur-
thermore, as Little suggests, an analysis of all objectives simul-
taneously could expedite the decision making process. The absence of
a unified evaluation scheme, he implied, is one reason why politi-
cians cannot agree on many things. 2
Fifth, conflicts among the development objective are real and
serious. In earlier sections, we discussed in some length the po-
-tential conflict between growth and equity and between growth and
environmental protection. Let us therefore direct our attention of
the empolyment-output dichotomy. Many scholars argue that to treat
employment as a means of increasing output (by fully exploiting a
H. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 27
2Ibid., p. 25.
productive economic resource) is overly simplistic. We shall briefly
present one set of arguments.
1) Given any input-output relationship, there is a
cailing above which it will not be economical to
employ an additional unit of labor. This obser-
vation is obvious when the technique involves
fixed factor proportions but is nevertheless true
for industries where the range for input substi-
tution is wide. For example, for a given set of
prices there is an economic limit to the extent
to which we can replace machine with labor in a
steel plant or in an automobile repair shop, al-
though in general industries may allow much more
factor substitution. This suggest
that the maximization of both efficiency and
employment may be infeasible.
2) Unemployment has a demoralizing effect: "a deep
and distressing psychological impact on society.
(In fact), most contries regard large scale un-
employment as a disaster. Lawlessness, vagrancy,
crime and social disorder are closely associated
with widespread unemployment."1
3) The unemployed tend to lose their productive skills
ane expertise owing to the lack of practice.2
4) Employment is related closely to the redistribution
goal. Since unemployment welfare programs are usual-
ly non-existent, poor families have to rely on em-
ployment for income. For this reason, expanding the
employment base contribute tremendously to the equity
problem.
'UNIDO, op. cit., p. 8
2This and other aspects of employment are elaborated in UNIDO, ibid.,
pp. 32, 85-98.
The conclusion from these arguments is that it is worthwhile
to attach special meaning to employment other than those emanating
from its economic role.
3.4 Concluding Remarks-
In this chapter, we discussed briefly the evolution of project
appraisal from the traditional benefit-cost analysis (which used eith-
er market or shadow prices) to what is now described as the multiob-
jective approaches. We also reviewed, in some detail, the various
arguments raised by followers of the "efficiency" school which
contends that the systematic inclusion of other criteria such as in-
come distribution is not necessary, not beneficial and not practical.
Likewise, we enumerated the contentions of those who favor the MOAPA.
It is important to realize that some of the arguments made by
advocates of both approaches are directed towards the intrinsic
strengths and inadequacies of the methodologies. For example, those
who favor the MOAPA claim that the inability to take into account
the incidence of project benefits and costs is a serious flaw of
the efficiency benefit-cost analysis. The other aspects, however,
are largely empirical and will have to be assessed in the light of
particular countries experiences. For instance, the observed ina-
bility of the fiscal system to meet the redistribution objective,
one of the justifications for the MOAPA, has to be verified on a
country by country basis. In what follows therefore we shall analyze
to what extent the conditions in thq Philippines warrant the adoption
of the MOAPA.
PART TWO
CASE STUDY:
RELEVANCE OF THE MULTIOBJECTIVE APPROACH TO PROJECT
APPRAISAL AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
In the following chapters, we shall try to determine the relevance
of this multiobjective approach to project appraisal and resource alloca-
tion in the Philippines. For the purpose of this study, we defined the
relevance of the MOAPA in terms of the necessity and practicability of
utilizing this approach in project appraisal and selection. Accordingly,
the next three chapters are focused on the necessity of adopting the MOAPA.
In chapter 4, we will analyze the extent to which the development objectives
and policies compete and conflict in terms of project analysis and selection.
In Chapter 5 and 6, we will examine the practice of project development
in the context of the national objectives. We will concentrate on public
investment planning in Chapter 5 and will devote Chapter 6 to the investment
and export incentive systems. In Chapter 7, we will address the question
of practicability of the MOAPA by looking into the potentials of alterna-
tive schemes such as taxation and regulation and then comparing them with
those of the MOAPA. We will also offer some criteria that the Philippines
may use in the selection of particular multiobjective approach(es) and some
preliminary conclusions on the applicability of specific MOAPAs to the
Philippines.
CHAPTER 4
Government's Perspective of Development
As mentioned in Chapter 2, project appraisal is theoretically-only
one of the major operations undertaken in overall development planning. We
stressed then that the development objectives set forth in the plan should
form the backbone of project analysis. Accordingly, emphasis and change
in development thrust should be reflected in the criteria used in the design,
evaluation, and selection of projects.
In the following sections, we shall analyse how the development
objectives and policies contained in the Four Year Development Plan
(FY 1974-77)1 and the Five-Year Philippine Development Plan (FY 1978-82)2
relate to the practice of project appraisal and selection in the Philippines.
4.1 National Development Objectives
The national development objectives have been identified to meet
the various economic, social, environmental, and political changes that
confront the country. The general goal of raising the standard of living
of the greater portion of the population, was translated into more
operationally meaningful objectives, as shown on Table 7.
Republic of the Philippines, Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77.
2 Republic of the Philippines, Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82
In this report, "national plans", "development plans", or "plans" refer
to these Philippine national development plans, unless otherwise stated.
Table 1
National Development Objectives, 1974-77 and 1978-82
1978-82
1. maximum utilization of the labor
force or more specifically, the
promotion of employment and mini-
mization of underemployment;
2. more equitable distribution of
income and wealth;
3. promotion of social development;
4. regional development and indus-
trialization;
5. maximum economic growth feas-
ible; and
6. maintenance of an acceptable
level of price and balance of
payments stability;
creation of productive employment
opportunities;
2. reduction of income disparities;
3. improvement of the living standards
of the poor;
4. enrichment of social and cultural
values;
5. increased development of lagging
regions especially rural areas;
6. attainment of a high and sustained
economic growth;
7. maintenance of an acceptable price
level and improvement in domestic
resource mobilization and balance
of payments position;
8. attainment of self-sufficiency in
food and greater self-reliance in
energy;
9. improvement of habitat through
development of human settlements
and proper management of envi-
ronment; and
10. maintenance of internal security
and harmonious international
relations.
* As presented in the plan, the first four fall under the general heading:
"promotion of social development and social justice.
Sources:
Republic of the Philippines, Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77, p. 18.
Republic of the Philippines, Five-Year Philippine Development Plan,FY 1978-82, p.8.
1974-77
' 'It is obvious that the development objsctives for the 1974-77-period
were cparried over to 1978-82 plan. The new plan, however, has become
more complex with the addition of four objectives: enrichment of social
and cultural values; attainment of self-sufficiency in food and greater
self-reliance in energy; improvement of habitat through development of
human settlements and proper management of environment; and maintenance
of internal security and harmonious international relations. Hence, the
1978-82 National Plan seeks the achievement of four economic, four social,
one environmental, and one political objectives.
Specific sectoral objectives were set to put operational meaning
to these overall objectives.1 Generally, however, those sectors are more
focused on certain societal goals than they are to others. For example,
social services, nutrition and health are less oriented towards economic
growth, not to mention price stability, in comparison to say, industry
and agriculture. It can be noted, nevertheless, that regardless of the
fundamental role that sectors play with respect to these national goals,
there is an apparent effort for the planners to frame the sectoral plans
in such a way as to be consistent with the broader national thrust. Thus,
we find that Tourism, which is principally geared towards foreign exchange
generation, is expected to contribute to regional development. Similarly,
industry which has traditionally been considered as the key sector, with
the greatest potential for accelerating economic growth, is being shaped
to meet the objectives of employment, foreign exchange, regional development,
and even self reliance.3
1 Please refer to Appendix C for an enumeration of the major sectoral ob-
jectives.
2 Five-Year Development Plan; op. cit., p. 168.
Ibid. p. 125; also Four-Year Philippine Development Plan, op.dit. p.199.
4.2 Development Policies
Meanwhile, different policies which clearly had multisectoral
relevance and multiobjective implications were formulated for the two
planned periods. A number of them are conventional socio-economic tools
such as monetary and fiscal policies. Some of them, however, are more or
less peculiar to the country. An excellent example is the inclusion of
agrarian reform and "development-oriented type of diplomacy" as major
policies is the attention given to regional development, and lately,
energy and environment. These policies are supposedly consistent with the
overall development goals.1
4.3 The Development Objectives and Policies and Their Relevance to
Project Development
In this section, we will show: a) that the national plans create
the impression that the development objectives can be maximized simultaneously;
b) that these development objectives and policies in reality often conflict
with one another; and, c) that the inability of the Government to recognize
the extent of these conflicts could lead to difficulties in investment
decision-making.
4.3.1 The National Plans and the Maximization of Objectives
In many sections of the Plans, there are indications that the
economic, social, political, and/or environmental objectives can be
achieved without having to make sacrifices in any of the other objectives.
see Appendix C for details.
In the introduction of Chapter 1 of the 1978-82 Plan in which
t e national goals and policies are summarized, the following can be read:1
"Development over the next decade towafds the year 200 will be
a massive effort to provide for the basic needs of the majority
of the population and to secure their enjoyment of the fruits
of economic and social well-being in the comforts of a congenial
habitat.
"Economic development will be achieved and sustained-for the pro-
motion of social justice, according to all citizens a due and right-
ful share in benefits and obligations. Correspondingly, productive
dmployment opportunities will be created to minimize underemployment
and unemployment...
"...Greater efficiency and marked structural transformation
will be realized in the decade. In the first five years, emphasis
will be laid on rural development, with agrarian reform as the
cornerstone program, and on labor-intensive industrialization.
The gains of this period should secure the foundations for further
growth and change toward 2000."
Apparently, this quotation does not suggest that the maximization
of any one objective may be detrimental to the pursuance of another.
This observation is reinforced by the nature of the development
targets. For the period 1978-1987, the national plan projects a rosy
development scenario. Real per capita Gross National Project is expected
to grow by 5%.2 Inflation will be cut in half to 7.5%. Exports will
increase enormously and alleviate the balance of payments problem.
An equally optimistic social development process is anticipated.
Economic benefits will reach a larger proportion of the population and
will decrease the number of families below the poverty threshhold. Health,
nutrition, and social services will expand dramatically. Unemployment
1 Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, op.cit., p.4
The 1973-1977 period registered a 3.2% rise in per capita income.
ahd underemployment will also drop to 4% and 2.5%, respectively by 1987.1
Likewise, the expansion of the economy will have a favorable impact on
interregional inequalities. 2
4.3.2 Conflicting Objectives
While the development goals and policies are noble sounding, we
can show they are in conflict with one another. Objectives and targets
can only be in harmony, i.e., fully compatible, if they are identical,
complementary or indifferent to each other. However, while the objectives
might emanate from the same overriding goal of increasing the standards
of living of the people, the economic, social, environmental, and political
goals of the Philippines are directed towards different people, places, and
activities and therefore not synonymous, not interchangeable, not equivalent,
and not substitutable. Also, the objectives do not necessarily complement
each other. For example, when the government pursues "the attainment of
a high and sustained economic growth," it does not follow that employment
opportunities will also be created or that internal security will be
maintained.
Moreover, these rosy predictions are contradicted by neoclassical
economic theory that often sees a trade-off between efficiency and
1Ibid., p. 40. The expansion of employment is not expected to lower
average labor productivity. ibid., p.46.
2 Ibid.,chapter 3. For example, the Eastern Visayas (VIII) and Bicol (V)
Regions, two of the most depressed regions, are projected to register
the fastest growth rate in per captia Gross Domestic Product, at
6.6% and 613%, respectively.
equity.1 Historically, the natural tendency of economic development to
proceed unequally in geographical, and functional (sectoral) space had
been observed.2 This pattern has been explained by relative growth
prospects that emanate largely from differences in factor endowments, dis-
tance to large markets and the existence of external economies which
interact and influence the flow of investments, and other resources
(e.g., entrepreneur, skilled labor).3
From the efficiency planning perspective, therefore the conclusion
is that "an economy to lift itself to higher income levels must and will first
develop within itself.. .several regional centers of economic strength. This...
means that... interregional (and intraregional) inequality of growth is an
inevitable concomit-ant and condition of growth itself."4
1In recent years, there has developed a new school that argues these object-
ives can be harmonized. SeeChersry, et al., op. cit.
2This explicit in the Growth Pole theory (GPT) and implicit in the Location
Theory, and Central Place Theories. For these theories as they
relate to the Philippines, see E.M. Pernia and C.W. Paderanga, Jr.,
"Urbanization and Spatial Development in the Philippines: A Survey,"
Philippine Development Studies Series, Working Paper 7905, Philippine
Institute for Developmental Studies, January 1980. See also, J.B. Parr
"Growth Poles, Regional Development and Central Place Theory". Papers of
the Regional Science Association, Vol. 31, 1973, pp. 173-212. An excel-
lent collection of papers is contained in J. Friedman and W. Alonzo, (Eds.)
Regional Development and Planning: A Reader, MIT Press, Cambridge.
For more recent documentation of this trend, see D. Carlton, "Why New Firms
Locate Where They Do: An Economic Model" in W. Wheaton (Ed.), Interregional
Movements and Regional Growth, Urban Institute, 1969, also Engle
"A Disequilibrium Model of Regional Investment", Journal of Science, 14,
1974 and J. Harris and M. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment and Development,
A Two-Sector Analysis," American Economic Review, March 1970.
4A.0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University Press,
1958, pp. 183-184. The same observation was made by Perroux although he
spoke in terms of economic space. This philosophy is now known as the
Growth Pole (center) Approach. When applied to sectors, the term "Big
Push" popularized by Professor Rosenstein-Rodan is used. See P.N. Rosenstein-
Rodan, "The Theory of the Big Push," in G. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic
Development, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 393-398.
A similar phenomenon is said to have been observed among different social
or income groups.1 Clearly, this implies inequality in investment alloca-
tion change radically. We now are concerned about the incidence of benefits
and costs of any investment activity.
With respect to the Philippine Development Plans, there appears to
be two broad types of equity concerns, namely: to ameliorate poverty and
to attain a more equitable distribution of socio-economic benefits. Accor-
dingly, using "absolutepoverty" as the sole criterion for investing, we would
select projects that would benefit the families with income of, say,
P3,000 and less or perhaps the poorest 30 percentile of our population. The
second objective is a bit tricky2 but it basically means favoring
projects that benefit the poorer families ( or regions) rather than the
higher income people 6r regions)'. In either case, the productivity of
investment may be an irrelevant issue.
Ibid. p. 184-186, "unbalanced growth" and "growth center" strategies
envisage that the inequality accompanying growth at the early stages
of development will diminish as higher levels of incomes are attained
due to the anticipated "trickling down" or "spread" effects. See
Hirschman, op.cit., pp. 187-190; G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and
Underdeveloped Regions, London, 1957, Chapter 3-5.
2
There is a profound philosophical question that is relevant to the
distribution aspect. The issue is whether the policy makers should concern
themselves with the process or the outcome of attempts towards redistri-
bution. That is, is justice or fairness to be measured in terms of the
eventual-distribution or only to the processes toward the attainment of the
desired distribution? For some enlightening discussion of each, see R.
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974, and D. Rowls,
A Theory of Justice , Howard University Press, 1971.
4.3.3 Development Objectives and Policies as Guides to Project Evaluation and
Selection
The absence of any explicit attempt to recognize that the objectives
and policies do conflict can make decision making difficult. We can show,
for instance, that the conflicting objectives and policies can lead to
problems of priority setting and project appraisal which are difficult to
resolve.
Evaluation of Project Impacts
Apart from the selection- (or priority) problem, the national plans
also do not establish working principles by which project analysts could be
guided-in their evaluation of any given investment proposal. There is no
explicit or implicit hierarchy and trade-offs established among the
objectives so that it becomes problematical to evaluate and compare differ-
ent ' project impacts.
In the first place, the development objectives are only enumerated
in the plans and no mention is made as to whether or not the sequence reflects
the order of preference of the government. A careful scrutiny of the plans
shows only obscure statements that have little operational meaning. In
the 1974-77 Development Plan, for example, the following is stated:1
"...More recent developments in the economy... since September 21,
1972, when the country was put under martial law.. .have drastic-
ally altered the framework of development, necessitating a
restructuring and restatement of objectives and priorities.
"Thus, higher growth targets in general are set in the present Plan.
Furthermore, the Plan provides for a wider distribution of the
benefits of economic growth by placing greater emphasis on social
development and by integrating the approach to regional development.
"...The basic development philosophy proceeds from the broad
policy of reforms enumerated under the New Society calling for
socially meaningful growth."
Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, op.cit.,Foreword.
These statements do not provide much assistance to planners in their
identification, design, and appraisal of projects. Since the plans are
silent as to how much in terms of one objective can be sacrificed to
achieve other objectives, they do not permit comparison of different
project benefits and disbenefits. As a consequence, the planners often
have to mly on some general and perhaps, even occasionally , myopic
principles. For instance, it is a common practice to classify certain types
of projects as priority on the basis of piecemeal analysis. To
illustrate, consider five objectives listed in the plans. Note that some
of them are clearly economic, but others are obviously not. These objectives
become the criteria for preferring certain types of projects. For example,
food production projects and farm-to-market roads are favored because of the
considerable net benefits towards self-sufficiency in food that are ex-
pected of these policies or investment programs.
DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES POLICY/PRIORITY ACTIVITY
1. self-sufficiency in food 1. food production
2. farm-to-market roads
2. high and sustained economic 1. manufacturing projects with high
growth 'value-added ratio a/
2. pioneer industry b7
3. balance of payment stabilization 1. export oriented
2. import-substituting
4.'income redistribution (regional 1. located in rural or depressed region
and interpersonal) 2. "basic needs"
5. employment 1. labor-intensive projects
2. small-scale industries
a/ total payments to factors of pro-
duction as a percentage of the market price of the commodity.
b/ new industry or present production which is not yet in commercial scale.
Our first impression in this regard may be that the procedure and
selection of projects are very reasonable. After all, each of these
classes of projects are directed toward certain kinds of problems in the
economy. On closer analysis, however, it becomes evident that there is no
unifying framework for each of these criteria (or objectives) to be
considered. There would probably be little selection problem if all
proposed agricultural and industrial projects would use labor-intensive
technology, export its outputs and be located in lagging regions, although
we still would not be certain about the efficiency in the use of resources.
The difficulty arises when the investment activity meets some objectives but
clearly is less or not socially desirable from certain angles. For example,
how do we make a decision when we are faced with an import-substituting
project that employs a lot of people but would be located in the primate
city, or a pioneer industry proposed for a depressed region that is
capital-intensive and would require a subsidy to become commercially
feasible. Evidently, we are often confronted with projects that contribute
in different magnitudes and perhaps even negatively to the different
development objectives.
Clearly, the nature of investment allocation does not justify
a simple objective (problem)-project (solution) approach such as that
which we used above. The decision-making process requires a consistent
framework by which different project impacts (that are selected on the
basis of the development objectives) may be compared and allowed to
compensate for each other. Without a compensatory mechanism, the task
of resource allocation transforms into a highly arbitrary process. Project
selection is prone to pressure from interest groups and may neither
achieve efficiency, equity,or any of the other development objectives.
For other problems, see Part One, Section 3.
Examples of Actual Problems
The absence of guidelines for resolving conflicts among objectives
could also have many unfavorable effects. Consider the case involving
environmental objectives and other objectives, particularly growth and
employment. The problem involves, for the most part, large polluting
industries.1
We can mention two actual examples to illustrate how serious the
tradeoffs can be. In the 1950s and 1960s the government permitted mineral
extraction in Palawan, presumably, to generate more foreign exchange,
employment,-and output (GNP). We may venture to add the minimization of
spatial and interpersonal inequalities as implicit social objectives of that
policy, since Palawan was (and still is) one of the poorest provinces of the
country. Due to locational and qualitative features of Palawan's mineral
resources, most firms conducted open pit or strip mining operations.2
Unfortunately, these firms were located in the upper regions and so pol-
lution was transmitted into the lowlands and fishing grounds. That process
caused permanent damges not only to the mining area but to the outlying mu-
nicipalities as well. To date, nobody has really determined what the net
effect of said policy has been, not to mention the incidence of benefits and
costs. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see that only a few farmers
and fishermen at the
Visual impacts (e.g., preemption or alteration of the texture of the en-
vironment), traffic (e.g. increases in average daily traffic and corres-
ponding decline in the level of service), fiscal impact, (e.g., increases
in property taxes), and uther similar types of environmental concerns
are virtually unheard of. Except for polluting effects, these forms of
externalities are typically ignored in the investment decision making pro-
cess. For a discussion and evaluation of these impacts, see J. McEvoy III
and T. Dietz, Handbook for Environmental Plannig, John Wiley and Sons,
New York. 1977. also, P. Herr, G. Slater, and R. Bluhm, Evaluating
Development Impacts, MIT Laboratory for Architecture and Planning, 1978.
2 This issue is discussed extensively in NEDA, Palawan Integrated Area
Development Plan, 1979.
lowland became miners and that the province did not progress economically
as a long-term result of such mining operations. The mining industry
in Palawan did not help the agriculture and fishing industry, to say the
least.
Another case involved an alumina plant proposed in Samal Island
in the South of the Philippines. The plan will definitely be one of the
largest single industries in the country. It could theoretically con-
tribute a great deal to the highly depressed economic conditions of the
three towns in that island. While the proponents of the project have
slowed down in their activities as a result of the fall in the aluminim
market, the local government officials of Samal Island and the Davao Region
had been campaigning vigorously against the project. It is feared that
the wastes of the plant, which would be dumped into the Davao Gulf, could
be disastrous to the fishing industry and to the wonderful beaches.
Evidently, whatever economic benefits are to be derived from such indus-
try were not expected by the local authorities to compensate for what was
considered a serious ecological and social imbalance.
There is one important issue that is often involved in this dil-
emma concerning environmental objectives and other societal goals. I
am referring to the conflict between national interest and local preference.
We are told that these calculations are known only by Office of the
President and the Board of Investments.
When the government wants a project that is not perceived to bring net
benefits to the municipality or region in which it will be located, then
the project becomes a source of conflict. We can mention two actual
cases here.
One case involves a copper smelter plant1 which was to be
established in Batangas, a province of Souther Tagalog (Region III), some
100 kil6meters south of Manila. This industry was of national significance
because, while the country ranks seventh in copper mineral production,
it had no copper smelter plant in operation. The project would also gen-
erafe foreign exchange savings and provide employment to some 1800 individ-
uals of varying skills. To a lesser extent, the project would contribute
to the regional dispersal of industry. At the same time, it would attract
labor from Metro-Manila and thus promote to some degree urban-rural
migration. For Batangas residents, there would be a great deal of direct
and indirect economic benefits. Despite these advantages, the project was
strongly opposed not only within the province but in the universities
in Manila, as well.2 Opponents of the project argued that it would expel
chemicals that will not only be hazardous to health but would also be
corrosive (i.e., cause metals and metal-filled structures within a certain
The plant will process locally produced copper concentrates into refined
copper through a fresh smelting process developed by Outukumpu Oy in
Finland. It will have a capacity of 84 MTPY of copper cathodes.
2 The project was constantly mentioned in the major newspapers and
magazines in the country.
radius of the plant to rust). It was also feared that the plant might
destroy the popularity of Batangas as a center for local tourism.
A second example will indicate how much importance local gov-
ernment official and the public in general may place on pollution, real
or imagined. In 1975, a shipbuilding and repair (drydocking) project
proposed for a coastal area in Davao City was a subject of heated debate
during the public hearings held for this purpose. The project was clearly
a national priority and was granted some fiscal incentives by the
Board of Investment. The Maritime Industry Authority also encouraged the
project. On the local front, this project would increase the region's
income and employment.
The project proponents were applying for a building permit for
a site which they considered optimum. However, the proposed site was
designated only for light-medium industry.1 It was therefore the
City Council's task to decide whether or not the project was desirable
from the city's viewpoint.2
During the deliberations, it was apparent that "desirability"
was to be defined only in terms of pollution and consistency with the
existing land use ordinance. Increases in production, income, employment
and other benefits were either overlooked or deliberately ignored.
These were defined by type of industry and/or total project cost.
Projects with capital requirements of P4,000,000 or more and indus-
tries like shipbuilding are considered large or heavy industry.
2 If it was deemed beneficial, then the council could either consider
the project a-medium industry and thus in concurrence with the existing
land use ordinance or spot zone the area for heavy industry.
During the hearing, the proponents banked heavily on MARINA's approval
and on signed testimony from the agency in charge of pollution control
that stated that the project was permissible. In the end, the project
was rejected because of the "expert" opinion of one architect planner of the
Davao City Planning Office who supposedly made an objective assessment of
shipyards as they operated in Cebu and Manila. 1
In this case, there is reason to believe that the decision makers
may have overreacted to the general concern to protect the environment.
The opinions of experts on pollution (who considered the pollution of the
project not any more than that of any construction site), was indirectly
discredited when the council favored the recommendation of one, who,
to my mind, is not only biased, but more importantlywas untrained to make
categorical and authoritative statements on the subject.
These four examples exemplify the conflicts between environmental
considerations on one hand and other development objectives on the
other hand. The latter two examples added some flavor by showing how
environmental concerns may bring about a serious contradiction between what
is deemed good locally and what to the others is seen as being in the
best interest of society as a whole.
His objectives may be questioned because he had voiced some
apprehensions about the pollution effects of the project
before he conducted his study.
Risk of Wrong Analysis
The adoption of broad guidelines can also lead to wrong analysis.
Consider the criterion of "located in depressed area." On the basis
of this criterion alone, a large project to be located in a rural
community may be approved by the agency responsible for providing in-
centives. However,a project established in a depressed area does not
guarantee that the benefits will accrue to the host municipality, let alone
its poorer segments. The project's manpower requirements may be for
specific skills which the local workers do not possess. It may be an
enclave,self-sufficient in major individual needs,and hence may generate
little spillover effedts for the locality. There may be limited
derivable taxes (owing to transfer pricing, export orientation or maybe
because of special privileges,e.g., autonomy). Under these circumstances
the ultimate objective of the guideline may not be achieved at all.
Similarly, the application of "net foreign exchange savings" as
the criterion can be risky. It is not uncommon for proponents to use this
criterion in rationalizing import-substituting projects. The typical
flow of reasoning is that by importing the component parts and not the
whole commodity, then foreign exchange is "saved". When we analyze it
closely, it is true that raw materials or semi-finished products will cost
generally less than the finished products that they are parts of.
However, that does not mean anything, for, if it does, then almost
all products in all countries would have been produced domestically. The
reason is that this criterion ignores the opportunity cost of resources
that will be necessary to generate foreign exchange savings. Again,
the issue of trade-off between foreign exchange earnings or savings and
other objectives cannot be ignored. Roemer has this to say: "We must
be able to choose among efficient and inefficient foreign exchange-saving
projects, that is, between projects that substitute for large quantities
of imports at a high cost as against ones that earn a small additional
amount of foreigh exchange while providing numerous jobs and using
few scarce domestic resources."1
4.4 Are the Plans Binding?
It is often argued that development planning in non-socialist
countries is essentially a political rather than a technical process.
That is, strategies and policies are formulated less as guidelines for
future development efforts as much as they are made to appease or to
bring forth some sense of hope among the constituents. As such, the
published plans are not binding in so far as government functionaries that
identify and implement projects are concerned. Since investment activities
need not be consistent with the plans, it is not important how inadequate
the latter are in guiding project formulation and evaluation.
For the Philippines, this argument is not totally relevant.
While the plans do serve as political instruments, the government has
passed laws that strive to ensure the successful implementation of the
plans. Through Presidential Decree No. 1200, signed on September 21, 1977,
not only has the Five Year Philippine Development Plan been formally
adopted,'but all government agencies have been also ordered to conform
to the plan and the Secretary of Economic Planning has been authorized
to act on all matters related to the implementation of said plan.
1 Roemer, op.cit. p.
This degree may be viewed as a reflection of the sincerity of the govern-
ment to enforce the plans.1 Of course we cannot be absolutely certain
of the extent to which this decree is not just another political statement.
Section 2 states:
"All developmental activities of the National Government including
the prearation of the national budget, of regional development
councils in the preparation of regional development plans, of local
governments in the preparation of their plans and investment programs,
shall conform and be in accordance with the Five-Year Philippine
Development Plan for 1978 to 1982. The heads of departments, chiefs of
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the govern-
ment, the governing boards and managing heads of government-owned and
controlled corporations, the members of regional development councils
and governing boards and managing heads of regional development
authorities and the members of the governing councils and boards
and the executive heads of local governments including the barangays
are hereby charged with the responsibility and empowered to see to
it that the conduct and activities of their respective organizations
are in accordance with the abovementioned Five-Year Plan."
Section 3 provides:
"The Secretary of Economic Planning, as Director General of the
NEDA, shall have the authority to act, for and on behalf of and
upon consultation with the President, on all matters, including co-
ordination of plan implementation, creation of interagency committees,
issuance of circulars and orders, and promulgation of rules and
regulations, pertaining to the implementation of the Five-Year
Plan."
See Presidential-Decree No. 1200
4.5. Concluding Remarks
The adoption of a MOAPA presupposes the existence of conflicting
objectives that have to be reconciled at the project level. In this chap-
ter, we presented the national objectives and policies that were formulated
to meet the development challenges. We showed, contrary to what the plans
suggest, that the pursuance of these objectives involve trade-offs
which have to be recognized . We demonstrated that the government
failure to do so has resulted in the problem of setting priorities among
projects, in the selection of projects that address principally one or
selected objectives, in the lack of clear directions to project analysts,
and in the potential danger of incorrect analysis. We concluded by saying
that while the plans are political documents, the whole government in-
stitution is expected to conform to them.
In the next chapterwe shall examine to what extent the process
and the outcome of project development in the public sector are in
consonance with the development objectives and policies mentioned above.
CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAMS, AND
THE ISSUE OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In the preceding chapter, we saw that the Philippines Govern-
ment has identified development objectives that are potentially con-
flicting with each other. In this chapter, we will attempt to study
how the public sector deals with the problem of resource allocation
in the light of these competing objectives. We will focus our at-
tention on both the process and the outcome of the planning process.
5.1 Development Strategies and Public Investment Programs
To achieve the various development objectives, the Government
formulates overall and specific sectoral1 strategies and investment
programs.
For the period 1974-77, the development plan had two broad com-
ponents: economic and social improvement. On the economic side,
the emphasis was placed on food production, industrialization, and
infrastructure development. On the social side, the strategy was
to undertake land reform, to promote agricultural cooperative and
rural infrastructure, and to provide greater social facilities and
services.
In comparison, the overall strategy for the 1978-1982 planning
lIn this section the term "sector," does not imply a mutually exclu-
sive aggregation of certain goods and services or activities. We
are adopting the term as it is used in the development plans of the
Philippines where considerable overlapping exists.
2 The 1974-77 plan contains, for the most part, the same strategies
and measurement program enumerated in the 1972-75 Development Plan.
Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77, op.cit., p. 19.
period is broader, incorporating new concerns such as energy, science
and technology and environment. The strategy is two pronged involv-
ing the:
"1) attainment of a dynamic and balanced economy.
particularly through increased agricultural
and industrial production, trade diversifica-
tion and rationalization, transformation of
the energy structure, application of science
and technology and proper management of natu-
ral resources and environment; and 2) more
equitable access to social development op-
portunities and fuller utilization of human
resources in nation-building."i
Envisioned to achieve "increased production alongside better
distribution of income and opportunities," the first strategy im-
plies directing investment and institutional efforts in a balanced
manner "among sectors and among regions which are mutually reinforc-
ing."3 Accordingly, industrialization is intended to complement agri-
cultural development, while the service sector shall support the
rural sector and provide the needed "dynamic push" to the economy."
Rural and regional development are to be pursued through agricultural
production, institutional reforms, and industrial dispersal. The
integrated area development approach is adopted and careful environ-
mental and energy management is to be undertaken.
The second broad strategy is focused on human resources develop-
ment which is treated as an investment. Emphasis is to be placed on
the promotion of the physical aspect (i.e., health, nutrition,
1Five Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, op.cit. p. 8.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4This approach involves a more comprehensive planning and development
of complementory projects. Ibid. pp. 8-10.
housing services), on the intellectural-skill building aspect of man
(i.e., education) and on the fuller untilzation and just compensa-
tion of manpower.
As there are sectoral objectives that were presumably formulated
on the basis of national objectives, there are also sectoral strate-
gies, policies, and programs that were supposedly designed to achieve
these sectoral objectives within the framework of the overall develop-
ment strategies.2 The sectoral plans define the types of goods and
services that have to be produced and discuss the mechanisms of
which their production can be encouraged or undertaken by the govern-
ment. Thus, for both the 1974-77 and 1978-82 National plans,we find
that increases in agricultural production are envisioned to come from
rice, corn and feed grains and from certain types of meat and com-
mercial crops. To achieve this, the government would rely on credit
facilities, infrastructure support, cooperatives formation, land
transfers, the use of highly productive varieties or breeds, and so
on. Thus, we see that sectoral strategies are elaborations of the
broad national strategies.
Ibid. p. 10.
2We said "supposedly" and "personally" because as we shall discuss
later, the planning process did not result in the sequence of acti-
vities as suggested here.
A brief description of these strategies and programs is presented in
Appendix B. It should be made clear that other strategies such as
organizational changes and other schemes that will not be implemented
in terms of "projects" as defined in Part One have been excluded for
the most part. For fuller discussion, see Four Year Development Plan,
FY1974-77, op. cit., and Five Year Philippine Development Plan, FY1978-
1982, op.cit.
4Four Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77, op.cit., Chapter 10 and Five
Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, op.cit., Chapter 5.
5.2 Analysis of Sectoral Development Strategies and Investment
Programs
In the following sections, we shall analyze more closely the
different types of investment strategies and programs that were pre-
sumably formulated within the overall development objectives.
We shall concentrate on proposed projects , focusing on the man-
ner by which the plans address the development objectives and on the
task of project appraisal and selection. We shall analyze proposed
projects from different perspectives: the planning and project
identification processes, the objectives being served, and the selec-
tion of priorities.
5.2.1 The Practice of Planning at the Macro and Project Levels
Although the Philippines has had a long history of planning,2
the formulation of national plans does not show a rapid progress
toward greater rationality in the planning process. In what follows,
I will present a "participant-observer's" view of the practice of
planning with particular reference to the 1978-82 national plan.
A diagram has been prepared in order to provide the reader with
The investment activities listed in the plans are of three types:
on-going, pipeline, and proposed projects. On-going projects are
those whose implementation has been started before the adoption of
the plans. Most of these are carry-overs from the previous plans.
Pipeline projects are those that are programmed for the planned
period and for which funding had been committed. Proposed projects
include all other projects for which funding has not been allocated.
2 The first National plan was prepared in the 1950s. Project plan-
ning had began since the commonwealth period.
an overall picture of the planning process (See Figure 3). It can
be noted that the planning process is characterized by a great deal
of confusion. In this subsection, we shall focus on the deficien-
cies of the process and the role of political influence in project
planning.
A Deficient Planning Procedure
Planning exercises in the Philipines have just begun to approx-
imate the neat recursive models that we find in the literature.2
In fact, in some ways they fall considerably short of even the "basic"
rules of planning. The diagram can mirror to some extent the ap-
parent lack of proper integration of the various planning activities.
Project planning is a separate and distinct activity from macro
On the diagram, the column headings refer to the major role players
in planning. At the national level, there is the President, the
NEDA Board (i.e., the highest planning office, headed by the Presi-
dent), the Investment Coordinating Committee, and other Coordinating
Committees with powers to approve projects. There is also the NEDA,
the technical arm of the NEDA Board. At the sectoral level, we
grouped the important national ministries into two: funding agen-
cies (e.g. the Budget Commission, the Board of Investments, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, etc.), and the implementing
offices. At the regional and local level, we included the NEDA Re-
gional Office, the Regional Ministry, and private sector government
corporation, local government (as one). (In this study, we delibe-
rately excluded the Regional Office of the Budget Commission because
this office had not been established when the 1978-82 Plan was e-
volved). The vertical heading refer to the sequence of planning ac-
tivities from the analysis of existing condition of project funding.
Take note that these activities have been arranged in a sequence that
closely reflects the planning process discussed in Chapter 2 above.
2 See, for instance, A. Lewis, Development Planning, also, N. Islam,
"The Relevance of Development Model to Economic Planning in Devel-
oping Countries," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Sept.
1970, pp. 56-65. For a taste of a variety of sophisticated models,
see C.R. Blitzer, P.B. Clark, and L. Taylor, (Eds.) Economy-Wide
Models and Development Planning, Oxford University Press, 1975.
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or national planning. Generally, the projects identified in the
-plans do not emanate from the objectives and strategies formulated.
The projects evolved through the efforts of local governments, govern-
ment corporations, the private sector and the regional office of
the implementing ministries which are essentially trying to eliminate
specific bottlenecks such as "bad" roads or low tourist receipts.
These projects proponents are generally unconcerned, if not unaware,
of the overall and sectoral objectives and strategies defined at the
national level. On the other hand, the central planning office which
has a wider-understanding of the whole situation, has been involved
more in the formulation of policies and broad strategies that are
presented in the plans than in checking out how consistent the pro-
jects identified are with the overall plans and in finding out which
of these projects can maximize the people's welfare. For the most
part, therefore, the new plans contain a collection of projects that
have been decided in the past (i.e., on-going and pipeline projects),
and a handful of projects which have been proposed in isolation.
by the various line agencies.
To illustrate past process deficiencies, sectoral strategies
have tended to be formulated ahead of overall strategy and sectoral
objectives have tended to be written before the NEDA Board even saw
the draft version of the national objectives. In certain areas the
plans have been characterized by internal inconsistency. For ex-
ample, two different population projections have been used in the
1978-82 plan. Likewise, the development targets are not linked
to the projects developed. It is not so clear whether the increases
lFive-Year Phillipine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, op.cit., pp. 53-184.
in production resulting from the new projects and the expansion
of existing ones will be sufficient to attain the desired rate of
economic growth. The problems related specifically to project devel-
opment are presented in a causal fashion in Figure 4.
At the subnational level, the regional office of NEDA under-
took the typical steps in planning. However, there have been some
disappointing aspects. For one, regional targets were dictated by
the National NEDA although the regional NEDA were perhaps in a bet-
ter position to prepare required projections. Moreover, the sec-
toral strategies have also tended to be formulated independently of
overall strategies. On the better side, new projects were generated
through the active participation of citizen and local government
representatives. However, a most serious problem was that these region-
alplans could not be fully used in the preparation of national plans. In
fact,asof 1978, one year after the national plan was adopted, the re-
gional plans were still being reviewed!
As another critical comment, I would like to paraphrase John G.
Kemeny, the President of Dartmouth College in his metaphoric descrip-
tion of planning process in the United States:2 "Suppose the govern-
ment designed an airplane for you with each inter-agency committee
designing one component of it, and then the (NEDA) at 4 a.m. decided
how the various pieces should be put together. Would you fly on the
airplane?" The Filipino people were indeed flying on an industry
plan, energy plan highway plans, and other specific plans that were
1For example, for expediency, the Census Office's medium population pro-
jection was assumed for all regions.
2 Nena McCain, "The System Does not Work, "The Boston Globe, April 20,
1980, p. Bl.
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put together more or less in that way. To the extent that these
plans form the basis for actual resource allocation, we can say that
the planning process requires serious reassessment.
Role of Political Power in Project Development
An interesting feature of the Philippine planning process is the
flow of influence which affects the outcome of certain planning ac-
tivities. As in other countries, people who have power over the pat-
tern of resource allocation in the Philipines are always the target
of pressures from various interest groups. It has been observed
that many influential project proponents present their projects ideas
(with or without project feasibility studies) or their complaints
directly to the source of power. For lack of other recourse in these
situations,decision-makers sometimes succumb to the pressure by com-
municating favorable endorsements of projects to the appropriate
government instrumentality. Such endorsements tend to be taken as
impositions by these agencies which then prepare favorable project
feasibility or appraisal reports, or, as in the case of the funding
institution, give priority to the projects in question. It is con-
cievable that, in the process, some projects not even mentioned in
the development plans and that probably would have been rejected on
socio-economic grounds could have been implemented at the expense of
higher priority projects.
It is important to recognize that the the seeming irrationality
of the planning process is an offshoot of perfectly reasonable poli-
tical pragmatism. Political leaders who want to stay in office must
allocate resources in such a manner that will maximize their politi-
cal power. Invariably, this translates into projects that favor
the rich and the individuals "with the proper connections." These
beneficiaries may be influencial enough to alter the level of poli-
tical popularity, if not the results of elections.
Although political prudence may explain the deficiencies in the
process and outcome of planning, however, it does not tell the whole
story. It can be argued that there are more efficient ways of achiev-
ing political objectives. Rather than accepting in toto a project
that is proposed by certain powerful people, the politician may use
project analysis to modify the design of the project to achieve the
"second best" results from government investment. For example, as-
sume that a proposed new road in site X will benefit largely the
plantation of Mr. Juan de la Cruz. Assume further that that project
will have to be implemented for political reasons. If the plan as
proposed is to build a first class capital-intensive cement road,
the decision-makers can probably compromise that the road be made of
asphalt and labor intensive technology be used in the construction.
In this way, the politicians can perhaps achieve the "best" tradeoff
between political and socio-economic objectives.
From these general comments about the planning process, let us
take a step forward and observe what really takes place in terms of
actual projects.
5.2.2 Addressing the Development Objectives
Myopic Project Orientation
The various investment activities earmarked in the national
plans appear to have been identified, designed and selected follow-
ing different processes that did not ensure that all development
objectives were considered. Some components of the plans reflect
myopic sectoral and subsectoral. orientation that seem oblivious of
other evelopment concerns. We can take a few examples from the
1978-82 Development Plan to illustrate this point.
1. Proposed large-scale industries such as inte-
grated steel mills, petrochemical complex and
ammonia-ureaprojects are expected to generate
foreign exchange savings (through import-substi-
tution) and contribute to self-reliance. In the
plans, however, there is no indication that the
projects would be efficient (although conceivably
they could be). It also seems that the objectives
of employment generation, equity and environmental
protection have been sidelined.
2. Small-and midium-scale industries are to be en-
2
couraged and provided incentives. While this may
be consistent with the regional dispersal and em-
ployment policies, there is no guarantee that the
projects will be efficient. Neither is there cer-
tainty that they will promote interpersonal equity
and that they will not cause significant environmental
degradation.
Five Year Philippine Development Plan. op. cit., pp. 130-145.
2Ibid.
3The upper 50% of the income groups may well be proponents of these
projects. In these cases credit programs may even promote intra-
regional inequality.
3. Tourism-oriented investments are directed towards
maximizing tourists receipts and thus foreign ex-
change and towards spreading benefits to the dif-
ferent sections of the country. Tourism projects,
however, tend to be located in Metro Manila and
other urban centers and to be sponsored by moneyed
individuals. These projects also tend to be capi-
tal intensive and therefore may not be con-
sistent with the relative resource scarcity of the
country.
4. The selection of key ports wherein investments will
be concentrated was based largely on surrogates of
the efficiency criterion such as the volume and na-
ture of cargo and passenger traffic handled, the
existing and potential economic and social activi-
ties in the area, the extent of the service area
and the availability of supporting road links to
urban, primary, and secondary growth centers.2
On the basis of these criteria, it would be extreme-
ly difficult for depressed areas to receive funding
for port development.
5. Cotton production is to be promoted for self-reli-
ance and presumably also to save foreign exchange
and create employment However, there seems to be
little indication that the country has comparative
lbid. p. 118.
2Ibid. p. 288.
3Ibid. p. 118.
advantage in this area. 94
6. Virtually all municipalities will be provided with
radio-telegraph stations by 1982. The benefactors
include municipalities with a few hundred residents
and communities that are so close to each other
geographically and therefore may not really need
more than one set of facilities. While radio-
telegraph services for each community may appear
justified on social and political grounds, the
investment put on such facilities may have gene-
rated much greater returns had they been channeled
into other sectors of the economy, even in the
same towns.
In these examples, it can be observed that a narrow view of
societal problems may result in solutions that are in contradiction
with some of the other objectives of the country. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine how proponents of projects that are geared towards
particular ends may overlook the negative impacts of these projects.
These negative effects may be so serious that in the final analysis,
they may cancel out or exceed the intended favorable results of such
activities. It may also be argued that the absence in the plans of
indications as to whether the other objectives had infact been con-
sidered may be political strategy of a getting projects funded
"through the backdoor." Clearly, the absence of a broader framework
for project development could result in the selection of sub-optimal
1Ibid. p. 288.
projects when viewed from all the development goals as a whole.
Projects Designed to Meet Selected Objectives
Not all subsectoral programs suffer from the more serious flaw
of shortsightedness. In fact, many more projects were designed in
such a way as to achieve other societal objectives. For example,
industrial programs had been framed not only to achieve income in-
crements, to ease a balance of payment difficulties and to stabilize
prices, but also to promote employment and regional dispersal, among
others. 1
It is interesting to note that some proposed activities seem
to have lost their original features and have become intrisically
multiattribute. For instance, the animal dispersal-programs which
were originally intended to increase meat production only, are now
designed to help .the - poor farmers also. Similarly, the manpow-
er training programs that were intended to improve labor productivi-
ty (read efficiency) have been designed to increase the employment
changes of the poor (read equity).
Policy makers and planners, however, must realize that such at-
tempts, while less myopic, are not generally guided by a coherent
set of development principles. There are two undesirable situations
that can result from the investment choice. One, only a few objec-
tives are being served while the investments are indifferent or de-
trimental to the attainment of other development goals. Two, the
Ibid. pp. 130-145.
2Ibid. p. 120.
economy will have to sacrifice a great deal of the projects' primary
outputs to contribute a little to other objectives.
In the first case, we find that the projects, whose design was
altered to achieve more than one objective, may still neglect other
development objectives. To illustrate, the three most recent Philip-
pines development plans spoke of promoting industries with the great-
est potential for backward and forward linkages. The reasoning is
that the higher the integration, the more objectives are involved,
e.g., economic growth, price stability, etc. However, while there
are some merit for doing this, many objectives may not be subsumed
in intersectoral relationships. For example, environmental, politi-
cal, and equity concerns, among others are virtually ignored.1 A
planner should also be careful in using input-output analysis, a ba-
sic tool in this regard. Thesemodels assume fixed technical coef-
ficients which may not apply in the Philippines where technological
progress is said to be quite rapid. For example, it is observed
that tourism projects (e.g., hotels) are much more capital-intensive
now than they were five-years ago. There are also many tradeoffs
that an input-output table could not show that are worthy of consi-
deration. How do high forward and backward linkages relate to the
value-added contribution of labor, the proportion of imported in-
puts, or to the extent of important substitution or export_. por-
tential? It must be remembered that employment and foreign exchange
Indeed planners may use an interregional input-output matrix to
take inot account interregional inequality. However, to date, there
is no such tool that the Philippines can use, and data are general-
ly so poor that a newly constructed one may not be credible and use-
ful. More importantly, input-output analysis as practiced still has
strong conceptual flaws that limits its use in project selection.
generation are also objectives of the plans.
On the second point, it is important to recognize that the
costs of achieving multiobjective results should be compensated for
by Yhe benefits that would be derived in changing the project de-
sign. For example, conserving the environment and pursuing politi-
cal equity goals through the establishment of communal tree farms
and tree parks within municipalities and cities1 may not be appro-
priate if the areas are not suited for that purpose. Similarly, in-
creasing the "local content" (i.e., inputs) in domestic track manu-
facturing to some arbitrarily selected level2 may result in higher
production cost that is then translated into higher prices and
therefore the loss of welfare of the people.
On the Use of Standards and Ratios
Some sectoral plans contain some operational principles -to
guide project formulation and selection. For instance, it is com-
mon procedure to use general standards (or targets) in the infra-
structure sector: e.g., 2 kilometers of farm to market road per
100 hectares of farm and kilometer of development roads for every
10 kilometer farm to market roads 3; 1 classroom per 36 primary or
34 intermediate pupils . However, considering that these standards
reflect averages, they should not be used as the rule for resource'
allocation. Establishing only one primary school in a sparsely
populated area based on the aforecited standard may discourage
1Ibid. p. 89.
2Ibid. p. 141.
3Four-Year Development Plan FY 1974-77 op.cit., p. 183.
4Ibid., p. 325.
from attending school the young students who 'aave to walk long
distances.
The blind use of these standards may also lead to great ineffi-
ciencies. The terrain and other land features in some areas may
dictate less than the standard road to farm ratios. Therefore,
using standards only, while useful for national or regional plan-
ning, may be of limited use when designing individual projects.
5.2.3 Intersectoral and Intrasectoral Priorities: Selecting
Priorities among "Priorities"
In another vein, the sectoral and subsectoral investment stra-
tegies do not facilitate project appraisal and eventual selection.
In the first place, the hierarchy of importance among sectoral and
subsectoral outputs is not made explicit. Phrases such as "con-
sidered vital," "equally important," and "priority is placed" are
quite common and appear to be rhetorical (i.e., techniques to make
the plan sound elegant) and not clues as to the relative importance
of investments areas. There are also sections of the plans which
state that this or that activity will be undertaken or that certain
goods and services will increase, but the plans do not specify where
and when these projects are to be implemented.
Given the numerous investment options and assuming that they
will all generate positive socio-economic returns, the next ques-
tion relates to programming. Admittedly, this issue is partly
technical: e.g., the dam should not come after the irrigation
components. However, to a large extent, the choice also boils down
to whether fish conservation, for example, is more important than
electrification or irrigation or the provision of water supply and
sewerage. Again, the plans do not provide signals as to how deci-
sions should be made.
To be sure,formal attempts have been made to identify the pri-
orit programs and projects across sectors (See Table 2). One may
therefore argue that these priorities had been selected precisely
to "provide the guidelines to the activities of individual sectors
for the program period," and that the selection of priority pro-
grams had been made in consonance with the development objectives.
However, we can raise a number of arguments that point to the inade-
quacy of these listings both in providing guiding principles for
project section and in serving the development objectives.
The relative importance of these "priority" investment areas
is not made explicit in the 1974-77 and 1978-82 plans. It is not
clear how economic programs rank among themselves and in compari-
son with social and environmental-oriented investments. The earli-
er the (1972-75) plan made it clear that the 15 "priorities" were
"equally important from an integral development stance."2 However,
this plan did not spell out what such policy statement meant opera-
tionally. Should the allocation of resources be more or less equal
among these programs on the premise that the return on investment
will be the same (since, after all, the outputs are weighted equal-
ly). Should there be a equal number of projects (which does not
make much sense)? Perhaps the best interpretations is that the pub-
lic investment portfolio should generate comparable outputs in all
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 19.
Table 2 Priority Programs/Projects,
1972-75 1974-7
1972-75, 1974-77, and 1978-82a
7 1978-82
Economic
1. Infrastructure
2. Food production
3. Family planning
4. Tourism
5. Export Promotion
Social
6. Manpower Training
7. Educational reform
8. Land Reform
9. Land distribution
10. Social welfare and
community development
11. Cooperatives
12. Rural electrification
13. Health
14. Housing
15. Cottage industries and
employment
Economic
1. Infrastructure
2. Food production
3, Family planning
4. Tourism
Social
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11,
12.
Education and Manpower
development
Land Reform
Social Welfare and
community development
Cooperatives
Rural electrification
Health
Housing
Integrated regional
projects
Economic
1, Utilities and other
public woris
2, Agricultural production
and marketing
3, Industrial development
Social
4, Human Resource development
5. Countryside and rural
development c d
6. Social infrastructure
7. Metro-Manila developmente
Environmental
8, National resource and
environment
a Categorization based on the predominant development goal orientation,
b Encompassing health, nutrition, family planning, education, and manpower development.
c Covering nationwide agrarian reform, small- and medium-scale industries, communal type
infrastructure, rural health units, rural electrification, telecommunication services, etc.
d
Encompassing the physical aspects of health, social housing, government administration.
e Urban projects: housing, slum upgrading, resettlement, rail commuter services, circum-
ferential road.
f Covering reforestation, energy source exploration and develoment and environmental
protection including forest development and tree planting programs.
Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Four Year Development Plan, 1972-75,
Republic of the Philippines, Four Year Development Plan, 1974-77.
Republic of the Philippines, Eive Year Philippine Development Plan. 1978-82,
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15 areas. Even if this is correct, we still are not told how to
compare the outputs of these different programs.1
With or without weights being placed on the priority areas, it
would still be necessary for decision makers to make use of other
tools, particularly project analysis to ensure that the aggregate
project outputs, however consolidated, would be maximized. It
should be obvious that it is not automatic for all or any of the
projects that fall under any of these preferred investment areas
to produce high returns to society. For example, an expensive
health spa may be a human resource development or social infrastruc-
ture project but may not achieve social and economic objectives at
all.
Meanwhile, a casual look at the list of favored investments
will reveal critical gaps in the investments. It is difficult to
imagine how the 1974-77 plan could be expected to help in attaining
a high 10.7% annual growth in industrial output and a 10% yearly
1The analysis does not change much when we move from intersectoral
to project selection. Consider for instance, the "Priority Pro-
grams and Projects" o'f the Agriculture, Agrarian Reform and Cooper-
ative Development sector under the 1977-74 Plan. There were three
broad "priority" programs: production programs, marketing and stor-
age facilities programs, and agrarian reform programs. Under the
production programs, there were 15 "priority" investment programs/
projects and under the marketing and storage programs there were 5.
The agrarian reform programs, meanwhile, consist of 2 programs.
Ignoring for the meantime the potential competition for funds be-
tween agriculture and other sectors, like industry, even within the
agriculture sector alone, the comparison of projects would not be
easy. Apparently there were no hierarchical ordering of these in-
vestment areas. From these plans, it is not clear how important
one activity was compared to another as in the case of land settle-
ment and food production. It is obvious that these programs and
projects would still have to undergo more rigid tests in order to
ascertain which activities would maximize the well-being of the
people.
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increase in exports when industrialand export promotion programs
were not considered priority projects.1
An interesting question, then is, how the Government actually
selects and sets priorties among projects? Admittedly, this is an
area where future research can be focused. Very little has been
documented about what the Government actually does, as opposed to
what it thinks or says it does. I would venture to say however, that
the approaches that the Government use are not systematic and consis-
tent. I will discuss below two approaches that are observed to
be used within the public sector: the election approach and the
selection of priority locations for priority projects.
Election Approach
One approach which is not infrequently utilized in interpro-
ject selection is what can be called the election technique wherein
decision makers simply "vote" on which projects to implement first.
The technique may be rationalized in the sense that there is an im-
plicit evaluation process involved. Each evaluator is consciously
or unconsciously assessing the relative importance of proposed pro-
jects in terms of some unspecified criteria. The technique is com-
monly practiced in the local and even national (ministry) level
where the executives simply brainstorm on the list of projects be-
fore coming out with preferential ratings. Apparently, the nature
of the method is such that a lot of biases and politics is in-
volved. A project may be selected in the process simply because it
1 Ibid. pp. 145-199.
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benefits the friends of evaluators, if not any one of them theselves,
or because it was the mayor's preference (lest the staff member finds
himself without promotion or job the next day).
Priority Locations for Projects
For certain subsectors, the plans mentioned specific sites for
their projects, sometimes with statements as to their relative pri-
orities. For example, the latest plan states that in the next five
years, port works will center on the improvement of 4 primary ports
(i.e., Manila, Cebu, Cagayan de Oro, and Davao) and 11 secondary
sea ports (i.e., San Fernando, Casambalangan/San Vicente, Mariveles,
Batangas, Legaspi, Iloilo, Pulupandan, Tacloban, Zamboanga, Butuan/
Nasipit and Polloc.1
It appears that in these cases, the choice of location was
based either on pure efficiency or on pure equity considerations.
For example, the 1974-77 and 1978-82 port development plans have
sought to invest in a few key areas where the economic returns were
expected to be enormous. The following criteria were used: concen-
tration of population and economic activities, centrality of loca-
tion and other geographic features, the availability of location and
other geographic features, the availibility of supporting road links
2
to urban, primary, and secondary growth centers.
1Five Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, pp. 264-265.
2Another example is the selection of the tourist priority areas for
FY 1974-77 which.was based on criteria having economic underpinnings:
uniqueness of tourists attractions, concentration of tourist attrac-
tions, availability of accomadation facilities and other services,
and accessibility using all modes of transportation with special
emphasis on all transport. See Four Year Development Plan, FY 1974-
77, op.cit. p. 221 and p. 245.
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In the area of local transport system, on the other hand, equity
rather than efficiency appears to be the principal concern for the
next five years. As the 1978-82 plan puts it;
"Priority is given to depressed areas like Samar
and many parts of Mindanao where the degree of
accessibility (in terms of km. per square km. of
arable area and per population) is lower than the
national average. In these and in similar other
areas transport facilities will serve as an incen-
tive for increased participation form the rural
population in economic activities. The existence
of these facilities, furthermore, will serve as a
unifying medium by bringing the people living in
isolated islands and far-flung areas into the
mainstream of social and economic activities in
the urban centers."1
Even under these circumstances project planning is not very
easy. In the first place we are not informed about the relative
importance of the projects in each location. In our example, how
do the primary ports rank among themselves and in relation to the
secondary ports? If there is a fixed amount of investment capital,
will allocation be made equally among these sites (which may not
be economically prudent) or will it be concentrated on a few, in
which case the outcome may not be equitable). It is not also clear
what the term "priority" means in these situations. Does it mean
that all pertinent investments will flow only to these selected
sites? If not, what percentage will go elsewhere?
This method of selecting priority locations (or sectors) the
possibility of malinvestment. These plans might have misguided
investment allocation. A preferred project must have turned out
to be socially undesirable, i.e., the net benefits (however defined)
1Five Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, op.cit., p.248.
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might be low or even negative, or at least less than what could be
derived elsewhere. Consider, for instance, the Tourism plan for
1978-82. The sector's plan states that incentives would be limited
to Region I (Jilocos Sur, Benguetand La Union), Region IV (Metro-
Manila), Region IV-A (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas and Quezon), and
Region IX (Zamboanga del Sur). Apart from the problem of priority
rankings of these locations, this policy is conceptually erroneous
even on efficiency grounds. Projects situated in these areas will
not always generate net aggregate economi-c benefits .that are greater than
those in the non-preferred sites. More importantly, the location
may be viewed only a surrogate of financial and marketing analysis.
In the final analysis, it is probable that the projects for which in-
centives were provided did not need any more than information dissemi-
nation or perhaps accessible but unsubsidized credit facilities be-
cause the financial reward itself could have been enough.
Furthermore, this criterion neglects other development objec-
tives such as regional development. We can argue that there is no
national policy statement stating that tourism would only be geared
towards maximizing foreign exchange and in achieving efficiency. In
this respect, therefore, the prevailing tourism policy is inconsis-
tent with the overall development objectives.
5.2.4 Additional Comments
The preceeding discussion should not be construed to mean that
the projects cited must not be implemented. Perhaps some, if not,
all of them should be undertaken becasue they contribute to the
general welfare of the people, their well-being defined in terms of
the objectives of the plans. What we are simply arguing against is
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the apparent piecemeal approach to planning because it may produce
sub-optimal resource allocation vis-a-vis the overall goals. It
is imperative that planners and policymakers see to it that the
broader objectives of the economy and the tradeoffs among the dif-
ferent goals are recognized during the project development process.
5.3 Public Investment Allocation and Regional Development
The effectiveness of the planning and plan implementation pro-
cesses may be judged by the extent to which the planned expenditure
pattern is consistent with the development objectives spelled out
in the plan and how close the actual resources allocation comes to
what was planned.2 Accordingly, this section is devoted to the analy-
sis of planned and actual investment patterns as they relate to the
'During my research, I came across an investment proposal that ap-
peared to be inefficient. The 1974-77 plan mentioned the flood con-
trol and drainage program that would benefit 3 river basins (i.e.,
Manila and Suburbs, Pampanga and Agno) and cost about V826.5 million.
The plan estimates average annual flood losses of V35.2 million.
Assumingthat the projects would recover 80% of these losses (which
is already optimistic) or 128.2 million, and assuming a discount
rate equal to the anticipated annual increase in the value of flood
losses, it would have a pay back period of 29.3 years. Considering
possible maintenance costs and the relatively shorter life of flood
control projects, this project does not appear to be economically
justified.
2
Obviously, the investment allocation pattern in the plan should
reflect the development objectives in the plan. It also goes
without saying that the actual allocation of investment is expect-
ed to conform to the plan, unless there were serious and totally
unanticipated problems which required a drastic modification of
the investment plans. (Admittedly, there are many exogenous fac-
tors that may create a gap between proposed and actual investment
patterns. An effective planning process, however, provides some
allowance for unexpected events, i.e., natural calamities),
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achievement of regional development.1
The Phillipines has had a rich history of efforts toward region-
al development and industrialization dating back to 1961 when the new
defunct contress created two regional development authorities, It was,
however, only in the 1972-75 plan that this spatial concern was intro-
duced as one of the major national objectives. The importance given to
this regional policy by the Government is reflected by the 1978-82 plan
which devotes one whole chapter to regional development strategies and
investment programs. It would therefore be interesting to determine to
what extent: 1) actual resource allocation has been consistent with
the regional development objective; 2) planned (1978-82) public invest-
ment is expected to contribute to the same objectives; and 3) the inter-
regional investment pattern relates to interregional development.
5.3.1 Historical Analysis of Interregional Investment Pattern
There are strong indications that the pattern of public invest-
ment in the past did not conform with the government's objective of
spreading the benefits of development to a greater proportion of
1With respect to the Philippine situation, it -is difficult to undertake
this kind of analysis in a comprehensive manner because of the nature
of the development objectives and because of data limitations. Contri-
butions to environment and political goals, for instance, are extremely
difficulty to measure. Project impact on interrpersonal income equality
is measureable (e.g., proportion of benefits accuring to the lowest 30%
of income classes), but project planning as presently practiced in the
Philippines almost generally does not dwell on this aspect. Investment's
effects on the general level can conceivably be calculated, but projects
are generally too small to create tremendous movements in the price in-
dex. These constraints leave me with very little choice.
2For excellent analysis of regional development institutions in its his-
torical perspective, See R. Bado, 'Ifhe Political Administrative Context
and the Implementation of Regional Policies; An Inquiry into some Inter-
connections (The Philippines; A Case Study) Masteral Thesis (unpub-
lished), Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, 1978, pp.
46-98. See also, R. Bacani, Towards a Regional Dispersal Policy in
the Philippines, Masteral Thesis (unpublished), Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1979, pp. 68-105; "A Note in the Philippines Experience
in Regional Planning,' (mimeo) NEDA, RDC Technical Staff. Discussion
Paper No. XI-74-001, Davao City, April, April 28, 1974.
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1
the population. Recent studies have shown that past infrastruc-
ture expenditure was concentrated on a few regions particularly
Metropolitan Manila (MMA or Region IV). This occured despite the
adoption of regional development and industrialization as one of the
development goals as early as 1971.
An analysis of regional investment expenditures in the 1971-73
period have been as skewed in favor of some areas as in the 1959-61
peirod. Between FY 1959 and FY 1961, the government allocated close
to 50% of its total capital expenditure in the Southern Tagalog
Region, with a considerable proportion flowing- into Greater Manila
and its suburbs (See Table 3). In 1960, this region accounted for
only 20.5% of total population.2 The sectoral pattern was even more
concentrated. For portworks and buildup, schools, and hospitals,
the government allocated some 70% of the total expenditure on
these sectors.
To some extent, the distribution would seem to have been more
diversified during the FY 1971-73 period. Southern Tagalog (Region
IV) which accounted for 23.0% of Philippine population , only ac-
counted for 28.3%. However, this figure canbe misleading. In the first
place, only Central Luzon (Region III) which is contiguous to Region IV
appears to have benefitted from this change in expenditure pattern
lSee for instance, E.P. Javier, "Economic, Demographic and Political
Determinants of Regional Allocation of Government Expenditure in
the Philippines," April 1975 (NEDA-EPRS Discussion Paper). See
also, R. Bacani, Masteral Thesis, op. cit. pp.. 193-200.
2 In 1960, Southern Tagalog (including the Metro-Manila area) had a
total population of 5,544,000 while the whole Philippines had an
estimated 27,088,000 population, Republic of the Philippines,
1978 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, NEDA, 1978, pp. 24-26.
3In 1970, Southern Tagalog (including Greater Manila) and the Philip-
pines had an estimated population of 8,423,000 and 36,684,000, re-
spectively. Ibid.
Table 3 Allocation of Infrastructure Expenditure, by Sector and by Region (in percent)
All Infrastructure Portworks Waterworks Irrigation
Flood Control Buildings,Schools
& Drainage & Hospitals
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
1959- 1971- 1959- 1971- 1959- 1971- 1959- 1971- 1959- 19
61 73 61 73 61 73 61 73 61 7
FY FY FY
71- 1959- 1971- 1971-
3 61 73 73
I 4.8
II 4.4
4.2
6,3
III 7.0. 27,8
2.9
1,1
0.2
2.9
0.1
1,1
7.6
2,5
5,4
1,0 6,5,
0,9 13,8 4,2
3,9
3,5
6,2
1,8
2.9 58,0 43,2 37,6 37.6
0,2 5,7
0,7 2,7
1,2 10,0
IV 49,6 28,3 70.2 63.4 48.4 89,3 10,6 5,6 .8,1 29,5 68,9 49,6 16,7
V 4.3
VI 7.1
VII 1.9
VIII 5,9
IX 1.6
X 2.3
XI 11.1
7.2
1.8
2,9
8,8
2,2
8.9
1,6
3.7
2.9
4.2
4,6
3,1
3,9
3,1
4.5
1,8
2,4
1,5
4,9
2,0
9,0 10.1
2.9
7.8
1.3
3,6
4,0 12,2
1,9 19,7
0,4 17,8
0,2
0,6
0,3
2,0
0.5
0,0
6,5
1,7
1,2 10.9
2,0
0.0
4,0
3,2
0,1 11,8
7,9
4,6
3,3
0,4
0,0
1,8
8,8 10,1
4,7
3,7
1,5
4,8
2,7
3,3
4,3
3,9 13.6
3,5 7,1
W- 3,6
0,3
7.7
0,4 14,4 16,9
V. 0,4
0,0 0,8
24,9. 0,9
0,9
8,8
2,0
PHIL. 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Based on regional classification in 1974, The present Region XII was formed by combining 2 provinces from
Region X and 3 provinces from Region XI, One province from Region X was transferred to Region XI, Region
IV includes the Metropolitan Manila Area (Region IV-A in the new regional groupings).
Source: Ramon Bacani, Towards a Regional Dispersal Policy in the Philipines (Masteral Thesis, unpublished)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 1979, p, 201,
REGION
High-
ways
5,5
18,3
9,3
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Compared to its share in
the FY 1959-61 of 7%, Region III received almost 28% of total in-
frastructure expendiutres in FY 1971-73. At the sectoral level,
the allocation structure eigher improved only slightly or became
worse. For instance, government expenditure on water works on FY
1971-73 went almost entirely to Region IV (which received 89.3%
of total investment). For flood control and drainage, the share of
Region IV increased from 18% in FY 1959-61 to about 30% in FY 1971-
73. For Portworks and buildings, schools and hospitals, Region IV
accounted for a substantial 63 % and 50%, respectively.
The interregional impact of past government efforts with respect
to infrastructure and ulities development may be gleamed from the
level of services in the regions. In 1973, Region IV was the only
region with all its cities and municipalities supplied with electric
service (See Table 4). It also had a tremendously high telephone
density, per capita income, and national roads per square kilometer
area. It therefore should not be surprising that the centripetal
forces of Region IV are so strong that industries generally prefer
to operate there.
5.3.2 The 1978-82 National Plan and Regional Development
We might anticipate greater optimism about the regional alloca-
tion of infrastructure funds for the 1978-82 planning period. After
all, it will have been close to a decade since the government openly
stated that it was concerned about interregional inequality income.
1R. Bacani, op. cit. p. 43.
Table 4 Selected Physical Indicators, by Region, 1972
Per cent of Cities National Roadsb
and Municipalities Telephonea Per Capita Power Per Square
with Electric Service Density Consumption (KWH) Kilometer Area
LUZON
I Ilocos 56.97 1.47 72.90 0.095
II Cagayan VAlley 20.56 0.76 2.82 0.055
III Central Luzon 90.65 4.73 126.10 0.082
IV Metropolitan Manila 100.00 71.48 1,239.37 1.222
IV-A Southern Tagalog 74.31 3.30 660.09 0.071
V Bicol 63.16 41.23 13.12 0.089
VISAYAS
VI Western Visayas 53.85 5.38 26.38 0.990
VII Central Visayas 52.67 7.30 56.83 0.110
VIII Eastern Visayas 48.91 1.15 7.83 0.087
MINDANAO
IX We2stern Mindanao 39.19 1.15 15.98 0.046
X Northern Mindanao 50.00 2.75 115.08 0.063
XI Southern Mindanao 48.05 5.70 99.02 0.049
XII , Central Mindanao 37.35 1.15 797.24 0.047
a Telephone per 1,000 population
b National roads are roads of nationwide or interprovincial significance.
Sources: NEDA Annual Report 1973
Bureau of Communications
Physical Planning Strategy for the Philippines, Vol. X, Power 1973
Project Monitoring Staff, NEDA
From: Ramon C. Bacani, Towards a Regional Dispersal Policy in the Philippines, Masteaal Thesis,
(unpublished), MIT, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 1979, p. 43.
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Unfortunately, the few consolidated data on infrastructure
projects programmed between 1978 and 1982 show a disappointing investment
pattern. The MMA still account for a substantial percentage of total planned
investment in highways and portworks (Table 5), Apart from these, there
are massive infrastructure build-up planned for the EMA in the areas of
housing, airport, water supply and sewerage and other subsectors,1 A
number of new projects at MMA such as the large commercial-industrial
estate complementing a resettlement project are not even mentioned in
the Plan.
The planned development, while perhaps justifiable on economic
grounds is not in conformity with other national objectives and policies.
The programmed commercio-industrial estate in the MMA seem to run counter
to regional development policies that include a specific presidential
directive which bans the location of industries within a 50 kilometer
radius of Manila (except for export industries). These investment decisions
seem to indicate that the Government has not placed the necessary premium
for projects in depressed regions as one would expect if regional
development is indeed an important objective like-economic growth.
5.3.3 Regional Infrastructure Pattern and Growth Differential
It seems reasonable to suspect that such interregional imbalance
in resource allocation may have contributed to some extent to the present
disparities in income and level of development among regions. As a colleague
puts it: "Perhaps it is not purely accidental that these regions
(vhicfi e favbed by rho distributi~n of infrastructure
1 See Republic of the Philippines, Profile of Selected Development Projects,
1978-82, Vol. II of the Five-Year Philippine Development Plan.
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Table 5 Distribution of Highway and Portworks Investments, 1978-82,
by Region,
HIGHWAYS
PHILIPPINES 100.0
30.7Luzon
I
II
III
IV + IV-A
3.4
3.2
1.2
19.7
PORTWORK$
100.0
7 27,6
2,2
1.8
1.3
20.0
3.2
Visayas
VII
VIII
Mindanao
16..
7.8
6.2
2.2
8.1
2.1
1.9
1.2
2.9XII
2.3
9.9
2.9
2.7
4.3
16.3
3.2
4.8
4.5
3.8
INTERREGIONAL OR
NATIONWIDE
Source: Republic of the Philippines,
Plan, 1978-82.
Five-Year Philippine Development
45.0 46.2
expenditures) also rank as the most economically developed."l The
argument is that such a discriminating pattern of investment helped
create a few highly urbanized regions at the same time that other
regions did not even have the essential infrastructure and utilities
services. These physically developed regions then became extremely
attractive to foreign and domestic investors.2
This, however, is only one flaw within an interactive system.
The past regional allocation of investment appears to be a result
also of the development strategies of the 1950s and 1960s which called
for capital concentration in a few regions that possessed greater
potential for rapid industrialization. A recent study suggested
population level, urbanization, industrialization and commerciali-
zation as the major determinants of the regional allocation of pub-
lic expenditures in the country. It further indicated that the
expenditure pattern may well be a consequence, rather than a cause
of regional growth. That is, the more developed a region became,
the greater was the demand for infrastructure.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate causal re-
lationship pertaining to the regional allocation of public investment
amd economic growth. For this report, the essential fact to consider
is that many regions did not benefit in the past and that it does
not appear that these regions will benefit in the future from govern-
ment infrastructure programs to the extent one would anticipate if
1R. Bacani, op.cit. p. 193. words in parenthesis added.
2This may be substantiated by the distribution of BOI registered pro-
jects. See Section 6.6 below.
3See E.P. Javier, "Economic Demographic and Political Determinants to
the Regional Allocation of Government Infrastructure Expenditure in
the Philippines," in Journal of Philippine Development, No. 6. Vol.
II, No. 2, 1976.
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one assumed that the plans are really effective in achieving the
objective of regional development.
This is not to say, however, that the past actual and the future
planned investment is totally irrational. To argue that the invest-
ment pattern should be inversely proportional to the level and/or
rate of regional development would in fact be also myopic. In other
wordseven the pursuit of regional development should be planned in
the light of the other development objectives. The "social" oppor-
tunity costs of dispersing investments must be related to the social
values of regionally dispersed investment. Nevertheless, since an
ex-ante or ex post facto analysis of the interregional resource
allocation pattern is observed to show very little improvement to-
wards regional dispersal of investments, it may be argued that it is
because the economic benefits and costs are given substantial weights
in the investment analysis. That may indicate a need for a reassess-
ment of evaluation process.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
Public investment is an important tool for achieving the devel-
oping objectives of the country. It is particularly essential in
Admittedly, it is difficult to ascertain the optimum regional disper-
sal of investment because there are no standards to compare it with.
To say that the regional investment allocation should be proportional
to the relative size of the population is to ignore the relative
economic contributions of the regions. As we have been suggesting
throughout this report, investment decisions will have to take into
account the regional development objective as well as the other na-
tional objectives. Nonetheless, the lack of clear trend toward more
regionally dispersed investment may be a strong indication that re-
gional development may have been considered as less important then,
say, economic objectives.
2My impression is that there is a simultaneous interaction between
economic growth and infrastructure investment, i.e., an increase in
economic growth leads to an increase in infrastructure spending, and
vice-versa.
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areas (both sectoral and spatial) in which the private sector for
certain reasons, is not expected to fully engage. It is also help-
ful in expanding the benefits of development to reach the poor and
the depressed.
In this chapter, we studied the extent to which the processs
and the outcome of public investment planning contributed to the
development goals set fourth in the national plans. We noted that the
planning process permitted a weak link between development objec-
tives and projects. As a result, many of the national objectives
were left out in the identification, design, and appraisal of govern-
ment projects. There was also virtually no formal mechanism by
which projects may be compared and ranked within and across sectors.
We showed that setting priorities to sectors or locations can be
misleading and can lead to wrong decisions.
We tested the efficacy of the plans in attaining regional
development and industrialization. We observed that past resource-
allocation favored Metro-Manila and its adjacent regions. Analyzing
the 1978-82 plan and other information available to us, we concluded
that a substantially improved interregional investment pattern can-
not be expected in the near future. We argued that the spatially
concentrated distribution of public expenditure has led to increased
interregional inequality in income and development. All these take
place despite national plans calling for increased regional develop-
ment. We suggested that, although there is no evident shift in in-
terregional investment pattern, we are not saying that the Metro
Manila Area should not receive investments, We simply pointed out
the potential flaw in resource allocation planning. In fact, we
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stressed that the pursuit of regional development should not be
planned in isolation but in a framework that allows an understand-
ing of the implications of regionally dispersed investments in the
achievement of other objectives.
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CHAPTER 6 INFLUENCING PRIVATE INVESTMENT
In Chapter 5, we tried to understand the practice of public
investment planning in the context of the national objectives. From our
analysis, we concluded that the process and the outcome of resource
allocation in the public sector are not consistent with what the Govern-
ment says or thinks it does, i.e., to employ development projects as a
major vehicle for achieving the various national objectives. We recog-
nized the role that politics play in this environment. Nevertheless, we
argued that the adoption of a formal framework for evaluating various
project impacts and also for setting priorities within and among sectors
could have minimized the mistakes and the difficulties in the allocation
of government resources..
Some of us may wonder whether our conclusions in Chapter 5 apply
in other related areas as well. Basing from what we read in the papers,
the national plans, and the pertinent laws, we may mention,as a possible
exception, the Board of Investments which provides fiscal and other incen-
tives to preferred investment projects.
To complement the preceeding chapter, therefore, we will analyse
the manner in which the Government tries to influence private investment
activities. Specifically, we will dwell on the functions, operational
procedures, and outputs of the Board of Investments (BOI). We will focus
on five dimensions of the investment and export incentive systems: 1) the
policy objectives; 2) the nature of incentives granted; 3) the formulation
In the following sections, the Board of Investment is also referred to
as the Board or as the BOI.
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of the annual Priorities Plan; 4) the procedural aspect of project apprai-
sal; and 5) an ex post facto analysis of BOI-registered projects with
reference to the national objectives of regional development and employ-
ment expansion. As a way of introducting the subject matter, however,
we will provide briefly the institutional background.
6.1 The Board of Investments
The Board of Investments is the principal government institution
responsible for providing incentives to preferred private investment and
export activities. Created in 1967 through Republic Act (R.A.) No. 5186,
otherwise known as the Investment Incentives Act (IIA), the BOI is charged
inter-alia, with the formulation and execution of annual Investment Prior-
ities Plans (IPP). In 1970, the Board's functions were expanded through
the enactment of R.A. No. 6135, better known as the Export Incentives
Act (EIA) 1 to include the preparation and administration of annual Export
Priorities Plans (EPP).2
6.2 Declaration of Policy
The policy statements corresponding to the IIA1 and the
1 R.A. Nos. 5186 and 6135 have since been amended twice, through
Presidential Decrees Nos. 92 and 485. In what follows, the discussion
will refer to these Acts as amended.
2 In this report, the IPP and the EPP are referred to also as "Priorities
Plans" that are distinct from the National Plans.
"To accelerate the sound development of the national economy in conso-
nance with the principle and objectives of economic nationalism, and
in pursuance of a planned, economically feasible and practicable dis-
persal of industries, under conditions which encourage competition and
discourage monopolies, it is . . . the policy of the state to encourage
. . . investments which increase national income most at the least cost,
increase export, bring greater economic stability, provide more opportu-
nities for employment, raise the standard of living of the people and
provide for an equitable distribution of wealth." Capital-intensive pio-
neer enterprises utilizing heavily domestic materials, in joint venture
with substantial Filipino capital are welcome. Section 2. R.A. No. 5186.
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EIA1 indicate that these Acts are directed towards many but not all of
the development objectives set forth in the national plans. In the Invest-
ment Incentives Act, economic growth (which encompasses the full utili-
zation of domestic resources), employment creation, economic nationalism,
improvement of the balance of payments, regional industrialization, and
equity are clearly the objectives of the incentive system.2 An important
consideration is obviously missing here: the environmental-based goal.
There is not even a statement suggesting that environmental conservation
or protection shall be considered in the formulation of the Priorities
Plans3 and/or in the apprisal of projects. In other words, the IIA has
not been modified in accordance with changes in the development objectives.
Similarly, the policy declared in the EIA refer only to economic
growth, employment generation, balance of payment stability, and economic
nationalism. No mention is made of environmental, interpersonal equity
and regional development objectives. The lack of mention of regional
development is perhaps an oversight because the EIA provides special
incentives to regionally disperesed enterprises. At any rate, it appears
that the EIA is not expected to contribute much to the non-economic
objectives.
The EIA states that it is, state policy to encourage and diversify
exports, of service and manufactures that utilize domestic materials to
. the fullest extent, and to develop new export markets to achieve
increases in production and employment, foreign exchange earnings,
hasten the economic development of the nation, and assure that the
benefits of development accue to the Filipino people. Section 2,
R.A. No. 6135.
2
In later discussion, we shall show that the provisions of the IIA
do not really reflect and may contribute negatively to the objective
of "equitable distribution of wealth."
3 One possibility is to add the phrase "which does not generate pollution
beyond tolerable level" as another attribute of the preferred industries.
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In another vein, the IIA policy states that the dispersal of indus-
tries has to be "planned, economic and practicable." On closer analysis,
it can be argued that each word in this phrase implies something that
limits severely the success of attempts to disperse industries.
1) The term "planned" as applied to the Philippines connotes, a
political decision, a judgment which is likely to be based on a minimum
of technical and financial feasibility and a maximum of subjective pre-
ference. Such a process discriminates against depressed areas which
usually do not have much lobbying power and against commercially less.
profitable but socially desirable projects.
2) The term "economic" implies the use of social accounting wherein
the benefits and costs reflect theirreal values to society. It implies
the use of the term "opportunity costs" which is defined as the "benefit
of the next best alternative use." At the minimum, it means that the
economic benefits exceeds the economiccosts. It can, however, also indi-
cate that the projects should produce the maximum net economic benefits.
In any event, this criterion ignores the interpersonal and spatial inci-
dence of benefits and costs. To be sure, society may place greater social
(as against pure economic) value on the outputs and inputs accruing to
the poorer individuals or regions. Moreover, should the Government
translate the term "economic" to the "highest net economic benefit," then
the decision rule will favor industries in the Metro-Manila Area where
they may reap scale and external economies, among others..
3) The term "practicable" indicates technical and financial feasi-
bility. To the extent that it means financial viability, some projects
might not be dispersed in the regions because they would not be commer-
cially profitable, even if a socio-economic benefit cost analysis would
1A2
have indicated that they are desirable from society's viewpoint.
4) The term "and' means the satisfaction of all three aforementioned
criteria. Clearly, this condition puts tremendous constraints on indus-
trial dispersal and regional development since an unplanned, uneconomic
(in classical "efficiency" context), or or financially lesasprofitable
projects may not be promoted.
In recapitulation, the objectives of the IIA and the EIA do not
include some of the development goals. of the Government. We also noted
that the implicit conditions for regional dispersal, a surrogate for
regional development, limit the capacity of the incentive systems. to
achieve such objective.
6.3 Structure of Incentives and the Development Objectives
Under the IIA and the EIA, the BOI awards to inventors and enter-
prises sets of incentives, the components of which dependent the extent of
local ownership and participation and on the nature of the preferred
activity. The BOI incentives are summarized briefly below (Table 6 2
6.3.1 Nature of Incentives
All investors in a BOI-registered enterprise are entitled to the
protection of patents and other proprietory rights, tax exemption of
invested capital gains, and preference in receiving financial assistance
from the Government. Philippine Nationals with investments in registered
1 In latter sections, we shall show that the Act is very ineffective in
achieving regional dispersal of industries. See section 6.6 below.
2 See Appendix D for greater details. See section 3.
See Appendix D(section 3) for definition.
Table 6 Summary of Incentives under the Investment Incentives Act and
Presidential Decree Nos. 92 and 485
Export Incentives Act as Amended by
Rights and guarantees to registered enterprises
Export Inentives Art
Export Export Service
producer trader exporter
Investment Incentiyes Act
Filipmo-owned Foreign.
owzned
Pioneer Nonpioneer pioneer
Basic rights and guarantees under the constitution
Right to repatriate investments and remit earnings*
Right to remit foreign exchange to service foreign loans and obligations arising
from technological assistance contracts*
Freedom from expropriation ofiinvestment
Freedom from requisition of investment, except in event of war or national
emergency and only for the duration thereof
Deduction of organizational and preoperational expenses from taxable income
over a period of not more than ten years from start of operation
Deduction of labor-training expenses from taxable income equivalent to half of
expenses but not more than 10 percent of direct labor wage
Accelerated depreciation
Carry-over as deduction from taxable income of net operating losses incurred
in any of the first ten years immediately following the year of such loss
Exemption from tariff duties and compensating tax on importations of
machinery, equipment, and spare parts
Tax credit equivalent to 100 percent of the value of compensating tax and
customs duties that would have been paid on machinery, equipment, and
spare parts (purchased from a domestic manufacturer) had these items been
imported
Tax credit for tax withheld on interest payments on foreign loans provided
such credit is not enjoyed by lender-remittee in his country and registered
enterprise has assumed liability for tax payment
Righf to employ foreign nationals in supervisory technical or advisory positions
within five years from registration
Deduction from taxable income in the year reinvestment was made of a certain
percentage of the amount of undistributed profits or surplus transferred to
capital stock for procurement of machinery and equipment and other
expansion
Antidumping protection
Protection from government competition
Exemption from all taxes under the National Internal (evenue Code, except
income tax on a gradually diminishing percentage
Postoperative tariff protection
Tax credits equivalent to sales, compensating and specific taxes and duties on
supplies, raw materials, and semimanufactured products used in the mand-
facture, processing, or production of export products
Additional deduction from taxable income of direct labor cost and local raw
materials used in the manufacture of export products but not exceeding
25 percent of total export revenues for producers. 10 percent for traders.
and 50 percent for service exporters
Preference in grant of government loans
Employment of foreign nationals within five years from operation or even
after said period in exceptional cases
Exemption from export and stabilization taxes
Additional deduction from taxable income of 10 percent of incremnental export
sales
Additional incentivres whenever processing or manufacturing plant is located
in an area designated by Boi as necessary for proper dispersal of industry
or which is deficient in infrastructures, public utilities. and other facilities.
X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X
X X
X X
Xb Xb
Xe X
X X X1 X
Xh X X X1 X1
XaA Xj X) X X
Xbk Xbk
(Table continued n-xt page)
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Table (continued)
Export Incentives Act Investment Incentives Act
Filipino Foreign Filipino Foreign
Export Export Service Export Export Servce
Incentives to investors producer trader exporter producer trader exporter Pioneer Nonpwneer Pioneer Nonpioneer
Basic rights and guarantees X X X X X X X X X X
Right to repatriate investments
and remit earnings* X X X X X X X X X X
Freedom fromexpropriati6n o.i
investments X X X X X X X X X X
Freedom from requisition of
investments X X X X X X X X X X
Protection of patents and other
prpieayrihsX X X X X X . X X X Xproprietary rightsK K KK K. KKKK
Exemption from capital gains
tax on disposition of capital
assets provided proceeds of
sales are invested in new issues
of capital stock of a registered
enterprise within six months
from the date gains were
realized XM  X X X X X X X M X
Tax allowance to the extent of
actual investment but not to
exceed 10 percent of taxable
income Xr X
Tax exemption on sale of stock
dividends provided sale occurs
within seven years from date
of registration Xt X
Preference in grant of csts and
sss loans for purchase of shares
(for members only) Xe X X
* Subject to Central Bank regulations.
a. Applicable only to all projects for expansion and to both pioneer and nonpioneer projects listed in the Export Priorities Plan.
b. Applicable whenever a registered export producer or export trader shall use a brand name for an export product that distinguishes it from products produced
outside the Philippines.
c. Applicable to new and expanding nonpioneer projects with total assets not exceeding *500,000 for the. first two years of commercial operation. Nonpioneer
projects with assets exceeding said amount and expanding nonpioneer projects with less than 20 percent return on equity are entitled only to reduced tariff
and compensating tax, on a deferred payment basis for a period not exceeding ten years. Expanding nonpioneer projects with 20 percent or greater return on
equity shall be entitled to mere deferment of taxes and duties without any reduction thereof.
d. Applicable to new or expanding pioneer projects with less than 20 percent return on equity. Expanding pioneer projects with 20 percent or greater return
on equity and existing pioneer projects desiring-to replace and -modernize their facilities are entitled to mere deferment of taxes and duties without any reduction
thereof.
e. Same as note g below but limited to expansion projects only and to service exporters catering primarily to foreign tourists.
f. Provided registered export producer is engaged in a pioneer area.
g. Applicable to service exporters producing and exporting television and motion pictures or musical recordings.
h. Applicable to all registered export producers except foreign firms exporting 70 percent of their productions.
i. In the case of traditional export, local raw material component is not included in the computation of said deduction.j. Applicable to enterprises at least 60 percent Filipino-owned.
k. Applicable whenever financial assistance is extended by export trader to export producers in an amount equivalent to not less than 20 percent of export
trader's export sales during the year.
1. Additional incentives consist of using an amount equivalent to double the export producer's direct labor cost in applying the reduced income tax formula and/or
tax credit on infrastructure.
m. Exemption under sec. 6(b) of Republic Act 5186 is applicable onhv to Filipino investors in pioneer projects.
Source: Board of Investments (Bol). Philippine Progress, vol. 8, 2d quarter. 1974.
From: Russel J. Cheetham and Edward K. Hawkins, The Philippines: Priorities and
Prospects for Development. A World Bank Country Economic Report, Washing-
ton,D.C.: The World Bank, 1974.
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pioneer enterprises1 are also allowed income tax credits, exemption from
capital gains tax, and tax exemption on the sale of stock dividends from
pioneer enterprises.
The minimum benefits for registered2 enterprises under the IIA
are deductions from taxable income, tax credits from capital equipment,
and other non-fiscal incentives (e.g., anti-dumping-protections). BOI-
registered enterprises in pioneer activity are also granted exemption
from all taxes other than income tax on a gradually diminishing percentage,
permission to employ foreign nationals, and post-operative tariff protec-
tion. For the export of their products, registered corporations may
avail of special tax credits and reduced income taxes.
Similarly, the package of incentives that is granted under the
EIA depends on the nature of the export activity. Registered export pro-
ducers3 are entitled to income tax deductions for reinvestments and labor
training expenses, all the non-fiscal incentives or benefits granted under
the IIA, tax exemptions for imported and domestic capital equipment, and
other tax credits.
A "pioneer enterprise" engages in the production of commodities not being
produced in the Philippines on a commercial scale or uses a design or
system of production which is new and untried in the country, provided
that the final product involves substantial use and processing of domes-
tic raw materials, whenever available. Section 3 (h) R.A. No. 5186.
2 ,In this report, a "registered enterprise, firm, project, or product refers
to that which is approved and registered with the BOI.
A "registered export producer" manufactures export products and directly
export its export products, or sell them to a registered export trader
or to other export producers or to foreign tourists and travellers.
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The incentives available for a registered export trader1 are
exemptions from export tax, tax credits, and additional income tax deduc-
tion up to 10% of total export sales. An additional 1% of export revenues
may be deducted by the trader who provides financial assistance to a
registered export producer(s).
Registered service exporters are entitled to an income tax deduc-
tion of 50% of their export fees. Those dealing with television and motion
pictures or locally-produced musical recordings may be grnated tax credits
and a duty-free importation of capital equipment.
3
6.3.2 The Incentives and the Development Objectives
The nature and structure of incentives leave much to be desired
in terms of achieving their fundamental purposes as well as the other
objectives of the national plans.
First, the IIA and the EIA incentive systems cannot be expected
to achieve the objective of regional development. Notwithstanding the policy
of pursuing "a planned, economically feasible, and practicable dispersal
of industries," the IIA does not contain any provision specifying extra
incentives for projects that locate in the regions outside the MMA or any
other measure to be employed to effect an operationally feasible regional
1 A "registed export trader" derives at least 20% of his gross revenue
for the year in which the incentives are claimed from sale abroad of
exports or from domestic sale to foreign tourists and travelers.
2 A "registered service exporter" renders technical, professional servi-
ces which are paid in foreign currency, exports television and motion
picture and musical recordings made in the Philippines, or renders
services for foreign tourists and travelers.
Registered service exporters catering chiefly to foreign tourists in
the preferred tourist areas are also allowed tax exemption on imported
capital equipment.
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dispersal of industries or investments. Hence, while special incentives
are granted to registered enterprises, if they engaged in a pioneer activity
or in export production, the IIAallows no preferential treatment to region-
al dispersed projects.
Paradoxically, the EIA, whose policy statements make no mention
of regional development, provides two additional incentives to any export
producer who "establishes its processing or manufacturing plant in an
area that the Board designates as necessary for the proper dispersal of
industry or in an area which the Board finds deficient in infrastructure,.
public utilities, and other facilities." However, even these two incen-
tives offer very little in promoting industrial dispersal.
The first incentive allows the application on taxable income of
200% of direct labor-cost instead of the usual 100% deduction that is
permitted of all registered export producer. However, the total deduc-
tion in any case must not exceed 25% of total export revenue. This
ceilingwhich includes the local raw material costs,virtually eliminates
the extra incneitves because the combined cost of 100% of direct labor
anid raw materials for most company approaches, if not exceed, 25% of their
export earnings.
The second incentive, which allows reimbursements for the total
cost of infrastructure work undertaken by the export producer, may also
have little practical impact. New or expanding enterprises incur a great
deal of "normal" business expenditures during their initial years of oper-
ations. The cash flow situations of these firms are therefore usually
too tight during these years to permit their use of their limited funds
1 Section 9, R.A. No. 6135.
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for infrastructure projects. The time of executives is also too valuable
to waste on an activity such as road construction that, strictly speaking,
is outside their domain. Obviously, there are also easier waysof meeting
the infrastructure needs of a project than a firm doing it itself.1 For
these reasons, the BOI reimbursement scheme cannot contribute much to
the pursuance of regional dispersal of industries.
Second, the incentives favor the use of capital over labor which
is inconsistent with the country's factor endowments and with the employ-
ment objective. Many of the incentives encourage, directly or indirectly,
the use of capital, to wit: accelerated depreciation, allowance on imported
and domestic capital equipment, tax deduction of reinvetment, tax credit
on infrastructure cost and withheld interest payments on foreign loans,
and double deductions on shipping costs. Note that the value of the
incentives rises in direct proportion to the size and capital intensity
of the project.2 As a consequence, as much as 80% (e.g., in 1970-72) of
the total tax releif availed of by registered enterprises is accounted
for by capital-related incentives. 3
Recent amendments to the Investment Acts introduced additional
incentives that promote the use of labor. One-half of the total labor
training expenses up to 10% of direct wages may now be deducted from
taxable income. Likewise, the cost of direct labor and domestic raw
materials may be deducted from taxable income, up to 25% of total export
1 The plant can be established in a serviced site. In sites where these
needs are not met, the proponents of large industries are usually
influential enough to convince the pertinent Government agency to put
up the infrastructure facilities that they need.
2 R.J. Cheetham and E.K. Hawkins, The Philippines:Priorities and Pros-
pects for Development, (A World Bank Country Economic Report), The
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 335.
Ibid.
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sales for producers, 10% for traders, and 50% for service exporters. To
date, very few registered enterprises have availed themselves of the labor
training allowance. The second provision, on the other hand, may have
limited effects. In the first place, the cost of local raw materials
alone may come close to the 25% of gross export revenue, thereby making
the magnitude of labor inputs inconsequential. Second, "the real weight
of this measure is limited to a maximum of 8.75% of gross export sales
(equivalent to the 25% income deduction to which a tax rate of 35% is
applied) and this maximum can be achieved only by firms with export pro-
fit margins of at least 25% of gross sales. The relative importance of
this measure is even smaller for enterprises producing for both domestic
and export markets."1
In addition to these provisions, the BOI imposes a general rule
that one direct employment (man-year) should be generated for every
US$ 4,000 worth of imported capital asset.2 Projects can be exempted
from this conditions only if they are entirely export-oriented, or if
they can produce within five-years, the foreign exchange used by them
in excess of US$4,000 per job created, or if the sector plans prepared
by the BOI suggest so. Even this provision may raise some doubts about
its employment effects. The selective application of this requirement
to a few industries may limit its usefulness in channeling resources
towards labor-intensive projects. Also fixing the required ratio of
imported equipment and labor without reference to the technology and
the economics of the industry seems inappropriate.3
1 Ibid.
2 See Appendix D, Section 4.
Ibid.
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The foregoing analysis evidently points to the need for overhauling
the incentive systems so as to address more effectively the employment
objective of the country.
Third, the incentive systems are also deficient with respect to
the balance of payments objective vis export promotion. The fiscal incen-
tives that are granted to export enterprises are substantial but are only
slightly greater than those being enjoyed by all registered enterprises.
In addition, attempts to increase net export earnings are done indirectly
by providing incentives based on total export sales. However, the opti-
mum level of export sales in which the greatest net export earning is.
generated is not necessary the maximum level of export sales. Cheetham
has in fact argued that " an industry should not be led to undersell for
export to be eligible for other benefits and then seek to recover the
profit loss through higher prices in the domestic market."2 Furthermore,
the law restricts the application of incentives to enterprises which
export over 50% of their total sales. It may make sense to encourage
some exports below that arbitrarily selected floor level. All these
observations suggest the need for a reassessment of the incentives being
provided in order to encourage more effectively the expansion of export
activities but with consideration of their impacts on the other objectives.3
More enterprises are applying for incentives under the EIA merely to
improve their bargaining positions when seeking Government loans, foreign
exchange allocations, and fiscal incentives and also to circumvent the
IIA's provisions regarding "measured capacity" (i.e., demand-supply gap.
Ibid.
2 Ibid.
It has been suggested that the export sector needs import liberalization.
That would lower the cost of inputs and weaken the relative attractive-
ness of other import-using activities thereby increasing the available
resources for the export sector. Since "many export incentives are rela-
ted to imported inputs, fewer import restrictions would in turn make
export incentives less important and tax preference redundant." ibid. p.231.
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Finally, speaking of efficiency, the incentive system were designed
without appropriate analysis of the nature of incentives needed by speci-
fic industries and therefore may be inefficient. Both IIA and EIA provide
a fixed package of incentive benefits for projects that satisfied the
BOI criteria. This system of administration ignores the peculiar needs
of each industry. There i8 therefore the possibility that some benefits
1
are unnecessary.
In support of these view, Cheetham writes:2
"Cursory evidence based on personal interviews and on
major investment areas seems to suggest that much of
the investment would have been effected even without
incentives. Equally important, incentives-though not
actually fiscal benefits-seem to be factors such as
preferred access to institutional finance and foreign
exchange."
One justification for fixing the package of incentives is the ease of
administration. The BOI would find it cumbersome to grant incentives
on aproject by project basis. It is also argued that such a system
would invite more graft and corruption because the decision makers
at BOI would have greater discretionary power.
These arguments are well taken. Nevertheless, the package of incentives
being allowed may not represent the best compromise between an adminis-
tratively expedient but wasteful system and an individualized granting
of incentives that may not be manageable. In the first place, the
process by which the preferred investment projects are identified
involves both socio-economic and commercial benefit-cost analyses.
This means that the BOI would know the sources of market distortions
which would have served as basis for picking out the best incentives
for each industry. Decisions on the incentives could then be made prior
to the evluation of applications to these incentives. Hence, corruption
may not really be encouraged at all. Furthermore, corruption may prevail
only if the system of checks and balances in the Government is inadequate,
i.e., only to the extent that NEDA and the Investment Coordinating
-Committee and the Office of the President allow it. In any event,
the package of incentives may differ for each type or group of indus-
tries. Also, the contents of this package can change over time.
2 Ibid., p. 334.
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Meanwhile, the provisions of the law are also inadequate in
limiting the granting of incentives only to fledgeling and aherenter-
prises in need of some forms of assistance. Indeed, the B.O can withdraw
or cancel partially or totally the incentives granted under the Invest-
ment Acts when the registered enterprise already has a paid-up capital
exceeding P500,000 and earned for at least two years an annual rate of
return on equity of 33 1/3% even without incentives. However, companies
can use a variety of schemes to decrease the book value of its yearly
profit below this 33 1/3%. Through their connections. abroad, they can
employ transfer pricing in order that the profit accrues to one of the
subsidiary companies somewhere where the income tax rate is lower. Trans-
fer pricing can also be done by involving one or more losing enterprises
that are transacting business with the BOI-registered enterprise. These
firms can also provide their executives with extremely high salaries.
Holiday trips of company mangers can be treated as official expenses.
Luxury expenditures (e.g., penthouse, summer resort, recreation centers)
may be considered as integral part of the business operations. They may
also create sister companies to lower their capitalization. Evidently,
the registered enterprises can evade the BOI profit ceilings and other
provisions in many ways.
Another issue is the distinctionbetween pioneer and non-pioneer
projects. It is not clear why an industry that has not been established
in the country, ot at least, not on a commercial scale should be granted
special incentives over existing but perhaps more essential industries.
1 Section , R.A. No. 5186.
2 Cheetham op. cit., p. 337.
It is in fact possible that these pioneer industries have not been
established in the country precisely because they are economically
unprofitable. We therefore run the risk of investing in socially
undesirable projects.
Thus we can see that even from the perspective of economic
efficiency, the BOI incentive systems have been deficient.
To briefly summarize this section, we showed that the existing
BOI incentives are inadequate in addressing properly the regional
development, balance of payments, employment, and even efficiency
objectives.
6.4 Formulation of Annualnvestment and Export Priorities Plans
The BOI Priorities Plans contain listings of preferred investment
and export activities and their corresponding "measured capacity,"
recommended economic size, investment requirements, manpower requirements
by level of skills, and output value.'
The IIA provides the basic guidelines for the formulation of the
IPP by the BOI.2 This Act state that in determining the preferred and
pioneer projects and their measured cpacity, the Board shall consider
the policy objectives of the IIA and pinpoint the economically viable
import-substituting and export industries as well as those with subs-
tantial value-added contribution. The Board shall also assess the
potential of these investment areas in creating productive employmentand
in regional industry dispersal and study the capital requirements, risk,
Section 3 (k) and Section 18, R.A. No. 5186
2 Section 18, R.A., No. 5186.
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profitability, and other aspects.
In allocating investment available in any given year among the
potential preferred projects, the decision rule is "to give priority to
projects with the highest rate of return to the national economy."1
In like fashion, the EIA provides that in determining the priority
of export products, "the comparative advantage (that) they enjoy or could
be made to enjoy, their potential for earning foreign exchange, and their
profitability to the national economy"2 will be considered.3
There are several comments and observations that we can raise
with regards to the process and outcome of the preparation of Priorities
Plans.
First, some of the IIA criteria may be viewed as surrogates for
commercial feasibility, e.g., commercial risks and rate of profitability.
However, commercial profitability is deficient as a criterion for project
evaluation. The principal criticism to it is that it utilizes market
pricesin its accounting of costs and benefits, prices which may not
reflect the real value of inputs and outputs to society. We have no
intentions of proving here the arguments against this measure. We are
merely pointing out that the use of this criterion may prejudice against
projects with high socio-economic net benefits but which are less or not
commercially feasible for certain reasons such as imperfections in the market.
Ibid.
2 Section 4, R.A., No. 6135
3 See also BOI issuance, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 6135.
The reader may refer to the extensive literature of the subject. See,
UNIDO Guidelines, op. cit., Chapter 2, pp. 18-28; R.N. McKean, "The
Use of Shadow Prices," in R. Layard, (ed.), Cost Benefit Analysis,
Penguin Books, New York, 1972, pp. 119-139.
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It may be argued that commercial feasibility is also important
because private projects do not operate on the basis of shadow prices,
As Professor Eckaus explains it: "Projects selected (through economic
cost-benefit analysis) must live in the real world of market prices." 1
If we ignore this fact, preferred projects may never be carried out, or
if ever, it may not survive. This argument, however, is relevant only
to the extent that the discrepency between social and market prices are
not reconciled through government intervention, Hence, since the BOI
grants numerous incentives including fiscal benefits that more than
compensates for market distortions, it is safe to say that such an
argument does not hold in this case.2
Second, the criteria being adopted by the Board, which supposedly
emanate from the policies declared in the respective Acts (policies that
in themselves already ignored certain national policies), do not really
reflect such policies in totality. The EIA, which is designed to "attain
a rising level of employment," among others, does not include the employ-
ment aspect in determining the priority of export products to be promoted.
3
Similarly, the IIA, which is purportedly also concerned with promoting
'an equitable distribution of wealth" is clearly focusing on economic
objectives. Of the 11 criteria being applied, 9 are obviously economic-
based. One (i.e., increasing the supply of consumer goods) is contribut-
ing indirectly to increasing the standard of living of the people and
another deals with both employment and dispersal of industries that again
1 R.S. Eckaus, "Financial and Other Problems of Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis," (mimeo), MIT, March 3, 1974.
2 Eckaus mentions these policies as options to solve the aforementioned
problem. ibid.
See Section 4, R.A. No. 6135.
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is founded on economics (,ie,, "to the extent that is economically fea-
sible and practicable.") Of course, earlier, we discussed how these
provision works against social objectives, To top it all, the IIA
dictates the use of "highest rate of return to the national economy"2 as
the criterion in indentifying preferred areas of investment where there
are resource constraints. This criterion tends to be measured in terms
of economic efficiency and since the resources available are always
less than the requirements of competing projects, then presumably only
this economic measure have been used,
Third, the Priorities Plans contain annual capacities represent-
ing the economic size of plants as recommended by the BOI for each of
the preferred investment and export projects. It appears that this
implicit condition for BOI registration is founded on economic efficiency
seeking to encourage economies of scale. This condition, however discri-
minates against the smaller-scale industries which can probably be rea-
sonably efficient. It also ignores the distributive goals as well as the
industry sector objectives and strategies which call for the promotion
of small- to medium-scale industries. However, we do not suggest that
the "efficiency" objective which this minimum capacity addresses should
be ignored. We are simply voicing out the need to give due considerations
to small industries, which although less efficient, nevertheless can
contribute substantially to the employment and the redistribution objectives.
See Section 18, R.A. No. 5186.
2 Ibid.
Fourth, the seemingly important role of the industrial dispersal
policy in the IIA (as indicated by the policy statment and the criteria
being used in the identification of preferred investments) is difficult
to reconcile with the outcome of the planning process, The Annual IPPs
do not generally specify what types of production activities would be
promoted in which regions. Even in 1973 when the BOI attempted to present
a regional distribution of preferred investments, the distribution was
rather spotty.1 More importantly, the identified projects outside the
Metro-Manila Area (IV) and Southern Tagalog (IV-A) were largely on mining
and mineral processing and therefore would have operated close to the
mineral sources anyway. Unless the BOI is explicit with regards to its
spatial preferences, there will be a natural tendency for investments 'to
be channeled into Greater Manila and its neighboring provinces,
Finally, the preferred projects listed in the Priorities Plans
are not convincing with respect to the BOI's pursuance of employment
objective. By and large, the preferred projects do not create much new
employment, let alone employment for the unskilled people who predominate
in the Philippine labor force. The Fourth IPP, for instance, required
an investment of about Y3.517 Billion but only 21,872 direct workers,2
implying a high capital-labor ratio of 1214,600 per worker. The unem-
ployment and underemployment ran to about 0.7 million and over 1 million,
Board of Investment, Fourth Annual Investment Priorities Plan, 1973.
2 It is argued that this number does not take into account total employ-
ment generation via the forward and backward linkage effects (See Four
Year Development Plan, FY 1972-77, op. cit., p. 147). While this is
true, there is no guarantee that these indirect employment would not
also require substantial amount of investment of their own. Unfortu-
nately, the Board does not estimate the secondary employment effects
of ther projects. This is another important flaw of the BOI incentive
system.
respectively, during its year of implementation (1971) and thus such
capital intensity is difficult to justify on social grounds. The Eight
IPP and the Sixth EPP likewise favor the use of capital over labor by
promoting projects with an average capitalization of P500,000 (US$71,000)
per worker, a capital intensity that is "rarely found in countries at a
similar stage of development."1
In summary, this section discussed the deficiencies in the for-
mulation of BOI Priorities Plans. We argued that the criteria for selec-
tion include fiancial viability which is an inadequate measure of project
desirability from society's viewpoint. We contended that the criteria
used do not really mirror the policy objectives of the incentive systems.
We also pointed out that while the provision on economic size plants
may promote efficiency, it distriminates against small industries. Finally,
we showed that the resulting Piorities Plans do not seem to reflect the
dispersal and employment policies of the BOI.
6.5 Project Appraisal and Selection
Neither of-the Acts provided specific guidelines as to how appli-
cations for incentives should be appraised. The Board, therefore, prepared
a manual for screening and evaluating reports for application under R.A.
Nos. 5186 and 6135.2 The specific aspects studied at the firm level are
summarized in Appendix D. (Table D.1). For purposes of this study, however,
we shall elaborate only on the Economic Aspects.
1 R. Cheetham, op. cit., p. 197.
2 Project Evaluation Manual, op. cit. Also referred to as the Manual.
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6.5.1 Economic Evaluation of Project Worthiness
The Manual directs the analysis of eight (8) components of the
Economic Aspects. They are:
1) Foreign exchange reserves; 5) Usage of indigenous raw materials;
2) Employment Generation 6) Related industries or linkages;
3) Labor-intensity criterion; 7) Raising of the standards of living;and
4) Value-added of the project; 8) Social rate of return.
Specific formula(s) are associated with (1), (3), (4), (5), and (8)
while (2), (6), and (7) are analyzed qualitatively.1
The Manual mentions other economic considerations that are not
captured in the eight aforecited aspects. Many of these questions are
supposed to have been covered during the formulation of sectoral programs
and are therefore only intended as checks to see how well the project
fits into these programs. Professional judgment is expected to be exer-
cised by the evaluators at all times.
6.5.2 Broad Guidelines to Project Selection
The IIA provides general guidelines in connection with the eval-
uation of BOI applicatins that meet the basic requirements sucha as the
conditions on local ownership and participation and the submission of a
project feasibility study.2 These guidelines suggest that when the total
of the proposed production capacities of qualified applicants exceed the
measured capacity of the preferred industry,the Board shall register
only those than can be accomodated by the measured capacity and that are
better suited to achieve the objectives of the IIA. The criteria for
1 See Appendix D for details.
2 Section 20, R.A. No. 5136.
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selection include the ownership and control arrangement, the potential
for integration, relevant experience, cost factors and economies of
scale, net foreign exchange inflow and local resource utilization.
Then dealing with many qualified applicants proposing to produce
substantially identical commodities, the Board shall give preference to
'"an expansion or . . . integration of existing facilities whenever they
enjoy the advantages of lower costs and economies of scale over projects
undertaken on isolation from technically related facilities; and, other
things being equal, . . . to enterprises where the degree of ownership
"l
and control by Philippine Nationals is greater. If all things turn out
equal, the enterprises which filed ahead shall be given preference.
2
6.5.3 Assessment of the Evaluation Procedure
The procedure for appraising applications for BOI registration
does not create an appropriate avenue for comparing project benefits and
costs calculated in terms of the policy objectives of the IIA and the EIA.
First, the Incentives Acts implicitly rule that projects must
be commercially profitable. The adoption of this measure apart from
economic appraisal may be questioned because, as we discussed earlier,
the former is an inadequate indicator of project worthiness from society's
viewpoint.
Slecond, the broad guidelines for project approval under the IIA
are so general that the process leaves much to the prerogative of the
Board. For instance, the IIA introduces a priority scheme that should
1 Ibid.
2 See BOI issuance on R.A. No. 6135, Rule IV Section 1.
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be used when the aggregate production capacity of qualified applicants
exceed the measured capacity of a given preferred investment area, The
approach is to consider some eight criteria which reflect the policy
objectives of the IIA. The Act, however, does not spell out the indi-
cators that would be used to measure project outputs vis-a-vis these
criteria.1 It also does not explain how these criteria may be utilized
in a framework that could compare- one aspect against another. The
weighting of these criteria is thus left to the Board to decide. In
this set-up, the Board, comprising of five people, could succumb to
pressures from special interest groups who are aware that the relative
weights of criteria can "legitimately" be decided upon and changed in
an arbitrary fashion.
Indeed, the IIA provides quite clear decision rules when there
are many qualified applicants for the same investment area. The method
is basically the lexicographic approach. The first priority should go
to expansion projects whenever they enjoy lower costs and economies of
scale. In case of tie, the extent of ownership and control of Philippine
Nationals becomes the basis for selection. The Manual has come up
with a third tie-breaker: the chronological order of the application.
These rules seems to have been designed for the sake of consistency and
expediency. Apart from being highly arbitrary, however, these rules are
not defensible. What makes the level of integration much more important
than ownership? The first contributes to economic growth but the latter
contributes to economic nationalism, to say the least. This procedure
1 The Manual defines these indicators.
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can also be criticized for favoring industrial concentration because
vertical integration is more probable in the more developed areas (e.g.,
Metro-Manila). This therefore discriminates against regional development
and industrialization. The use of filing date as a criterion also favors
those who have greater access to the BOI , i.e., those who stay in the MMA
and the neighboring regions.
Third, the BOI Manual that is devised to guide the Board in making
project by project decision is also inadequate. The Manual does not make
clear how the various indicators would be consolidated or at least compared
in a consistent manner with one another. It does not specify how important
one set of measures, such as the foreign exchange reserve contribution of
projects, is to another,say, labor-intensity or value-added ratio. Since.
projects have varying degrees of impacts with respect to these objectives-
criteria, a framework by which otuputs of one type may be compared or made
to compensate for another is necessary to minimize arbitrariness in the
project evaluation process.
Even within each area analyzed, the Manual is silent about the
interpretation of the various measures. For instance, there are three
indicators to measure the foreign exchange reserve contribution of the
project. The Manual, however, does not specify what the minimum standard
of acceptability is for each measures. It is also not clear what a plan-
ner would do if one measure is "good" but another is "bad."
One may argue that it is the Board's function to interpret the
results of these measurements. Although this is true, the absence of
explicit guidelines in this connection gives a lot of leeways to the
Board to exercise judgments without ensuring consistency. In fact, the
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existence of too mcuh information may create extreme difficulties for the
Board to make decisions especially when there are many applicants compet-
ing for the same preferred investment area. The risk is that the projects
selected on bits and pieces of different information would not be the same
had a compensatory framework (i.e., MOAPA) been applied.
In fact, in the absence of such a unifying framework, the Manual
may have actually increased the chances of wrong decision. Coming once
more to the foreign exchange criterion, the formulas only measure the
inflows and the outflows of foreign exchange. None of the indicators
include the domestic cost of generating a net inflow of foreign exchange.
In a way, this measure favored import-substitution but neglected the
efficiency criterion.
Indeed, the BOI calculates the social rate of return (SRR). This
certainly could provide a coherent framework for project analysis. Howe-
ver, there are reasons for apprehension in this regard. In the first
place, the Manual allows only about one page of text and one page of
questions relating to the economic appraisal using this tool. For an
important methodology for consolidating different information, the SRR
does not seem to be treated as such. The Manual makes no mention of what
benefits and costs should be taken into account and how they should be
measured, leaving the process essentially to "some judgment" and "on the
experience and insight of the evaluator."1 It is very likely therefore
that the analyst would only calculate the benefits and costs in terms
of distorted market prices and perhaps some efficiency shadow prices.
That would leave out of consideration the social value of investment and
1 Manual, op. cit., R.A. No. 5136, 111.6.8.
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of net benefit to the poor, to say the least. Clearly, the Board is not
taking advantage of this powerful tool of analysis which,if properly
undertaken, would make redundant the isolated use of such indicators as
foreign exchange, integration, and value-added.
The second problem with the BOI's SRR is that the Manual does not
explain how it will be interpreted. Is there a minimum rate that all
projects must meet? If there is, who is to select the minimum and on
what basis? How is this rate to be related to the other criteria? Answers
to these questions are nowhere in the Manual.
A third issue is more technical than operational. Conceptually
speaking, while the SRR may be better than the other indicators in provid-
ing an overall picture of the desirability of a project, the SRR is not
the best around. The SRR is guaranteed to be unique only when the flow
of net benefits is either all positive or first negative. and then posi-
tive. In other situations, there may be more than one SRR. For example,
when there are large negative net benefits at the initial years and then
again during later years, there may be two SRRs. A more fundamental issue
is that the SRR may yield a result that differs with the use of Net Pre-
sent Value. It is argued that when projects are really mutually exclusive,
for example,and the Government is concerned about increments to social
welfare, then the NPV is a better measure of project desirability.1 In
other words, apart from the fact that the SRR does not seem to be intended
as a mechanism for consolidating information on project impacts, it also
has strong conceptual flaws that limits its potential as a measure of
project worthiness.
To recapitulate, this section has shown the inadequacies of the
1 For a more detailed discussion, see R. Layard, op.cit., pp. 51-53.
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BOI's process of project appraisal and selection. We have repeated the
problems in the use of financial analysis. We also have discussed lengthily
the lack of a consistent framework for evaluating the different impacts
of a project and for comparing them with other projects. In the next
section,we shall try to examine whether our analysis about the inadequacies
of the incentive systems to address the development objectives well can
be substantiated by the past performances of the BOI.
6.6 BOI Registered Projects and Social Objectives
One way of ascertaining the effectiveness of the BOI incentive
systemsis by analyzing the extent to which the schemeshaveachieved their
objectives and how well they have played their roles with respect to the
national objectives. In this section, we shall discuss how the BOI pro-
jects relate to two of the stated objectives of the incentive systems:
industrial dispersal and employment generation.1
6.6.1 Industrial Dispersal
Although regional development was introduced as one of the
objectives of the IIA in 1971, the investment incentive system has not
contributed much to industrial dispersal. Between 1967 and June, 1976,
176 projects, representing 41.7% of all IIA-projects were accounted 'for
by Southern Tagalog (IV) and the MMA (IV-A) (Table 7). These same regions
have the highest per capita income and level of industrialization in the
country.2 In terms of investment, a better but still concentrated dis-
Due to data constraints, it is difficult to undertake an ex post facto
analysis of BOI projects in terms of efficiency and economy, environ-
mental impacts, and effects on income distribution.
2 See Appendix B.
Table 7 Number of BOI-Registered Projects under RA, Nos, 5186
6135, by Region, as of June, 1976,
Region
PHILIPPINES
Luzon
I Ilocos
II Cagayan Valley
III Central Luzon
IV Southern Tagalog
V Bicol
Visayas
VI Western Visayas
VII Cental Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
Mindanao
IX
X
XI
XII
R,A, No, 5186
(IIA)
Number Share(%)
422
255
29
7
31
176
12
100.0
60,4
6.9
1,7
7,4
41,7
2,8
50 11.8
11
26
13
117
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
R,A, No, 6135
(EIA)
1975
PopulatiQn
Number Share(%} Distribution(%)
121
99
2
9-
88
6
2.6
6,2
3.1
27.7
3.1
8,1
11.6
5.0
'16
100,0
81,8
1,7
7,4
72,7
5,0
1,7
3,3
13.2
1.7
8,3
3,3
100.0
53,9
7.8
4,8
10,3
23,6
7,6
23,0
9,1
8,0
5.9
23,1
5,3
5.7
6,6
5,5
Note: Percentage distribution may not add to 100% due to rounding off.
*
New regional delineation
**
Including the Metro-Manila Area.
Source of Consolidated Data: Board of Investments.
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Table 8 Project Cost and Employment by Region for BOI-Registered Firms
R.A. 5186
(July 1968-June 1976)
Project Cost Employment
(in millions)
REGIONS K/L a
(in 000)
R.A, 6135(List B)
(1970-June 1976)
Project Cost Employment
(in millions)
PHILIPPINES
Luzon
I Ilocos
II Cagayan Valley
III Central Luzon b
IV Southern Tagalogb
V Bicol
Visayas
VI Western Visayas
VII Central Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
1l5,600
2,563
45
202
3,560
82
113
1,203
607
111,164 V141
22,265
1,149
3,572
'33,225
3,587
2,383
13,462
2,396
115
30
57
107
23
47
89
253
Mindanao
IX Western Mindanao
X Northern Mindanao
XI Sourthern Mindanao
XII Central Mindanao
207
4,040
765
,250
2,575
12,543
9,100
4,907
105
322
84
459
a Average capital-labor ratio: Project cost t employment
b Includes Metropolitan Manila
Source of Consolidated Data: Board of Investments
V2,121
K/L
(in 000)
47,167 V 45
129
1,572
254
4,257
38,930
189
448
106
58
11
50
303
166
1,631
1,292
66
31
235
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tribution can be noted (Table 8 ). Regions IV and IV-A accounted for 23%
of total investment generated as of June, 1976. In contrast, Regions II,
V, VIII, and IX, which are four of the six most depressed regions in terms
of per capita Gross Domestic Product and where 23% of the population
resides, had a combined share of only 6.4% of total IIA investments.
Furthermore, although Regions I and XII, the two other most depressed
regions, benefitted from a substantial amount of investments, the BOI
registered projects in these regions have been capital-intensive and
therefore have not contributed much to the spread of development benefits
via employment (Table 8).1
The situation was worse with the EIA, despite the granting (in
1973) of special incentives to regional dispersal export activities.
Between 1970 and june, 1976, 88 out of the total 121 projects registered
by BOI under the EIA (List B) were located in Southern Luzon including
the MMA. Four of the most underdeveloped regions did not have any export
project at all while another four regions had between 2 to 4 projects.
This is also a glaring concentration of export investments in Regions IV
and IV-A, which received 74.1% of total investment in BOI registered
projects under the EIA (Table 8 ).
Consistent with this analysis, the incentives availed of by the
BOI registered activities under the IIA and the EIA, was expectedly
skewed in favor of Regions IV and IV-A (Table 9). As of 1974, these
regions recieved an estimated 37% of total value of fiscal incentives.
In comparison, five of the six least developed regions (Regions I, II, V,
VIII, and IX) collectively acquired only 9% of total incentive value
1 This will be elaborated on in the next section.
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Table- 9, INVESTMENT GENERAT10l AND ESTIMATED INCENTIVES
AVAILED OF BOI PROJECTS, BY REGION, 1968-1974
: Investment Generation : :Estimates
Under :of Incen-
: RA-5166 : RA-6133 :tives Avai-
R E G 1 0 N :(1968-1974) : (1971-74) : Total :led :% Share
-
* 1968-74
P'000 P'ooo P'000 ?'000
0 T A L :2,314,186 : 838,896 : 10,153,082 : 1,522,962 : 100.0
U Z 0 N :4,341,778 : 648,947 : 4,988,725 : 748,309 : 49.1
I : 540,757 : - : 540,757 : 81,113 : 5.3
II : 20,208 : - : 20,268 : 3,040 : 0.2
III : 407,280 : 116,735 : 524,015 : 78,603 : 5.2
IV :3,272,968 : 526,633 : 3,799,601 : 569,940 : 37.4
V : 100,505 : 3,579 : 104,084 : 15,613 : 1.0
IT.AYAG :1,293,473 : 34,88o : 1,328,353 : 199,253 : 13.1
VI : 195,200 : 18,769 : 213,969 : 32,096 : 2.1
VII : 783,155 : 16,111 : 799,266 : 119,889 : 7.9
VIII : 315,118 : - : 315,118 : 47,268 : 3.1
.1IaintAaO :3,678,935 : 157,069 3,636,004 : 575,400 : 37.8
IX : 52,722 : - : 52,722 : 7,908 : 0.5
X :2,120,911 : 13,844 : 2,134,755 : 320,213 : 21.0
X1 : 522,333 : 21,818 : 574,151 : 86,123 : 5.7
XII : 952,969 121,407 : 1,074,376 : 161,156 : 10.6
6OURCE: BOI, Statistical Appendix, 1976 of the Ninth Investment Priorities
Plans and 7th Export Priorities Plan.
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received between 1968 and 1974. Inaddition, the fact that BOI estimates
the incentives received by each region to be about 15% of total invest-
ments for all regions appear to be a strong evidence that the incentive
systems are indifferent to the regional location of the projects.
One may hope that this pattern would have changed substantially
in recent years, implicitly assuming an adjustment period for BOI,
However, empirical evidence do not support any claim that the incentive
systems have been promoting more recently the objective of regional
industrialization. The regional distribtuion of BOI project approved
under the 9th IPP and the 7th EPP (in 1975) still reflects a pronounced
concentration of projects in Regions IV and IV-A which account for 44%
and 79% of total BOI approved investment and export projects, respectively
(Table.10)Jurthermore, comparing a cumulative estimate of BOI-registered pro-
jects as of December, 1977 with the corresponding BOI-consolidated data
for June, 1976, it appears that the Board registered in this 1 1/2 years
a total of 93 IPP projects, of which 54 are located in Regions IV and
IV-A (Tablell).1
The foregoing analysis (complete with statistical support) shows
quite conclusively that the investment and export incentive systems had
not been consistent with the objectives of the Acts and the national plans.
While it is not clear what the real reasons could be, it appears that the
special incentives that are allowed for projects that would contribute to
this dispersal policy are not sufficiently attractive to compensate for
1 There seems to be some discrepancies between my estimate and the BOI-
consolidated data, which may be caused by project cancellations. Never-
theless, this table is still useful as a crude indicator of the pattern
of distribution of BOI registered projects between 1976 and 1977.
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Table 10. - RGIO2AL DISTRILUTION CF PROJECTS
APPOVED LY THE BOARD OF INVESTMENT, 1975
(Percentages)
9th Investment: 7th Export Population
RE GION Priorities Plan : istribution
Plan (RA 5186) 635): 1975
P1ILIPPINES 100.0 100.0 100.0
III
IV + IV-A
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
4.4
1.5
6.8
: 43.7
3.2
3.2
6.8
2.4
3.5
9.7
7.4
7.4
Investment, (BOI) 1976
0.9
6.1
79.0
1.3
1.6
5.2
0.3
0.3
1.3
2.9
1.1
7.8
4.6
10.3
23.6
7.6
9.1
8.0
5.9
5.3
5.7
6.6
5.5
Source: Doard of
Table 11 , INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION OF BOI-REGISTERED
PROJECTS UNDER INVESTiNT INCLPTIVES ACT (R.A.5186)
BY REGIONS, FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1968-DECEMER 1977
Total ::Total Niember:: Total Investment as of December 1977
: Number of : % :of Persons : % :
Regions : Projects Share :Employed as: Share : Local : Foreign 1/: Total 2/ : Share
as of 1977: :of 1977 : (M) : $ (1M) : (-)
PHILIPPINES : : 100.0 : lH5495 : 100.0 : 10101. 2 : 1,970 5 :24878.5 100.0
Luzon : 319 61.9 : 71,007 : 61.5 5,600.4: 1,054.7 :13510.0: 54.3
I : 24 : 4.7 12,008 10.4 : 1,678.3 : 312.2 4,019.8 : 16.2
II 7 1.4 : 1,803 1.6 51.4 11.0 : 133.9 0.5
III : 45 : 8.7 10,006 : 8.7 793.9 99.8 1,542.4 6.2
IV : 15-9 2.9 : 2,987 :.2.6 : 182.9: 19.2 : 326.9 1.3
IV-A 215 41.7 : 2,343 : 36.7 : 2,803.2 : 597.4 : 7,233.3_3. 20.3
V 13 2.5 : 1,860 : 1.6 : 90.8 : 15.0 : 203.3 : 0.8
Visayas 54 10.5 : 19.18 1,367.3 356.4 : 4,039.6 : 16.2
VI 11 : 2.1 : 1,289 : 1.1 : 91.0 30.9 : 322.8 : 1.3
VII : 33 : 6.4 : 7,538 : 6.5 : 1,099.7 : 288.0 : 3,259.0 : 13.1
VIII 10 1.9 2,474. : 2.1 : 176.6 : 37.5 : 457.8 : 1.8
1Mindanao : 142 : 27.6 : 33,187 : 28.7 : 3,133.4 : 559.4 : 77,328.9 : 29.4
IX 15 : 2.9 : 4,154 : 3.6 : 185.1 : 29.4 : 405.6 : 1.6
X 45 : 8.7 10,916 : 9.4 : 1,992.8 : 316.0 : 4,362.8 : 17.5
XI : 50 : 9.7 11,381 : 9.8 : 492.7 : 103.0 : 1,265.2 : 5.1
XII : 32 : 6.2 : 6,736 : 5.8 : 462.8 : 111.0 : 1,295.3 : 5.2
-"Includes both foreign equity and non-equity investment.
- Forex rate of t7.50 = US $1.00 used to compute for the peso value of foreign investment.
3/
- For 1977 only. Previous years investments are included in Region IV-A's total.
4/
- Investment in CY 1977 for Region IV-A represents above 45% of total.
Source B01.
of basic data:
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loss of benefits (either direct, e.g., transportation cost, or.indirect
e.g., external economies) of being closer to the MMA,
The centralized operation of the BOI may also have provided
some unplanned benefits to entrepreneurs from regions closer to the NMAR,
Since the BOI is based in the IMA, it is more accessible to entrepre-
neurs from Luzon particularly Regions III, IV, and IV-A. There is a
tremendous disadvantage to potential investors in other regions in terms
of time which conceivalbly may have resulted in high prioportion of Luzon
proponents getting the BOT approval to meet the demand.
1
It is also ery likely that the Board, its evaluation of applica-
tions has placed low weights to the criterion of regional dispersal of
industry vis-a-vis other criteria particularly those that are economic-
oriented. From the perspective of the applicants, therefore, there is
little pressure to design their projects to have such spatial dimension
in order to order to increase the chances that their project would be
approved.
1 On this last point, one may mention the investment promotion campaigns
of the BOI and the planned institutional decentralization as vehicles
for achieving industrial dispersal. While not discounting the potential
benefits of such approaches, it can be said that not one investment
promotion center in any of the major cities or one small regional office
had been established since they were mentioned in the 1972-75 Plan. The
promotional campaigns undertaken in the past also do not appear to have
been very successful, looking from the distribution of projects in
recent years. To my mind, the problem was a "cart and horse" situation.
The BOI did not aggressively campaign and did not establish regional
offices or centers because they did not seem justified based on the
interest shown by the businessmen in the regions and the implicitly
assumed limitations in the number of projects that may be generated.
At the same time, however, these same problems seem to be attributable
to the absence of a sustained campaign and regionally based agency that
was accessible to the prospective clients. The author is inclined to
believe that a small office that was adequately advertized could have
been of much help in this regard.
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6.6.2 Employment Generation
The BOI incentive systems have not been very effective in creat-
ing employment to that extent that one would expect after reading the
provisions of the Acts and the Manual. As of 1976, the BOI had been
promoting industries that averaged one new employment per r141,000 of
investment (Table ). This figure appears vey high for the Philippines
which perennially has a substantial labor surplus. Considering that for
Regions II, III, V, VI, VII, and XI combined, the average project cost
per person was only about I72,000, it is obvious that the problem lies
within the high capital-intensity of projects in the other regions, It
is ironical that Regions I, VIII, IX, and XII, four of the most under-
developed regions of the lans where employment opportunities are severely
limited, are the locations of very capital-intensive projects, many of
which require high skilled manpower.
The situation was less serious on the average with respect to
List B projects under R.A. No. 6135. The average capital-employment ratio
was f45,000 for all projects as of 1976,2 However, as in the IIA, Region
XII, an economically lagging area, had very capital-intensive projects
(averaging 235,000 per worker). More serious is the case of Regions
II, V, VII, and IX where there is not a single export project registered
under List B.
It may be contended that these employment figures represent direct
employment only. Employment generated by the forward and backward linkages
1 Project cost includes the cost of land. If land is excluded as the BOI
does, the analysis will not differ much because land as a percentage of
total project cost was not very large.
2 See Table
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of the project must be added. However, if we do that, then we should
also include the marginal investment required of such industries. Unfor-
tunately, we are not certain if the linkage industries will be any less
capital intensive than the key industry. To date, little attention is
being paid by the BOI to secondary effects of projects. This again
indicates that employment as a criterion has not really been given that
much importance in the evaluation process, so long as the economic con-
tribution is enormous. Interestingly enough, no economically less
attractive project was to my knowledge approved on the grounds that it
generated considerable employment. In this regard, the whole system
can be criticized for not providing a framework by which benefits of one
typr could be compared with another in a compensatory way. To favor one
kind of output over another without a proper examination of the other
outputs does not seem to be tenable in the light of the objectives of
the Acts and the national plans.
6. 2. Concluding Remarks: Inadequacy of the Planning Process
In this chapter, we analyzed the BOI incentive systems in various
perspectives in the context of the national development objectives. We
noted that the objectives of the Investment and Export Incentives Actsdo
not reflect all of the national objectives and that the policy statements
regarding regional industry dispersal has implicit provisions that limit
the potential of using these Acts to achieve regional development. We
showed why the incentive benefits are inadequate in addressing properly
the regional development, the balance of payments, the employment, and
1 Four Year Development Plan, FY 1972-75, op. cit. p.
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even the efficiency objectives. With respect tp the Priorities Plans,
we argued that the process and the outcome of planning have many important
deficiencies such as the focus on commercial feasibility (which is an
inadequate measure of project worthiness), the tendency towards capital
intensity, and the use of minimum plant capacity (which discriminates
against smaller industries). We also discussed the inadequacies of the
BOI procedure for project appraisal, to wit: the employment of the
financial viability criterion, the absence of consistent framework for
comparing costs and benefits, the use of lexicographic ordering (an
approach which is not theoretically sound) when dealing with many quali-
fied applicants, the problems in BOI's use of social rate of return,
and others. Finally, we tested the effectiveness of the incentives in
addressing the social objectives and found out that the systems do not
adequately deal with the regional development and employment objectives.
Much of the problems discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 could have been
avoided or at least mitigated had there been a planning process that placed
m ore emphasis on maximizing the total welfare of the people. The failure
of public and private investments to conform to the development objectives
and policies, the tendency of project planners to formulate projects on
a shortsighted "ad-hoc" problem-solving approach, the difficulties
associated with the task of allocating resources among "priority" needs.
and the occurence of sub-optimal or mal-investment may be attributed to
political prudence. Decision makers have to entertain ( or appear to
entertain) as many people as possible. However, that is only part of
the total picture. Another and equally important explanation is the
absence of a systematic procedure for designing, evaluating, and selecting
projects in the light of the national objectives.
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The apparent over-concentration of public and private investment
in a few regions would have beem minimized had there been a system by
which investment programs could have been assesses in terms of their
overall effects on the development of the country, That is, during the
appraisal and even the design stages, the projects could have been
analyzed individually or collectively in terms of their impacts on
each of the objectives. The planners could have gone back to the drawing
board upon discovering that the infrastructure programs ignore the
regional development objective. Otherwise, the policy-makers would
have had to justify the resulting distribution on the grounds that the
economic and perhaps interpersonal income effects were substantial
enough to compensate for the unfavorable interregional resource allocation
pattern. The last possibility could be implicit in the national plans.
However, we are not clear whether proper calculations were in fact made
and if the regional development objective would be achieved through
other means.
Similarly, the lack of a unifying development framework caused
the tendency for project planners to operate on a myopic problem-solving
approach. As a consequence, the impacts of the proposed solutions on the
other dimensions of development were rarely considered. It is conceivable
that investments that were designed to attack sertain societal ills had
actually created other forms of problems. For example, many irrigation
projects which sought to increase rice production and the farmers' pro-
ductivity were said to have cause floodings to non-irrigated areas,
Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether the value and incidence of the
secondary costs and benefits were identified and measured.
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Evidently, there are many symptoms and glaring indications that
the present practice of resource allocation is wanting. We therefore
conclude that the first requirement for the necessity of a multi-objective
approach to project appraisal has been met.
The crucial questions then are: What can the MOAPA offer? Do we
have other options? Is the prevailing environment conducive to the
adoption and successful implementation of the MOAPA. These and other
related questions will be dealt with in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 7 DEALING WITH "NON-EFFICIENCY" OBJECTIVES: ALTERNATIVES
TO MULTIOBJECTIVE PROJECT APPRAISAL
The preceding three chapters dwelt on the necessity of a
multiobjective approach to project analysis and resource allocation
in the Philippines. As a complementary analysis, the next two
chapters will deal with the practicability of adopting the MOAPA
in the Philippines. We will compare the prospects of the MOAPA
with those of alternative tools for dealing with "non-efficiency"
objectives.
In this chapter, we will devote our attention on the alterna-
tive mechanimss for achieving the "non-efficiency" goals, particu-
larly the income redistribution objectives. We will specifically
study: 1) the tax system; 2) regulations; 3) social develop-
ment programs; and 4) programs promoting cottage, small-and medium-
scale industries.
7.1 Tax System
The traditional alternative to public investment projects in
addressing the equity objective are income transfers, i.e., taxa-
tions and subsidies. As neoclassical economists would argue, the
most efficient way to redistribute income is through a two-stage
process wherein Gross National Product is maximized first and then
redistributed. Taxation is also suggested by neoclassical economist
for dealing with activities that generate negative externalities
'Project selection is therefore considered a second-best redistribu-
tive mechanism.
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(e.g., pollution).
Regretably, the Philippine tax system does not offer much pro-
mise, at least in the short-run, as an effective tool for redistri-
buting income and wealth much less for penalizing negative externali-
ties. It does not even encourage the efficient use of resources.
First, the tax system lacks a central coordinating office that
is responsible for revenue planning, legislation, and enforcement. 1
The tax enforcement agancies operate essentially as independent en-
tities, "collecting partly the same taxes from different sectors of
the economy." Tax policy decision are made frequently without
proper consultations with other pertinent government functionaries.
This leads to confusion in the administration of fiscal incentives.
There is also no consistent tax policy that addresses the rural de-
velopment policies and strategies.3
Second, the tax system is highly regressive. One important
reason for this regressivity is that direct taxation had been a
grossly neglected fiscal area in the Philippines. The basic charac-
teristics of the personal income tax have not changed since 1960.
This tax allows inflation to push people's incomes to higher tax
brackets which is more harmful to the poor than it is to the rich
who are already in the highest tax brackets. This component of the
1R. Cheetham, op.cit., p. 397.
2 Ibid. For example, import taxes on raw materials are levied by the
Bureau of Customs while sales taxes are collected from local indus-
try by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
3Information is limited about the equality impact of government tax
and expenditure policies on the rural sector.
The effective tax increase caused by inflation for the poor is
equal to the rate of inflation plus the difference in tax rate between
the present and former tax brackets. For the rich who are aiready in
the highest tax bracket, the effective increase in tax rate caused
by intiaTo is e qualto only to
the inflation rate.
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tax system also has numerous loopholes (i.e., personal deducations)
which can be taken advantage of by the upper income families. On
the other hand, the corporate tax rate has been raised for income
exceeding Y100,000 from 30% to 35% in 1969.1 However, the "exces-
sive and highly complex array of possible deductions"2 continue to
be the major drawback of the corporate income tax system.
Meanwhile, the Government has relied heavily on indirect taxa-
tion which accounts for 70% to 75% of total tax revenues. If as the
theory predicts, much of the burden of these taxes are passed on to
the consumers, the Philippine tax system is regressive.3 Even if
they are not, the tax system still needs to increase the excise tax
on non-essential commodities, the motor vehicles and fuels taxes and
the sales tax4 to expand its revenue base as well as to effect great-
er progressivity in the system.
Similarly, the export tax, the only significant tax on agricul-
ture, also has regressive features.5 While this tax is imposed on
1lIncome taxes accounted for only 22% of total revenue in 1974, and
only 18% in 1976. Five Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-
82, op. cit., p. 357. See also Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1972-
75, op.cit., p. 38.
2R. Cheetham, op.cit., p. 440.
3For theoretical explanations, the reader may refer to Introductory
Economics textbooks such as R.C. Heilbroner and L.C. Thurow, The
Economic Problem, Prentice-Hall, 1976, Chapter 20, pp. 289-304.
In the case of the Philippines, a large proportion of the poor do
not take part in the market economy and consumes a great deal of
unprocessed (and untaxed) food which account for over 50% of typi-
cal household budget. Sales tax is therefore not regressive. R.M.
Bird, D. Shimoni, and R.W. Smith, Taxes and Tax Reform in the Phil-
ippines, (Restricted Circulation Draft), International Monetary
Fund, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 120.
5R. Cheetham, op.cit., p. 116.
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it also applies to coconut producers who are, by and large, small
farmers. It is also believe that as a result of the unfavorable
market for coconut oils, the tax has been bourne largely by these
small holders producing coconut.
Third, tax enforcement is inadequate, resulting in rampant tax
evasion and cheating. Only a tiny fraction of "taxable" people
actually file their income tax returns and of thes tax filers, the
proportion that results in actual tax payment is small (i.e., 1.1%
in 1970 ). Similarly, the corporate income tax has a low effective
tax collection rate. This low efective rate reduces the attrac-
tiveness of rax incentives such as those of the BOI. In fact,
agriculture and manufacturing, two priority economic sectors have
higher effective taxes than the rest of the private corporate sec-
tor.2 Both personal and corporate income taxation are inoperative
1lIbid., p. 439.
2Summarizing the report of T.C. Toledo, Director of the Revenue
Operations and Management Planning Division of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) to Commission M.P. Vera of the BIR, Chee-
tham writes: "A recent report on income tax returns of corpora-
tions revealed that out of some 15,350 registered corporations
that filed tax returns, about a third were exempt, with recorded
total gross income V3,750 million. Between 1959 and 1972, when
there were fewer corporations registered, the percentage was be-
tween 50 and 60. The effective income tax rate of both taxable
and exexpt corporations decreased from an average 6.8% of gross
income in 1973 to 4.0% in 1974. Taxable corporations derived de-
ductions from 65% to 85% of their 1973 gross income. Exempt cor-
porations claimed deductions ranging between 105 and 155% of their
gross incomes; in 1974 tax paying tax-empt corporations combined
claimed deductions ranging between 74 and 84%. A sectoral analysis
showed that in 1973 the highest payers were agricultural and natur-
al-resource industries, paying 8.8%. The financial and real estate
sectors paid 4.9% of gross income, and other service industries
paid 4.1%. The latter seem to have claimed abnormally high deduc-
tions or to have declared very low gross income. ibid. pp. 440-441.
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tools for equity purposes. A substantial amount of the income of the
rich is undeclared due to improper accounting and documentation
of business transaction, frequently with the blessings of local tax
collectors.
The administration of real property tax, the major tax on
wealth in the Philippines is likewise very deficient. In many com-
munities, the tax rate is imposed substantially below the authorized
level. Moreover, properties are frequently assessed at less than
50% of their actual market value.1 More importantly, because of in-
adequate cadastralmaps and other basic assessment tools, many taxa-
ble properties are left out in the assessment rolls. Finally, real
property taxation suffers from tax collection problems. As Cheetham
describes: "In the 1960s only half the real property taxes due
were collected; often, unpaid or back taxes exceeded taxes currently
due. In FY70 back taxes accounted for about a fourth of total col-
lections."2 There are many possible explanations for this failure
to collect taxes including the absence of strong penalties for tax
evaders, inadequate staffing (with underpaid and incompetent of-
ficials), graft and corruption, incomplete land records, etc.
Fourth, no matter how efficient the enforcement of the tax sys-
tem may be, using taxation for equity purposes may serve as a strong
'Recent studies show that the asse'sment of real property average on-
ly 45% of current and fair market value on the 1960s and early 1970s.
Of late, this situation improved only slightly because of inadequate
tax enforcement. E.Z. Romualdez, Sr., A.O. Yoinco, and A.O. Casem,
Jr. Philippine Public Finance, GIC Enterprises, 1973, pp. 463-464.
2
R. Cheetham, op.cit., p. 428. The impact of recent measures direc-
ted to these issues are too early to determine.
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disincentive for maximizing income. To the extent that this is
applicable, the argument of expanding the pie first and redistribute
later may not be as strong as it seems. The Philippine government
realizes this danger. As the 1972-75 Plan states:
"In taxing affluence on equity grounds,...there
is the danger of killing enrepreneurial initia-
tive. Prohibitive rates, when imposed indis-
crimitely, are liable to discourage individual
efforts to maximize productivity. Because of
the enormous monetary sacrifice involved, this
may also worsen the tax evasion problem. To
some extent, even foreign capital as well as
domestic savings might be diverted to those
countries where the tax climate is more favor-
able. In effect, not only will the tax base
diminish but also, and more fundamentally, the
development goals might suffer a setback. For
this reason, the investment incentives package
which was adopted recently features tax exem-
tion priveleges to preferred areas of invest-
ment."1
Finally, taxation is not utilized by the Government towards
the preservation of environmental quality. No user or effluence
charges are being levied on polluting firms. Loggers pay forest
charges which are small in relation to the environmental costs (e.g.,
faster denudation, flooding).
For these aforecited reasons, it is unwise to expect the tax
system to contribute effectively to the equity and environmental
objectives. As an offshoot of the low effective tax rate it may
even deter the efficient use of resources.
7.2 Regulation
Regulations may be effective in contributing to some of the
development objectives such as regional development and the
1Four Year Development Plan, FY 1972-75, op. cit., p. 38.
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protection of environmental quality. Unfortunately, past experi-
ences in the use of this tool for achieving these objectives in the
Philippines have been discouraging. Of late,revisions in the old
Pollution Control Law (under R.A. No. 3931)1 are expected to cor-
rect the "poor compliance to government requirements on the preven-
tion and control of environmental protection and management pro-
gram."'2
While this move can be effective, there are some problems.
First, the focus of industrial pollution control enforcement is the
Metro-Manila Area (MMA) whereas other areas are equally if not
severely polluted (e.g., mining towns). Second, environmental im-
pact assessment is required for existing and proposed government
and private plants. However, this requirement has not been adopted
by leading institutions in their evaluation of projects. Further-
more, "areas with serious pollution problems will be covered first
3by EIA". This means that environmentally undesirable projects
may continue in the countryside.
Moreover, these rules and regulations are designed in consonance
with a specific policy (i.e., environmental policy) and to solve a
problem (e.g., pollution) in isolation. These regulatory schemes
totally ignore the magnitude of economic and social contributions
of these so-called polluting industries. In effect, environmental
- consideration has a benefit value of infinity. This is certainly
too much a weight for a country that is suffering from hunger and
unemployment. To be sure, there is a trade-off between environmental
1 Presidential Decree No. 984.2 Ibid., p. 98
3Ibid., p. 99.
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quality and other development objectives. Such compromise, however,
is not made clear under the pertinent environmental-related laws.
To what extent people are actually willing to accept smog and polluted
water for employment and food is something that is clearly set aside
in this framework. Some degrees of pollution may be tolerable in a
society where hunger and absolute poverty are at stake. 1
The government has also used its regulatory powers to influence
the flow of resources among regions. Two recent policies are worth
mentioning. One is a presidential directive that bans the establish-
ment of industrial enterprises except for export industries within
the 50 kilometer radius of Manila. A second one is a Central Bank
circular which require banking institutions to invest 75% of deposits
accumulated in their branch offices in the latter's respective areas
of operation. Export based enterprises continue to concentrate in
MMA. Some observers point to the possible loopholes in the defini-
tion of export-oriented industries.2 Evidently, banning industries
in specific locations does not necessarily promote their establish-
ment in lagging region.
The Central Bank Circular has not been succsssful either. Given
the stiff collateral requirements of banks, not enough investment
demands are generated. At the same time, the CB allowed that the 75%
requirement be met through the purchase of Central Bank Certificates
.of Indebtedness (CBCIs). These CBCIs, with its tax free interest has
1This is parallel to neoclassical economist's view that the poors
"willingness to pay" is low for clean air and water and a healthy
environment.
R. Bacani, op.cit., p. 112.
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quality and other development objectives. Such compromise, however,
is not made clear under the pertinent environmental-related laws.
To what extent people are actually willing to accept smog and polluted
water for employment and food is somthing that is clearly set aside
in this framework. Some degrees of pollution may be tolerable in a
society where hunger and absolute poverty are at stake.'
The government has also used its regulatory powers to influence
the flow of resources among regions. Two recent policies are worth
mentioning. One is a presidential directive that bans the establish-
ment of industrial enterprises except for export industries within
the 50 kilometer radius of Manila. A second one is Central Bank
circular which require banking institutions to invest 75% of deposits
accumulated in their branch office in the latter's respective areas
of operation.
To the regret policy makers, these measures have not worked. As
can be expected, worked, new firms proliferated just beyond the peri-
phery of the banned zone. Export based enterprises continue to concen-
trate in MMA. Some observers point to the possible loopholes in the
definition of export-oriented industries.2 Evidently, banning indus-
tries in specific locations does not necessarily promote theri establish-
ment in lagging region.
The Central Bank Circular has not been successful either. Given the
stiff collateral requirements of banks, not enough investment demands
are generated. At the same time, the CB allowed that the 75% require-
ment be met through the purchase of Central Bank Certificates
of Indebtedness (CBCIs). These CBCIs, with its tax free interest has
1This is parallel to necolassical economist's view that the poors "will-
ingness to pay" is low for clean air and water and a healthy environment.
2R. Bacani, op.cit., p. 112
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has become the principal loophole of the Circular.
These examples are clear indications of how ineffective the
regulations have been in contributing to certain development objec-
tives. There is little reason for being optimistic about their fu-
ture performances.
7.3 Social Development Programs
The government can also tackle the equity ssue, not through tra-
ditional investment projects such as industries, utilities and high-
way networks, but through social welfare and development programs.
To some extent, this does seem to be happening. Between 1973 and
1976, social development programs accounted for some 18%-22% of
national government expenditure and around 33%-38% of local govern-
ment outlays. 1
Likewise, the 1978-82 Plan, offers the benefits of social de-
velopment programs each year to some additional 1.5 to 2.55 millions
fo disadvantaged individuals (i.e. family heads, preschoolers,
youth, disabled and distressed) out of the 12 million comprising the
bottom 30% of the population.2 Similarly some 3 million cultural
minorities and 8.6 to 10.5 million laborers will be beneficiaries
of assistance programs.
Very little has been written about the social development pro-
grams of the country. There is no study that attempts to compare
the redistributive effects of social development programs with those
of directly productive investments. The government may have been
allocating resources without a clear understanding of the overall
1Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, Fy 1978-82, p. 358.
23Ibid., p. 243. Refer to Appendix C for description of these programs.
Ibid.
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impact of its decisions. Using Harberger's argument, therefore,
there is a real possibility that the benefits foregone (e.g., say,
production) in promoting other objectives (e.g., say redistribution
or environmental quality) may be so large that the government and/or
the people, had they been aware, might not have permitted such trade-
off.
It is observed that some social programs are also poorly admi-
nistered and are unsuccessful in achieving their purpose. It is
noted that owing to traditional welfare-relief approach of the
Government, the Filipino people tend to treat social development
programs as doleouts. Hence, everybody wants to benefit from them.
Many people are said to have abused them. For instance, many people
avail of liberalized credit and misuse the funds and/or refuse to
pay the amortizations.1 Graft and corruption are also prevalent
in the Civil Service, particularly in the purchase and use of sup-
plies and equipment. Likewise, there have been many cases of
food, medicine, and supplies spoiling in warehouses and government
offices. Transfers of funds between governments accounts, which
is prohibited by law, are believed to happen frequently. A consi-
derable proportion of local goverment development funds are alleged-
ly channeled to political campaigns largely in support of the domi-
nant party. All these circumstances leave one to suspect that these
social programs may not even be half as effective in achieving social
1For example, loan repayments for gain production had been very low.
Cases of borrowers hiding from bank personnel are pretty common.
2Just recently, the newly appointed Minister of Health revealed
that millions of pesos went into the pockets of the previous ad-
ministrators of the Ministry.
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In support of the view, recent studies have shown that large
urban centers particularly the MMA have benefited from most social
programs. More importantly, these studies indicate that the abso-
lute value of benefits received by families from government services
appears to rise with family income and to dcrease with distance from
the MMA. This is observed even among programs such as public educa-
tion, medicare, and rural extension services which have been directed
especially to lower income people. "Low incomes, distance from
the source of the services and ignorance of the availability and
cost-benefits of the services have probably prevented low-income
families from availing themselves of these services."2 Irrespective
of the reason, many provinces have received considerably less in
government services than they have contributed through taxes.
On the technical side, the evaluation and the setting of
priorities among social programs may even be more difficult than it
is with industrial and infrastructure projects. While the equity as-
pect of development may be properly addressed by social investments,
the issue of choice among the various types of social intentions and
among the possible beneficiaries (whether in terms of locations or
people) remains unsettled. For example, it is not easy to forecast
and compare the results of alternative nutrition programs such as
supplementary feeding and nutrition education with each other, let
alone translate the benefits into monetary terms. Owing to the ab-
sence of a workable decision framework, the selection process is
lSee R. Cheetham. op.cit., pp. 400-401. See also, E.A. Tan, Taxation
Government,Spending_, and Income Distribution in the Philippines, Uni-
versity of the iiiippines Institute of Economics, Quezon CIty, 1975,
pp. 37-42.
R..Cheetham, op.cit.
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naturally highly subjective.
A reviewof the three development plans prepared in the 1970s
shows that for certain social development programs, some attempts
were made to clarify the priority setting process. For example, the
1974-77Plan states that with respect to grants-in-aid projects under
the community development programs "projects leading to increased pro-
duction and income assume the highest priority. Socioeconomic in-
frastructure projects come next followed by those directed at improv-
ing the health and sanitation of the community."1 In earlier chapters,
we discussed extensively the weaknesses of this type of guidelines
to project selection. In this particular example, there is an
implicit valuation or evaluation procefure that has not been justi-
fied. The ranking of projects adopted either assumes that all di-
rectly productive investments will generate the highest net aggre-
gate benefits (however defined), followed by socio-economic infra-
structure and finally by health-related projects or that the value
of direct increases in income and employment is greater than indi-
rect development benefits (via infrastructure and health projects).
This ranking is neither correct nor acceptable. In the first place,
certian infrastructure projects may yield greater benefits compared
to industrial investments. Secondly, it not clear, why benefits
derived from increases in production should be treated differently
from those resulting,for example, from savings in transportation
cost?
These plan criteria are also not really adequate for guiding re-
source allocation. How does the prioritization work in terms of
1Four Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77, op. cit., p. 314.
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actual programming? Does this scheme suggest that all proposed and
acceptable production projects will be funded first or that there is
a percentage distribution? Furthermore, these criteria do not
reflect some of the development objectives such as spatial income
inequality.
This example is just one of many. Evidently there is a need
to improve the current procefure for making investment decisions
towards greater objectivity, consistency, and comprehensiveness.
In summary, we are pessimistic about the adequacy of social
interventions in achieving the social objectives of the Government.
In addition, like economic development projects, social develop-
ment programs will still require a coherent framework for evaluation
and for setting priorities.
7.4 Promotion of Cottage, Small andMeditim-Scale Industries
The government can promote smaller industries to develop the
lagging regions and to redress interpersonal income inequality.
Credit facilities (at subsidized or unsubsidized rates) and tax
holidays may be provided to regions other than the Metro-Manila Area
and/or to entrepreneurs who have less access to these benefits (i.e.
not the large landowners or wealth families).
The Philippine government appears to be aware that the credit
system may be molded to assist in the achievement of social objec-
tives. In the early 1970s, the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the principal public development banking institution, started
a subsidized credit program for small- and medium-scale industries.1
DBP financed up to 10% of total annual investments in the past. DBP
also finances agricultural, transport and other projects.
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To complement this program, the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund
(IGLF) has also been created to encourage private financial insti-
tutions to provide cridit facilities to home (or cottage) to small-
scale industries. The Ministry of Industry, particularly its Com-
mission on Small and Medium-Scale Industries (CMSI) and the medium-
and Small-Scale Industries Coordinated Actipn Programs (MASICAP),
promotes assists and develops smaller industries especially in the
rural areas. Likewise, the Trade Assistance Center (of the Ministry
of Trade) extends marketing assistance to small industries in the
various regions while the Regional Manpower Training Centers (which
administered by the National Manpower Training and Youth Council)
conduct skills development programs that are directed to the needs
of the regional economy. The National Cottage Industries Authori-
ty, which has long been in existence, provides tax exemption pri-
vileges, technical assistance, training and, occasionally, loans up
to 15,000 per cottage producer. In any event, smaller industries
are being promoted because they are more appropriate for rural areas
owing to their agriculture-base or labor intensive operation and
small local market orientation.
The limited available empirical evidence, unfortunately, do not
seem to indicate that these efforts have been that successful and
there seems to be no reason to expect that they would at least in the
near future. We shall concentrate our analysis on the credit -system
which is a vital component of this small industry assistance program.
'Under this program, loans may be sponsored (by a commercial or trust
bank or any financial intermediary) from a minimum of V50,000 to
maxi um of 5000,000 and between s20 0 to 150 000 for ai ibla
rural ranks. Interest rate is pegged at (non-aiscounta e an
the repayment period is 3 years for working capital and 10 years
for fixed assets. Payment on equal quarterly amortization.
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The industrial projects assisted by the DBP have produced a
high capital-intensity that does not reflect the economy's relative
resource scarcity. For example, in FY1973, DBP projects had an
average capital-labor ratio of about V105,000 (US $14,000) per wor-
1ker, which, although lower than the average for all BOI projects, is
nonetheless still high for the Philippines. The DBP also achieved
only minor improvements in lending distribution. During FY 1966-77
to FY 1969-70, Manila and Suburbs, Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog2
accounted for a combined 58% of total projects and for 77% of the
(Table 12)..
aggregate of individual project costs, ese regions combined ac-
counted for only 32.8% of the Philippine population in 1970. In FY
1970-71 to FY 1975-76, these same areas acounted for 43% of total
projects, 56% of the total of all project costs and only 34.3% of
the population. The tendency of the DBP to favor these 3 regions
is apparent when we analyze year to year lending. After limiting
its lending to thse three regions to 42.5% in 1973-74, DBP once again
lent out 68% of its investments to these same regions in 1974-75 (See
Table t3),Furthermore, there is still this tendency to channel much of
the capital to the Metro-Manila rea (MMA). This region accounted
for 31% to 44% of total loans granted by DBP each year between 1971
and 1976 where,,it only comprised only 10% of the total Philippine
population in 1975.
It may be mentioned that the share of project numbers located
in the MhA has declined consistently between 1971 and 1976 (See
Table 14). On closer analysis, however, we can observe many related
1R. Cheetham, op.cit., p. 424.
2As mentioned in earlier chapters, they are three of the most econom-
ically developed regions in the country. Refer to Appendix B.
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developments that are disturbing. Earlier, we pointed out that
a substantial proportion of industrial investment (via DBP) was ac-
counted for by MMA. Looking further, the average project cost for
the MMA has increased tremendously. This suggests that large indus-
tries are being promoted in this region thereby eassentially ignor-
ing the 50 kilometer ban and the decentralization policies of the
government.
More fundamentally, while DBP's financial program has reached
the countryside, much is left to be done in the case of the most
depressed regions. Note also that there is no discernable trend to-
ward an increasing share in the number of projects or in the amount
of DBP loans among these less developed regions especially Regions
II, V, VIII, and XII.
However, we must take caution in interpreting these regional
patterns. We must remember that regional development is only one
of the developmet objectives of the country. Reiterating the theme
of this report, the appraisal of small private sector projects must
take into account not only the social value of regional investment
dispersal, but also the economic value of these proposed projects.
Nevertheless, these concentration of DBP projects in a few areas
plus other factors, which we will discuss soon, appears to indicate
that the DBP does not place as much premium to regionally dispersed
projects as we expect them to do considering the purpose of their
lending programs.
Another serious criticism on the DBP lending system relates
to its evaluation of applications. The DBP is observed to have
overemphasized collateral and debt-equity policies in its lending
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decisions. Its requirement are evidently prejected against the
poor. Entrepreneurs with socially desirable and commercially
profitable industrial venture but who do not have collateral enough
to cover the loan are not eligible for DBP lending. Similarly,
proponents must also raise at least 45% of the total project cost
for urban proponents and 15% for rural proponents.2 It is felt
that these policies discriminate aginst the struggling but hard-
working poor.
It has also been suggested that DBP may be favoring larger pro-
jects because their administrative and processing costs are about
1The loan values of collaterials offered for home and
medium scal industries as follows (in %)
Collaterials Home Industries
Urban area Rural area
small-and-
Small & Medium
Scale Industries
a. Titled land 80 100 90
b. Unititled land 60 80 80
c. Building and Improve- 80 100 90
ments erected on ti-
tle land
d. Building and improve- 60 80 80
ments erected on un-
titled land
e. Machinery and equip- 60 80 80
ment already acquired
or to be acquired
Urban areas cover the Greater Manila Area, Metro-Cebu and specific
districts of Davao City.
2Project cost is equal to the value of land, machinery and equipment
and building structures that are directly related to the operation
of the project plus pre-operating expenses and working capital (typ-
ically for one month).
3Bacani, op. cit. p. 124.
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the same as theat for smaller projects. One other reason is that
proponents of larger projects tend to be also the most influencial
personalities in the regions. Also disheratening is the complexity
of loan application procedures and the discouraging long processing
time (average one year). 2
Moreover, while DBP's project appraisal covers management,
technical, marketing and financial feasibility, DBP is said to be
largely concerned with the commercial feasibility of proposed pro-
jects. As we indicated in previous chapters, there are many dangers
in using the commercial profitability criterion in lieu of social-
economic benefit-cost analysis. It bay be argued, therefore, that the
DBP is functioning more like a private banking institution rather
than a public agency that has been created to help achieve certain
development goals of the country.
The Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund is not any better than
the DBP. Since its inception in 1972 until 1976, The IGLF Review
Committee approved 570 projects involving a long value of Y101,500,000.(Tablel5),
Of the total laons granted, 43% went to Region IV and another 24%
flowed to Region III and IV-A combined. In the terms of projects
approved Regions III, IV, and IV-A accounted for 55% of the total.
The more depressed areas, Regions II, V, VIII, IX and XII, accounted
for a combined share of 4.6% and 4.3% of total number of projects and
of total loans granted, respectively. (Table 16),
Bacani, op.cit., p. 124. This is of course a Common Complaint about
this type of orginizations.
2It is important to realize that for small entrepreneurs who earn by
the hour that they work, the poorotunity costs for following up loans
are excetremely valuable.
Table 15 Amount of Tndustrial Loans Approved by the Industrial Guarantee
and Loan Fund, by Region, 1973-1976,
1973-1974 % 1974-1975 1975-1976 Total
P111IL11 Ii3
Luzo n
RegiCn I
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Iy I
IV.A
V i say
Ueg on VI
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Region IX
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1,931
-m3,189
2,059
100.0 52,572.5
100.0 21 13 .5
27-0
144.5
28.5
--m
6,922.5
70
5 58 8.5
22,612
5,895.5
100 -
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5,322
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1,400
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2,010
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11.1
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14.0
4.8
7.4
1.8
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1.8
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1.6
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Table 16 Number of Industrial Loans Approved by the Industrial Guarantee
and Loan Fund, by Region, 1973-1976.
1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1976
PHILI!)LPINES
Luzon
Region I
II
III
IV
IV-A
V
Visay:As
Region II
VII
vriii
MindA nao
Region IX
XI
RXI
'ource: IGLF
32
32
Total
100.0
100..0
46.9
31.2
21.9
10
7
347
277
91
1
29
84
71
1
66
22
37
7
100.0
79.8
26.2
0.3
8.3
24.2
20.5
0.3
19.0
6.3
10.7
2.0
191
146
21
30
55
30
10
34
12
19
3
11
2
5
2
570
455
127
1
59
149
108
11
100
100.0
76.4
11.0
15.7
28.8
15.7
5.2
17.7
6.3
9.9
1.5
34
-56
10
155.9,
1.1
2.6
1.1
1.1
100.0
79.7
22.3
0.2
10.3
26.1
18.9
1.9
17.5
6.o
9.8
1.7
2.8
0.4
1 1.
0.9
0.4
1.2
0.3
0.9
Like DBP, the IBLF is alledgedly being administered purely on
the basis of commercial profitability. No social project appraisal
is undertaken. Although employment nad foreign exchange earnings
and savings are supposedly treated as other criteria, no compensa-
tory scheme involving the various types of benefits and cost is opera-
tional. Hence projects with considerable empolyment of foreign
exchange earnings but low financial refund may have been rejected.
One may hypothesize that the failure of the ICLF (like the DBP)
to reach the depressed regions is due to the lack of viable indus-
trial prospects in these areas. WHile this association may be part-
ly true, it does not totally explain the situation. This argument
may even be incorrect if the MASICAP1 performance is used as a
guage of relative prospects for business. Between FY 1975-1976
and FY 1976-77, over 800 projects of 31% of the total 2,600 MASICAP
assisted projected was accounted for by Regions II, V, VIII, IX and
XII, combined (See Table 17).2 This is a far cry from the 4% ex-
tended by the IGLF to these regions.
The samll number of of IGLF assisted projects appear to be a
result mainly of institutional deficiencies. Since the program
new, very few entrepreneurs were aware of its existence. Branches
of banking institutions are equally unaware of the procedures for
1 These are field teams that assist proponents in the preparation of
project feasibility studies and loan follow-ups.
It may also be presumptuous to say that there is limited industrial
potential in the lagging regions. On the bais of past MASICAP
accomplishment again, these 5 less developed regions accounted for
26.4%of total MASICAP assisted manufacturing industries until FY
1977.
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processing IBLF loan applications and tended to deemphasize this
program. A few bank executives even expressed the opinion that IGLF
was competing with their regular lending programs. Even the head
offices of banking institutions were at a loss as to how to handle
applications coming from their branch offices. Part of the problem
is the centralized operation of the IBLF Review Committee1 in Manila.
Only a handful of people in the regions outside the MMA could answer
with authority or certainty what the correct procedure is.
In summary, our analysis incicate that vital programs designed
to assist small private industry enterprises to meet social objec-
tives such as employment, income redistribution, and regional develop-
ment have not been successful. We noted for instance that the credit
programs for small industries are administered principally on the
basis of financial analysis (which we have shown to be an inadequate
measure of project worthiness and with emphasis on securities. They
also have not resulted in a trend towards regional dispersal of
industries. We do not therefore expect that these programs can ad-
dress the social objectives adequately, at least in the short-run.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
The foregoing discussion examined the prospects of tools other
than the MOAPA and the real interest in pursuing "non-efficiency"
objectives in the Philippines. We considered the tax system, regula-
tory processes, social development programs and small industry pro-
motion programs. We observed that the tax system in the Philippines
1Composed of representatives from the NEDA, the Central Bank, the Min-
istry of Industry and the University of che Philippines, and the In-
stitute for Small-Scale Industry (1SSI).
186
is not properly integrated, is highly- regressive, and is badly en-
forced. We also noted that the Government recognizes the disincen-
tive effect of taxes and that the taxation is not employed to pena-
lize negative externalities resulting from industrial projects. We
likewise pointed to the myopic orientation (i.e. does not consider
other project impacts) and lack of success of regulatory schemes.
We also explained our apprehension with regards to social de-
velopment programs saying that the Government is unaware of the re-
distributive effects of these activities relative to those of invest-
ments in directly productive undertaking. We argue that social
programs are poorly administered and generally unsuccessful. Further-
more, we said that the problems of evaluation and priority setting
are extremely difficult with social development programs and projects.
Finally, we discussed the failures of credit programs to contribute
to regional development, employment, and to the development to small-
scale entrepreneurs.
The foregoing discussion brings to the fore an evident conclu-
sion: thest these more traditional tools are not effective mecha-
nisms for achieving the non-economic development objectives in the
Philippines. In this respect, we say that the multiobjective scheme
is a necessary alternative.
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CHAPTER 8 RELEVANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES OF THE MULTIOBJECTIVE
APPROACH TO PROJECT APPRAISAL
We investigated the necessity of the MOAPA in chapters 4 to 6.
We also studied the potentials of alternative tools for achieving
"non-efficiency" objectives in Chapter 7. The only thing that is
left for us to do is to present what the MOAPA has to offer and
analyze its feasibility in the Philippines.
The following sections serve as the concluding chapter of this
study. Different dimensions of the MOAPA will be discussed: 1) its
benefits, 2) its costs; 3) its political underpinnings; and
4) the problem of choosing the specific methodology.
8.1 The Advantages of the MOAPA
In the previous chapter, we showed that in the Philippines,
taxation, regulation, social development programs, and small-indus-
try credit assistance programs are not efficiently and successfully
administered. We therefore say that in the manner in which these
tools have been employed, they are not viable alternatives in achiev-
ing the "non-economic" objectives. But, is the MOAPA any better?
We venture to say "yes."
The MOAPA offers potentially more effective vehicles in addres-
sing the various development objectives, especially those that are
conventionally not included systematically in project appraisal.1
We carn discuss the advantages of the MOAPA in terms of:
The reader is advised to review the other arguments discussed in
Chapter 3, Section 3.3, which will not be repeated here.
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1) project analysis; 2) determining of priorities; 3) citizen
participation; and 4) political considerations.
A multiobjective approach to project analysis and resource al-
location in general permits a comparison of the various investment
impacts in a systematic as well as compensatory way. The approach
recognizes, in an explicit manner, the existence of many and partly
conflicting development objectives. It forces planners and policy
makers to consider the different consequences of proposed projects,
not just the potential impacts of these projects to the problems,
which they are purposely designed to solve. At the same time, this
methodology permits a project's low and even negative impacts of
certain kinds to be compensated by high and positive effects on
other development criteria. The use of a MOAPA does not necessari-
ly mean that projects with serious negative consequences (e.g.,
pollution) will be promoted. The multiobjective techniques only
makes more certain that the decision makers understand the extent
of the other types of benefits (e.g., employment, output) that will
be foregone to avoid such unfavorable impacts.
This "comprehensive" approach also makes the task of priority
setting considerably easier. Rather than relying on development
plans which may have been prepared less as guidelines as they are
as political documents, or on investment laws or projects manuals
which neither define how the multiple criteria will be used nor
have a unifying and consolidating framework, a multiobjective
methodology enables the planners and decision-makers to compare the
Projects with great negative impacts should only be implemented if
their positive impacts far outweight the negative impacts.
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various projects from different perspectives and eventually to set
relative priorities on the basis of their aggregate socio-economic-
political-environmental benefits and costs.
This approach can also contribute to wider citizen participation
in the development process. Since the decision-making process will
be generally clear, planner-advocates the leaders in the regions may
have greater incentives to be involved in the identification, design,
and perhaps even appraisal of projects. Those in depressed regions
will be more than willing to participate in planning exerciese know-
int that their relative poverty will now be openly recognized in
the deliberation. An attendant effect is that greater relevant in-
formation will be generated which can then be used for future designs
of projects and in policy formulation. Project purposes will also
be more attuned to the overall development objectives.1
One the political side, there are-three important benefits. First,
politicians should be better equipped to decide (i.e., to accept or
reject and to set priority) on proposed investments that contribute
in different ways to the various development objectives. Second, a
MOAPA may serve as a political instrument for rejecting projects
proposed by special interest groups, no matter how attractive these
proposals may be on certain grounds. Three, the MOAPA may help in
minimizing political conflicts by providing a mechanism for reach-
ing workable compromises among competing interests as in the case
between environmentalists and "efficiency" economists.
In summary, the MOAPA permits a systematic assessment of project
1These aspects were elaborated in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.
benefits and costs, many of which have been left out or dealt with
inadequately in traditional project analysis. The MOAPA may be used
for setting priorities within and across sectors, on the basis not
of a single or a few selected objectives but of all development
objectives. This "comprehensive" approach also provides politicians
with a better understanding of the trade-offs involved in project
selection and with an "objective" tool for rejecting projects that
are undesirable in terms of socity's development goals. The MOAPA
may likewise promote wider citizen participation and may generate
better project information.
One may ask, who benefits when the MOAPA is adopted? The Fili-
pino, in general, is expected to benefit from the MOAPA. The rea-
soning is that the MOAPA will enable the decision makers to more ef-
fectively address the various development objectives. Government
resources will be more properly allocated among the competing needs
since the tradeoffs (i.e., the benefits foregone in selecting
certain investment activities) will be better understood by the de-
cision-makers. The general public also benefits from the MOAPA in
terms of a workable compromise between conflicting objectives such
as environmental objectives (which tend to be viewed in isolation)
versus employment and income objectives.
Through the MOAPA the poor families and the less developed
areas (towns and regions), in particular, will receive more benefits
from public investments than they would otherwise. This is antici-
pated because the income redistribution, employment, and regional
development objectives will be systematically incorporated in pro-
ject analysis. Projects with low efficiency ratings but which con-
tribute enormously to these social objectives will now have somewhat
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better chances of being implemented since these social impacts will
now be given as much attention as that given to economic impacts.
8.2 The Cost of Adopting the MOAPA
The adoption of any new system or procedure will invariably in-
volve certain costs to the Government and society. With respect to
the MOAPA, these costs can be broadly categorized into: 1) insti-
tutional reforms; 2) manpower training; 3) data collection; and
4) longer time in project appraisal.
Institutional changes will have to be made to pave the way for
a successful implementation of the MOAPA. An umbrella project plan-
ning office may be necessary to assist and guide agencies such as
the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Board of Investment,
the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund, the various regional develop-
ment authorities, and the Budget Commission, which evaluate and
approve projects. To be effective, such an office should be endowed
with as much power, independence, technical expertise, and credi-
bility as possible. That should not be so difficult. The Programs
and Projects' office under NEDA should be able to provide the neces-
sary technical staff (with some training). The Government may also
strengthen the most appropriate division under the Office of the
President and raise this division's chief into cabinet rank in
order to give more clout on this new office. It can, alternatively,
reorganize the Investment Coordinating Committee in order to suit
the needs of the MOAPA. All these reforms are feasible given the
lOf course there should also be some mechanisms for checking on the
performance of this planning office.
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Irrespective of the organizational arrangement selected, the
adoption of the MOAPA will require the training (or retraining) of
project analysts and researchers who will implement the evaluation
exercises. The cost of training programs in this regard will not
involve an enormous increase in public expenditures. Since the
Government has been expending funds to strengthen the technical cap-
ability of national, regional and local planners, the MOAPA-related
training will only entail a reallocation of training funds.
Undoubtedly, more data will be required as inputs to the MOAPA.
Again, the differential costs between the 'with MOAPA" and the with-
out "MOAPA" conditions will not be great because the Government has
already been vigorously pursuing "a well-integrated and coordinated"
Philippine statistical system.1 In fact, it envisions a "national
computerization program taking into account the interfacing of manage-
ment information systems of the various national, regional, subre-
gional, and local level."2 These plans suggest that even without
the MOAPA, government funds will continue to be used to improve the
data base in the Philippines. Adopting the MOAPA may in fact help
in focusing on the type of statistics that should be collected and
therefore optimize the data that will be available. Admittedly,
there may be other data that are project specific which may have to
be collected in the field. However, the type and precision of data
collected can be made to suit the size and nature of projects being
evaluated. In addition as we argued earlier, the cost of data col-
lection is partly compensated by the secondary benefits its (i.e.
Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, FY 1978-82, op.cit., p. 415.
2 Ibid.
193
inmarroeconomic and project planning) in the use of these statistics.
It may agued that the MOAPA may consume more time to complete
than existing methods. This argument, however, is true only to the
extent that data collection takes longer time and that the analysts
are slow in following the procedures. On the first point, the time
needed to collect data will depend on the nature of the project's
benefits and costs as well as the availability of data. As we im-
plied earlier, the statistical system can be designed to minimize
the time spent on data collection at the project level. On the
second point, the inability of analysts to apply the MOAPA with
greater speed should only be a short-term problem which will be
minimized as these planners get more exposed to the methodology.
Obviousely the cost of adopting a multiobjective approach to
project appraisal and resource allocation will depend on the nature
of the methodology. The more and the greater detailed the informa-
tion required is, the greater will be the cost. Likewise, the more
complicated the procedure is, the more training will be required of
the project analysts, researchers, and data collectors. There would
also be projects that might not justify the costs of a extremely
complex evaluation schemes. For example, a project that requires
a small amount of government funds and also little effect outside
the political boundaries of a community would probably necessitate
only a simple version of a social benefit-cost analysis. In other
words, the cost requirements of the MOAPA could be made to suit the
size and nature of the projects being evaluated.
Finally, it must be remembered that costs are useless indica-
tors unless they are compared to the benefits. In this case, it
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seems evident that the costs will be substantially less than the
.benefits.
8.3 Political Underpinnings
Much of this question has been answered in the discussion of
costs of introducing the approach. We argue that the bureacratic
changes concommitant to this new methodology are not that serious
because the appropriate office already exists. The next interes-
ting question is: will the political pwer approve this approach
and abide by the rules of the game?
We can never be certain about the answers to these questions.
At most, we can make a calculated guess in the light of the signs
of the times. Some people may argue that introducing a systematic
and integrated multiobjective approach is close to a desiring Utopian
state. That is, it would be naive to hope for such an ideal solu-
tion to the problem of resource allocation. Perhaps the argument
is correct. After all, the leaders who decide on public invest-
ments must play politics in order to survive. They must make many
people happy or appear to be trying to do so. Moreover, politicians
would be the last people to change a system that is favorable to
their colleagues and friends, if not themselves. How else can they
stay in power if they push for institutional reforms that could hurt
the very people who could support them during the elections. In
another vein, decision-makers would generally be reluctant to
explicitly reveal their value system since that would leave them
very open to criticism. Perhaps the most important consideration
is that the power base of politicians might be eroded if an expli-
cit project appraisal scheme were adopted. They would have less
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discretionary power at the same time that decision making may be
more mechanical.
These arguments are well taken. Most likely, they all apply to
some extent to the Philippine situation. Nevertheless, these should
not preclude attempts of planners-advocates to improve the system
of project planning. In fact, it should be incumbent upon the plan-
ner to act as an aspiring marketing man, thinking of the best way of
"packaging" the MOAPA so that the political leaders would "buy" the
idea.
There may even be some cause for optimism that a multiobjective
project appraisal methodology may be adopted by the goverment. De-
spite rumors to the contrary, there is a minimum degree of politi-
cal stability that favors the adoption of a radical institutional
change such as this comprehensive appraisal technique. If the
administration is able to institute land reform, then the resource
allocation system can probably be inproved. With the existing in-
stitutional set-up, there are also less opportunities for particu-
lar interest groups to lobby against such an improvement in public
expenditure. The activities of the National planning office, NEDA,
has not been seriously hampered by actions made by the private sec-
tor.
Paradoxically, the private sector may even endorse a suggestion
that would put clearer direction to the use of public resources.
Who would rot like one's government to be more systematic in the
way it makes decisions? When the policy makers deliberate on the use
of $OAPA, I believe that there will not be much oppositions from
private interests groups. There is no priori reason for them to
complain because it is difficult to assess the impact of a MOAPA
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unless projects actually undergo such analysis. This means that at
the conceptual stage, most of the people will feel better off with
such an approach. Who would not favor a mechanism by which projects
may be evaluated more adequately by politicians? This and the other
benefits of the multiQbjective approach have been discussed in earlier
sections and will not be repeated here.
Meanwhile, it appears that the government is becoming increas-
ingly aware of the relevance of a comprehensive system of project
evaluation. Several government publications have tried to deal with
this issue. The Budget Commission, for its part, has been encourag-
ing other agency planners as well as its own to come up with devices
by which the relative priorities of projects may be determined. To
my mind, these are clear indications that the Government is inter-
ested and has begun to acknowledge the potential usefulness of MOAPA.
There is however one caveat. The foregoing discussion is not
meant to imply that the use of a multiobjective resource planning
technique will eliminate corruption and the execution of sub-optimal
investment projects (defined this time in terms of various objectives).
No system is free from such possibilities. It is hoped, however,
that the tradeoffs among the various conflicting objectives will be
understood a great deal more if that method is adopted. It is
also expected that the adoption of a MOAPA will put greater pressure
on the political leaders to avoid making arbitrary and costly invest-
ment decisions.
lSee National Economic Development Authority, Methodology for Project
Ranking (forthcoming). Also NEDA, A Guide to Development, 1978, pp.
134-140, NEDA Region XI, op.cit,", NEDA, Project Economic Staff, "Po-
sition Paper: Use of the MPR Model for the Programming of Major Na-
tional Projects" (trimeo) 1978.
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The succes.s of the multiobjective approaches adopted will rest
on how well the existing institutions could be improved to set the
proper atmosphere for using the MOAPA. For many disciples of the
MOAPA school, one essential requirement is the strengthening of the
office that coordinates and monitors the application of the new
approach. In the Philippines, this may mean the expansion of the
Office of the President or of the Programs and Projects' Office of
the NEDA and the improvements of its institutional links with the
planning staffs of other ministries. This could also imply the con-
stant communication between this office and the Budget Commission
as well as the other funding institutions such as teh DBP and the
IBL-.
An equally essential condition is the sincere and enthusiastic
support of the President. The umbrella project office must be free
as much as possible from external influence. The President can
probably help by elevating the rank of this office to Cabinet level
to minimize the pressures emanating from the other ministries and
special interests.
8.4 Choosing the Specific Methodology
Consistent with the theme of this report, the selection of the
specific MOAPA should be based on the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of the alternatives being evaluated. This requires a set
of criteria that defines the nature of costs and benefits of par-
ticular methods.
In the case of the Philippines, the following aspects seem to
be most applicable:
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1) Soundness of the theoritical framework - Is the
technique founded on a consistent and theoreti-
cally acceptable set of principles?
2) Citizen participation - To what extent does the
method encourage citizen participation in the
project planning process?
4) Cost of administration - What the cost require-
ment of the technique in order that it be ef-
fectively executed?
5) Complexity - Is the method easy to apply? Are
the data and manpower requirements of the tech-
nique presently available or at least can be
produced in the foreseeable future?
The choice of techniques must also take into account the pre-
vailing conditions of the planning environment. For the Philippines,
one must recognize the existence of a hierarchy of decision-makers
from the President down to the town and city mayors. Each of them
has its own technical staffs whose level of planning and evaluation
capability tend to increase with the responsibility of the decision-
makers whom they support. This means that rigorous and complicated
techniques may only be feasible for the high level decision making
office. This would be true at least until the technical personnel
at the lower levels have been trained accordingly.
The selection of the technique must also take a realistic view
of the nature of the data available in the field. For instance,
the technique should be useful in evaluating small projects in the
countryside where there may be limited or perhpas no meaningful
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statistics at all. Again, this should apply until the Philippine
statistical system has been improved to permit the application of
more sophisiticated and comprehensive evaluation models.
The decision on which methods to adopt should likewise be de-
pendent on the properties of the projects being analyzed. For exam-
ple, it is suggested that a general (rather than a partial) equili-
brium model be applied whenever the project is large enough to gene-
rate considerable price or secondary effects for the rest of the
economy. Similarly, fairly simple evaluation procedures may be
justified for very small projects.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion as well as the results
of the survey on the various multiobjective project evaluation
approaches 1, I offer threepreliminary conclusions:
First, there is no one best model for use in the Philippines.
The Goverment would be better off in adopting a number of MOAPAs to
suit the different planning conditions. At the local and provin-
2
cial levels, a simplified version of the Goasl Achievement Analysis
may be most appropriate considering that these governments are severe-
ly handicapped in qualified personnel for evaluation purposes. Such
less-complicated and inexpensive techniques can be useful in their
evaluation and in the determination of priorities from among their usual-
ly numerous small projects. At the regional level, more sophisticated
- 3
techniques such as Hill's Goal's Achievement Matrix (GAM) Lichfield's
Planning Balance Sheet Approach (PBSA) may be feasible because of
the presences of staff members who are better trained in economics
1SeeChapter 3, Section 3.1.
2
N. Lichfield, et al., op. cit.
3Hill.., op. cit.
4N. Lichfield, et al., op.cit.
and project analysis. These techniques can be of service to the 200
Regional Development Councils or the River Basin Authorities in
"getting rid of bad projects" as well as in defining more clearly
the regional priorities. Where applicable, the valuation imputs
e.g., shadow prices or labor, foreign exchange and capital, may
have to be provided by the national planning office until the re-
gional planning office comes up with their regional parameters.
At the national level, there are many highly qualified public
servants who can adequately meet the skill requirements of the most
sophisticated techniques such as that of the UNIDO , the Little-
Mirrless (or OECD) , and the Squire-van der Tak3 approaches. The
size of national projects also generally justify and perhaps neces-
sitate the application of more comprehensive evaluation procedures.
It should be mentioned that the use of simple MOAPAs at the
national and region levels may be necessary as preliminary screening
devices when dealing with numerious projects. The full analysis
of all proposed projects may be expensive, cumbersome, and unjusti-
fied considering that many of them will eventually be given low
priority if not rejected.
Second, while the alternative techniques have their own advan-
tages and limitations, some methods are clearly more sound in theo-
retical and conceptual sense than others. It is generally accepted
l'
UNIDO, op.cit.
2I.M.D. Little & J.A. Mirrlees, op,cit.
3 L. Squire & H.G. van der Tak, op.cit..
4This has been suggested for road projects. See C. Carnemark, J.
Biderman, and D. Bovet, The Economic Analysis of Rural Roads Pro-
jects, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 241, International Bank
for Reconstruction adn Development., Aug. 1976, p. 16 and Annex 3.
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that techniques relying only on the judgement of evaluators for the
magnitude of project contributions are less defensible than those
methods that require measurements of benefits and costs.I Similarly,
methods using the basic principles of benefit-cost analysis appear
to be superior to "index-based" and less consistent techniques such
as the Goal Achievement Matrix. As Lichfield argues, it would be
possible to alter the index values (and therefore the findings of
the evaluation) "by using different values for the parameters within
the indices, or by adding to or changing the dimensions." 2 It is
also observed that methods not based on the principles of social
accounting tend to be inconsistent on matters of measurement, and
usually have no standard principles for testing the validity of
the measurements.
Third, to some extent, the choice of the "best" method is a
matter of political judgement. For example, granting that the "so-
cialefficiency" benefit-cost approach is preferred, then the
selection from the UNIDO, the Little-Mirrlees, the Squire-van der
Tak and similar techniques is partly a matter of taste. However, the
choice may be influenced by the extent to which these alternative
techniques come close to the currently used method.
8.5 Final Remarks
In this chapter, we focusedonthefeasibility of adopting the
MOAPA in the Philippines. We discussed the advantages offered by
1Examples of methods that do not require actual measurements, see NEDA
Region XI, "Prioritization of Regional Development Projects in South-
eastern Mindanao," NRO XI Staff Paper No. 77-1, Feb., 1977; Also,
Kreditor's "Policy Evaluation Matrix" discussed in N. Lichfield, et
al. pp. 51-52.
2Ibid, p. 89.
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the MOAPA in the context of project analysis, priQrity setting, citi-
zen participation, and political benefits. We argued that the Fili-
pino people in general, and the poorer families, towns and regions,
in particular, will benefit from the MOAPA in terms of resource
allocation. We also enumerated the various costs associated with the
MOAPA. We concluded that the additional costs involved are marginal
and are justified by the benefits derived.
We analyzed the institutional repurcussions of a proposed MOAPA.
We suggested that proponents of the MOAPA should not be discouraged
by the possible rejection of their policy recommendations. However,
we also said that certain developments in the Philippines provide
some causes for optimism that the MOAPA may be adopted.
Finally, we dwelt on the issue of choosing the "best" MOAPA.
We offered six criteria for the selection of the specific MOAPA:
soundness of theoretical framework, comprehensiveness, extent of
citizen participation is promoted, cost of administration, and com-
plexity. We also said that the choice should also be viewed in the
light of the planning environment. We concluded by stating three
preliminary conclusions: a) that the Philippines may have to adopt
different MOAPA for the various level of government; b) that cer-
tain techniques are clearly superior over others; and c) that the
choice of the "best" MOAPA is partly a matter of taste.
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SELECTED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
Table B.1
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a/Level and Inderc- of l'er Capita Gross Doraestic 1iroduct, by Reg;ion
1971 - 1974
1 9 71 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4
R E G I 0 N * Level Index Level Index Level Index Level IndexREG10N(f) e~ m~
PFILIPPINES
LUZON
III
IV:.
IV-A
1421
1650
884
818
1279
3310
1638
675
100.0 1449 100.0 1532
116.1 1645 113.5 1756
62.2
57.6
882
943
90.0 1195
60.9
65.1
962
920
82.5 1182
233.0' 3312 228.6 3753
115.3 1536 106.0 1564
47.5 818 56.5 801
100.0 1562
114.6' l;44
62.0
60.1
937
916
77.2 1219
245.0 4156
102.1
52.3.
1546
792
83.0 1206 83.2 1285
113.3 1567 108.-1 1647
71.2" 1144
51.4 729
79.2 1236
58.8 926
80.3 1277
108.9 1651
63.3 997
79.0 1218
50.3 804
85.3 1254
63.9 896
88.1 1274
113.9 1785
68.8 925
83.9 1262
107.5 1602
79.5
52.5
1217
783
81.9 1197
58.5 963
83.2 1140
116.5 1670
60.4 887
Authority
100.0
11.1
60. 0
56.6
78.0
266.1
99.0
50.7
VISAYAS
VII
VIII
MInM!ANA0
XII
1179
1610
1012
730
1125
'35
1141
1547
899
80.8
102.6
77.9
50.1
76.6
61.7
73.0
106.9
54.8
ing Philippines = 100.0
Source: National Accounts Staff, National Economic and Development
Table B.2 Total Families, Total Family Income*, Average Family Income, By Region, 1975
Mean Med ian Mean/
Family Family Family Median
Families % Share Income % Share Income Income Ratio
(pesos) (pesos)
PHILIPPINES. 6,859 100.0 40,058 100.0 5,840 4,480 1.30
LU ZGI1 -
I Ilocos 558 8.1 3,082 7.7 5,525 4,558 1.21
II Cagayan Valley 329 4.8 1,679 4.2 5,102 4,093 1.24
III Central Luzon 662 9.7 3,824 9.6 5,773 4,940 1.17
IV Metropolitan Manila 770 11.2 8,057 20.1 10,439 6,840 1.53
IV-A Southern Tagalog 888 12.9 4,832 12.1 5,441 4,472 1.22
V Bicol 518 7.6 2,216 5.5 4,280 3,572 1.20
VISAYAS
VI Western Visayas 679 9.9 3,722 9.3 5,484 4,150 1.32
VII Central Visayas 595 8.7 3,078 7.7 5,172 4,129 1.25
VIII Eastern Visayas 441 6.4 2,134 5.3 4,834 3,751 1.29
UIND ANAO
IX Western Mindanao 314 4.6' 1,779 4.4 5,662 3,680 1.54
X Northern Mindanao 370 5.4 1,408 3.5 -3,803 3,286 1.16
XI Southern Mindanao 433 6.3 2,731 6.8 6,307 4,560 1.33
XII Central Mindanao 301 4.4 1,515 3.8 5,025 4,737 1.06
* in current prices (millions of pesos)
Note: Details may not add up to totals because of rounding
Source: National Sample Survey of Households on Family Income and Expenditures, National Census and
Statistics Office
0
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Table D.3 Families in the Bottom 40% and Top 20% of Income Range, 1971, By Region*
Families in Bottom Families in Top 20%.
Total Number Families 40% of Income Range of Income Range
Regions No.(000's) % No.(000's) % No..(000's) %
PHILIPPINES 6,348 100.0 2,539 40.0 1,267 20.0
LUZON AND ISLAND GROUPS 3,351 52.8 1,167 18.4 829 13.0
Metropolitan Manila 525 8.3 34 0.5 262 4.1
Southern Luzon 869 13.7 285 4.5 220 3.5
Central Luzon 855 13.5 250 3.9 211 3.3
Ilocos and Mt. Province 346 5.4 185 . 2.9 56 0.9
iBicol 496 7.8 257 4.1 60 0.9
Cagayan Valley & Batanes 260 4.1 156 2.5 20 0.3
THE VISAYAS 1,650 26.0 834 13.1 213 3.4
Western Vasayas 670 10.6 267 4.1 97 1.6
Eastern Visayas 980 15.4 572 9.0 116 1.8
MINDANAO 1,347 21.2 538 8.5 225 3.6
Northern Mindanao 522 8.2 235 3.7 67 1.1
Southern Mindanao 825 1.3 303 4.8 158 2.5
* Based on.old regional classification. The regions in Luzon follow closely the present delineation, with
minor variations in Metropolitan Manila and Southern Tagalog. The old Eastern Visayas covers the present
Eastern Visayas and Central Visayas. The old Northern Mindanao 'includes the present Northern Mindanao'
plus the Lanao provinces and Surigao del Sur, which belong now to Central and Southern Mindanao, respect-
ively. The old Southern Mindanao encompasses the present Southern Mindanao plus the Cotabato provinces
(presently in Central Mindanao) and the present Western Mindanao.
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey of the Philippines, 1971;
Bureau of Census and Statistics.
Table B.4
Selected Indicators of Regional Differences in Social Services
No. of
Hospital
Beds per
: 10,000
: Popula-
: tion -
FHILIPPINES : 12
L u 4 U
V I S A
ISA
li I N D
I :
II :
III :
IV
IV-A :
VI
VII
A N A 0 :
Ix
x
NI
XII
17
13
7
7
29
6
8
5
9
6
6
4
7
6
4
: Barrio :Infant
: !:ea.lth :Physician: OMortality
:Stations :per 1000 : : per
per 10,000 -Life Ex- : 1000
: 10,000 1/:Popula-11 :pectanc : Live 3/
:Population: tion - Years - :Birth -
0.6 3.2 60.00 60.6
0.4 4.0 60.35 59.9
0.6 5.0 61.03 54.2
0.8 2.1 56.57 72.6
0.6 2.4 61.50 51.1
0.3 5.8 63.83 63.0
- 60.98 59.6
0.03 1.9 59.65 58.7
1.5 2.6 58.86 71.9
1.2 : 2.7 : 58.86 79.7
1.5 3.3 : 58.80 59.6
0.7 1.6 : 58.59 76.3
0.4 1.6 : 59.95 50.0
0.83 : 1.5 : 60.46 59.7
0.2 2.1 58.04 52.1
0.2 1.5 61.99 42.2
n "1 1.5 : 60.41 48.0
/. Mal- Literacy
% Fami- nourished : Rate . chool Atendance :% louse- house-
:lies Below:Children :(Fop. 10 * h Rtes : hold with+ hold with-
:Food Thres~to Total :yrs. and . . : out safe : out
:holds 4 e- : Child 5/ : over) 6-14 15-24 :Water toilets
: vel - :Populction: 1970 . 6/ : 6/
: 65.3 : 30.6 : 80.5 60.'3 27.2 : 76.7 ; 83.6
60.5
63.5
63.50
:56.6
40.8
63.4
75.2
67.1
65.4
65.9
70.1
68.3
72.3
77.5
80.1
63.2
30.5
31.0
29.2
32.5
31.3
28.6
30.7
33.6
36.8
27.0
34.5
26.9
29.2
28.4
24.8
27.7
3 7.9
83.1
78.7
90.3
96.7
92.0
86.4
79.2
82.1
77.8
77.7
74.3
55.4
63.4
81.8
66.0
67.4
69.1
62.0
69.0
74.1
66.5
63.5
59.1
62.1
56.9
52.4
56.0
52.2
62.0
53.4
51.3
31.2
36.1
29.0
28.0
40.8
26.7
26.3
24.4
26.6
23.2
23.2
25.9
22.5
27.7
26.1
27.3
65. :
83.5 :
95.0
85.0
1.0
10.2
80.0
79.9
80.6
82.5 :
76.7
84.3
84.0
71.3
94.0
88.0
76.7
72.6
79.8
74.3
57.7
87.7
87.8
87.1
70.0
79.8
91.5
86.9
90.0
78.4
89.2
90.0
- DO1, 1974
2/
~ Boulier's estimated for 1965-70 as adjusted by RDS-SS.
3/ 1974, Phil. Health Stetitics, NC0
1973, Tnitial Survey Release, NCSO
5'
- DPT, Dec. 1970
1970, Social Indicators, NCSO
Vigo.
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APPENDIX C
EXTRACTS FROM THE 1974-77 AND 1978-82 PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLANS
1. Sectoral Development Objectives
1974-1977
Economic
1.1 Agriculture
-Acceleration of land transfer and distribution;
-Self-sufficiency in food and food products;
-Conservation and development of forest resources; and
-Expansion of exports and import substitutes.
1.2 Industry
-Promotion of employment and minimizing underemployment;
-Alleviation of the trade imbalance via export-oriented industries uti-
lizing indigenous raw materials heavily and the further processing of
traditional exports;
-Promoting the development of intermediate and capital goods industries
particularly those with greatest potential for forward and backward
linkages; and
-Dispersal of industries to different regions to promote regional deve-
lopment.
1.3 Foreign Trade
To contribute to maximum economic growth, promotion of employment, in-
ternal and external stability and regional industrialization through:
-Vigorous expansion of export earnings;
-Utilization of excess capabilities in manufacturing for export production;
-Development of new market for the country's exports;
-Utilization of indigenous raw materials for exports;
-Creation of employment opportunities through export production;
-Regional dispersal of industries;
-Achievement of linkage benefits through integration of export industries
-Shift from the traditional primary and raw material exports towards
processed and manufactured ores;
-Conservation of limited foreign exchange earnings through the efficient
allocation of dollars among important competing imports;
-Importation of basic food requirements of the economy; and
-Importation of raw materials, supplies and capital equipment for indust-
rial expansion and infrastructure.
1.4 Tourism
Maximize the country's tourism potential.
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Infrastructure and Utilities
Improve the economy's productive capacity by providing the growth-gene-
rating facilities necessary to attain the sectoral targets envisaged.
1,5 Government
Provision of an adequate and well stratified physical plant for essen-
tial government services, such as schools, hospitals and administration
offices,
1,6 Transportation
Provision of an extensive and efficient inter-modal transport system
consisting of complementary trunk highways and supporting feeder roads
and a hierarchy of nationalregional and local seaports and airports
for the convenience and fast mobility of people and goods,where volumes
are considerably with the growth and development of agriculture, in-
dustry, trade, commerce, and tourism.
1.7 Water Resources
-Proper development of water resources for optimum utilization for irri-
gation, water supply, power generation mining, fish production and rec-
reation purposes
-Conservation of water resources and the safeguarding of useful water
resources against deterioration from wasteful use and neglect through
adequate water control, surface water quality control watershed manage-
ment, and soil conservation;
-Coordination of water and land resource undertakings with other sectors
of the economy, particularly with agriculture and industry to achieve
a balanced regional development; and
-Provision of an abundant and quality community water supply and the
protection of public health through pollution abatement and control
and through pest and disease control that are associated with water
and water supplies.
1.8 Power and Electrification
-Provision of cheap, adequate, and dependable electric power for indust-
rial and domestic use; and
-Support the increase in agricultural and industrial productivity, the
growth of new industries, the regional dispersal of investment and emp-
loyment opportunities, the attainment of socio-economic and agri-indust-
rial balance, and the improvement of living standards in rural and urban
areas;
-Energy Objectives:to reduce the demand for oil and oil products:
-To ensure constant supply of oil;
-To avert the spiraling of prices for oil and oil products; and
-To indicate the institutional arrangement needed.
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1.9 Telecommunications
-Provision of modern facilities for interconnection of local and overseas
enterprises geared towards a complete integration of systems starting
with government networks;
-Rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of backbone networks to
enable fast and efficient transmission of messages among regional and
provincial centers;
-Expansion of telephone and telegraph facilities to selected rural areas
and leading urban centers through the establishment of new telegraph
and radio stations and automatic telephone exchanges in important muni-
cipalities and/or cities having as yet no telephone systems.
Social Development
1.10 Social Services and Community Development
-Bring about an equality of social circumstances through institutional
facilities and social services, specifically skills development, better
education, health nutrition and housing and to create aspiration and
motivation for growth among the poor.
1.11 Education and Manpower Development
-Improvement of curricular programs and quality of instruction of all
levels by way of upgrading physical facilities, adoption of cost savings
instructional technology, and training and retraining of teachers and
administrators:
-Upgrading of academic standards through accreditation schemes,admissions
testing and guidance counselling;
-Democratization of access to educational opportunities through the
provision of financial assistance ed deserving students, skills training
programs for out-of-school youth, and a continuing educational program
for non-literate adults;
1.12 Employment
Generation of more employment opportunities, expanding at 4% in FY 1973
and by 4.5% over FY 1975-77.
1.13 Population
Reduce annual population growth of 2.99% in 1972 to 2.43% in 1977.
1.14 Health and Nutrition
-Health development, improvement of hospital and hospital administration,
and coordination between government and private health efforts;
-Improvement of national preventive and medicare services;
-Medical assistance; and
-Better nutrition.
1.15 Housing
-Allocation of resettlemen sites and the construction of dwelling units to
benefits at least 1.2 million families.
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1978-1982
Economic
1.1 Agriculture, Agrarian Reform and Cooperatives Development
-Promotion of rural productive employment; -
-Enhancement of farm household income;
-Improvement of capacity to produce the country's food and raw material
requirements; and
-Maintenance of stable food supply, particularly of food grains.
1.2 Natural Resources Management
-Align population and industry requirements with available natural resources;
-Maximimize use of natural resources by programming exploitation and rep-
lenishment;
-Develop and adopt new technology for recycling by-products,wastes, and
secondary materials, particularly in fishery and forestry; and
-Maintain environmental balance.
1.3 Industry
-Employment generation;
-Increase in net foreign exchange earnings; and
-Greater self-reliance in the supply of important commodities, including
energy sources.
1.4 Foreign Trade
-Increase export earnings
-Import commodities in an amount sufficient to support the essential con-
sumer and production requirments;
-Include more processed and labor-intensive products in the composition
of exports;
-Diversify export marlets and import sources; and
-Disperse export development to the regions;
1.5 Tourism
Intensify foreign and domestic promotion and development to maximize the
the generation of foreign exchange for tourism and the spreading of its
benefits to the different regions in the country.
Infrastructure and Utilities
].6 Transportation
-Accelerate the realization of an intergrated, efficient, and service-
oriented inter-modal transport system consisting of both the infrastructure
and the carrier elements; 212
-Facilitates the movement of people. goods and services in support of the
government's overall social and economic objectives and plans;
-Through massive but judicious investments in land, air and water facilities,
to bring the cost of transportation to reasonable levels so as. to help the
nation attain its targets in the production and distribution of food, farm
crops, and manufactured goods.
1.7 Water Resources
-Proper development and optimum utilization of water resources for the
multiple requirements of irregation, domestic and municipal consumption,
industrial use, power generation, fish production and recreational purpose;
-Conservation of the water resources base and the institution of safeguards
against its deterioration from wasterful use and neglect through the com-
bined measures of flled control, drainage, surface water quality control.
watershed management, and soil conservation;
-Coordination of efforts with other sectoral activities, particularly ag-
riculture and industry, in support of the regional planning strategy; and
-Provision of adequate and quality community water supply and the protection
of public health through pollution abatement and control of waterborne
diseased;
1.8 Energy
Provision of an adequate, stable, secure, and reasonably economical and
and environmentally acceptable energy supply.
1.9 Telecommunications and Postal Communication
-Provision of local telephone exchange and telex services in metropolitan.
primary, secondary, and tertiary settlements and in major centers of de-
velopment activities;
-Provision of telegram service in all towns and municipalities;
-Provision of transmission system in prblic telephone call stations in
municipalities with a population of at least 20,000 (other than those
to be provided with local telephone exchange service;
-Provision of common international gateways for incoming and outgoing inter-
national telecommunication services; and
-Regulatory facilities covering all regions for effective supervision and
control of the various telecommunication services.
Social Development
1.10 Social Services and Community Development
-Accelerate the social and economic advancement of the most disadvantaged
group of society particularly those in the rural areas;
-Maintain industrial peace based on social justice and promote workers
welfare;
-Promote the well-being of cultural communities and prepare them for pro-
ductive roles in society through projccts that will make them economically
and socially self-reliant;
-Enable communities to discover and use their own resources in identifying
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and coping with common and local welfare needs through institution building,
planning, training, education, project assistance, joint action programs,
research, and evaluation;
-Anticipate and prevent the occurrence of social breakcown brought about
by such phenomena as industrialization, rapid urbanization, migration,
and population explosion resulting in such social problems as crime,
juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, and mental illness; also, life and pro-
perty lossed brought about by natural and man-made disasters could be
minimized through community preparedness programs and emergency, resto-
ration, and rehabilitation services.
-Serve the needs of the most disadvantaged members of society by supporting
the objectives of other social sectors;
-Develop standards of accreditation for the regulation of private and public
agencies including local government units engaged in social service activities;
-Devise ways and means by which the sector could respond to new challenges
attendant to the modernization process, and to promote regional cooperation
for social development among the Association of Southeast Aisan Nationns
(ASEAN) countries.
1.11 Educational Manpower
-Provide for a broad general education that will assist each individual to
attain his potential as a human being, enhance the range and quality of
individual and group participation in the basic functions of society,
and acquire the essential educational foundations for his development
into a productive and versatile citizen committed to national goals and
ideas;
-Develop and train manpower in critical skills required for social and
economic development;
-Develop high-level professions that will provide leadership for the nation,
advance knowledge through research, and apply new knowledge for improving
the quality of human life; and
-Develop and promote national identity and culture.
1.12 Health, Nutrition and Family Planning
-Increase the average life expectation of Filipinos;
-Reduce the annual rate of population growth;
-Reduce the rate of mortality (infant and preschool) and morbidity;
-Reduce the prevalence of total third-and second-degree malnutrition among
pre-school (0-6 years old) and school aged (7-14 years old children:
-Increase energy and protein intake among households with existing deficien-
cies;
-Reduce the prevalence of anemia among pregnant woman,nursing mothers, and
affected children, of goiter in endemic areas, and of Vitamin A deficiency;
-Improve environmental sanitation;
-Increase coverage of health insurance so as to cover the total population; and
-Reduce health disabilities.
1.13 Housing
-Prevent the housing backlog from increasing in the urban areas.;
-Discourage the growth of marginal settlements in that areas.
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1974-1977 a
1) Private enterprise shall remain the mediun of economic progress within
the guidelines defined by the government.
2) Monetary, credit and fiscal policies shall be employed to promote eco-
nomic growth and stability.
3) Greater labor utilization shall be encouraged through the use of various
instruments available to the government and through the institution of reforms
in labor laws, regualtions and practices.
4) Industries in established areas of priority will continue to be accorded
incentives under the country's investment incentives laws. Further ratio-
nalization of industry shall also be undertaken, taking into consideration
the availability of resources, the size of ixisting or potential markets
and the regional location of specific industries.
5) Agricultural development shall be emphasized in harmony with industrial
development in order to expand agricultural production, attain self-suffi-
ciency in basic staples and raise farm incomes.
6) Exports shall be expanided and deversified through various instruments
available to the government.
7) Foreign investments shall be encouraged especially in the defined areas
of priority. Laws and regualtions covering foreign investments shall be
liberalized without prejudice to national sovereignty.
8) A realistic exchange rate shall be maintained in order to promote exports
and, in general, to maintain external stability.
9) Within the government, efforts at streamlining the administrative machi-
nery for coordinated planning and implementation shall be continuously
pursued.
10) Steps will be taken to restructure and provide continuing support to
the educational sustem so as to develop the manpower skills required by
future development.
11) Infrastructure development shall continue to be accorded high priority
by the government.
12) Price control shall cover only basic commondities; it is not intended
to become an intergral part of the economic system.It is only an interim
measure designed to discourage speculation. control monopolistic profits
by providing for an allowable rate of return to investment, and encourage
efficiency through better cost management.
13) International cooperation, compatible with national interest, shall
be promoted to ensure understanding and collaboration particularly with
other Asian countries.
14) Foreign economic policy will strive towards a diversification of the
'tountry-9 sources of imports and of markets for its export products.
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1) The private and the public sectors will cooperate and reinforce each
other in working for the desired goals of development. The private sectors,
the engine of national progress, will provide the ancillary industries that
will complement the critical large-scale, capital-intensive ones and will
continuously be enjoined to promote the social aspects of development.
The public sector may engage in activities which are capital-intensive,
pioneering, high-risk and vital to national interest, and is expected to re-
gulate public utilities according to criteria protecting the general public
and to enhance the public interest in areas such as energy, power generation,
large-scale irrigation sustem and transportation, among others.
2) The state sill maintain population growth levels most conducive to national
welfare without prejudice to the health status and religous beliefs of indi-
viduals. A geographical distribution of population consistent with national
development will be promoted.
3) Economic activities which directly or indirectly promote the higher uti-
lization of manpower under just terms and conditions will be encouraged to
minimize unemplyment and underemployment. The development of manpower skills
will be aligned with the requirements of growth. The export of manpower will
increasingly be restrained as productive domestic employment opportunities
are created.
4) An effective incomes pdTicy including just compensation and social secu-
rity will be observed, taking into account the nned to maintain a balance
in the growth of incomes, wages, productivity, and prices.
5) Agrarian reform will be a motive force for social transformation and
wealth redistribution.
6) The state will pursue an integrated social development covering land
reform, health, nutrition, housing, education and culture, manpower deve-
lopment, youth and sports development, children, women and workers welfare,
cultural minorities, social security, social impact of economic development
and other social concerns.
7) Price stability will be promoted to ensure social stability, to provide
goods and services that are within the reach of every sector, and to serve
as an incentive for long-term investments.
8) Domestic sayings will be encouraged and mobilized through the organized
financial sector and the development of long-term degt instruments inclu-
ding interest rate and the tax system. Foreign savings will also be effective-
luy utilized.
9) Domestic and foreign investments will be encouraged especially efficient,
productive, outward-looking and pioneering investments. Investments incentives
will be rationalized to prevent undue erosion of geovernment revenues and
to consider regional development as important criterion.
10) A liberal but selective credit policy will be pursued to stimulate
investments in the productive sectors of the economy and to stabilize finan-
cial and monetary growth. Domestic credit resources will be allocated, nationally
and regionally, among developmental activities of high priority.
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11) Increasing reliance will be placed on direct taxation and on a more prog-
ssive indirect taxation with ability to pay as the principa; criterion. Ta-
riff rates will be further modified to induce local processing and to enhance
the efficiency and competitiveness of domestic industries.
12) The structure of public expenditure will gradually shift towerds greater
capital outlays, particularly economic and social expenditures, and will be
more favorable to the poor. Government subsides such as tax holidays will
be streamlined, granted only on a selective basis to priority industries:
The pricing of some public utilities at subsidized rates will be re-examined
to recover at least their cost of production without prejudice to regional
dispersal of industries:. Governemtn borrowings from the banking system will
be minimized to reduce inflationary pressures and to avoid competition with
the private sector for development funds. The overall borrowing program will
aim for the fuller development of a domestic securities market and for the
establishment of a stable financial position and sound credit image in the
international capital markets.
13) The country will continue to pursue a development-oriented type of dip-
lomacy, while promoting harmonious relations with as many countries as pos-
sible, particularly the ASEAN, especially in the areas of food and energy,
industry, agriculture, trade and tourism, finance and banking, and trans-
portation and communications. The country will also seek closer identifi-
cation with other developing countries towards attaining aNew International
Economic Order.Economic rdations with the socialist and developed countries
will continue to be actively promoted, while participation is intensified
in multilateral fora.
14) The state will promote and regulate the efficient utilization, acqui-
sition and disposition of land and other Aatural resources to maximize net
public benefit.
15) Energy conservation will be promoted through appropriate technology
and economic policies. Priority will be given to activities which seek to
tap indigenous sources of energy. Dependence on fossil-based fuels will be
balanced with energy derived from geothermal, hyroelctric, nuclear, and
other sources.
16) The development and wide-scale application of science and technology will
be promoted especially in the field of researech, local inventions, and
adaptation.
17) Human settlements will be improved particularly in the provision of
basic amenities and sources of livelihood. Population, services and faci-
lities will be redistributed to preselected urban areas to diffuse the
benefits of development tb the countryside.
18) The state will promote regional balance in economic opportunities through
infrastructure support, appropriate incentives and selective administra-
tive prescriptions.
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3. Major Sectoral Investment Strategies and Programs
1974-1977
Economics
1. Agriculture
-Land transfer and distribution;
-Strengthening of cooperative movement;
-Increase food production towards self-sufficiency especially
in rice, white corn and feedgrains (yello corn, sorghum and soy-
bean), beans and vegatables, inland and marine fish and fish
exprots (shrimp, tuna, sea weeds, and eels), and livestock
and poultry;
-Expnasion of commercial crops particularly coconut, banana, su-
gar, tobacco, fibers (abaca and cotton), fruits and long fiber
pulp (from Albizzia Falcata and Pinus insularis);
-Natural resource conservation and development through reforesta-
tion and kaingin management.
2. Industry
-Promotion of export-oriented industreis particularly those that
utilize heavily indigenous raw materials and excess capacity
and raw materials based on further precessing of traditional
exprots-: e.g., mineral and wood based;
-Encouragement of labor-intensive industries (especially those
providing labor training) and techniques of production, wage
goods industries, and small and medium-scale industries;
-Promotion of intermediate and captial goods industries, particu-
larly those with greatest potential for forward and backward
linkage: e.g. progressive car and motorcycle manufacturing
programs, shipbuilding.
3. Foreign Trade
-Provision of exprot incentives comprising of tax credit, reduced
income tax, tax exemption of imported and domestic capital equip-
ment and export tax exemption;
-Export promotion, e.g., establishment of Philippine Houses and
Tourism Centers abroad, participation in international Trade
fairs and exhibitions, etc.;
-Establishment of Philippine Export Credit Insurance and Guaran-
tee Corporation;
-Investments and provision of incentives for the Export process-
ing Zone in Bataan;
-Establishment of principal shipping points.
5. Tourism
-Incentives to service exporters such as hotels, tour operators,
resorts, restaurants, air, sea, and land transport services;
-Promotion and marketing abroad;
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-Promotion of domestic tourism, through incentive schemes and
other programs; and
-Infrastructure development particularly, the airports and road
networks that service a lot of foreign and domestic tourists.
Infrastructure and Utilities
5. Government Services
-Provision of an adequate physical plant to house government
institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals, and government offices);
6. Transportation
-Rehavilitation and paving of existing trunkline and secondary
roads, the improvement of gravel developmental and feeder roads,
and construction of new development and feeder roads closely
related to agricultural and industrial schemes and supportive
of investments- in main highways, ports, and other social over-
head facilities;
-Rehavilitation and eslective modernization of the present rail
facilities and rolling stock and the extension of its railway
service to Cagayan and to Sorsogon;
-Rehabilitation and upgrading of the Manila'International Air-
port and selected (47) trunkline airports;
-Provision of adequate capacities to effectively handle current
and immediate future needs in selected national and municipal
ports; and construction of Philippine Fisheries Port in
Navotas, Rizal.
7. Water Resources
-Integrated river basin development covering Pampanga, Agno
and Bicol river basins; irrigation program; storage; and irri-
gation works in selected areas;
-Expansion of water supply and sewarge system in Metro-Manila,
6 other cities and 6 provincial systems
-Investment in flood control and draining system in Metro-Manila
and the major river basins in the country.
8. Power and Electrification
-Development of island power grid system;
9. Telecommunications
-Nationwide Telecommunication Expansion and Improvement (NTEI)
Project, Phase II; establishment of multiple voice channeled
microwave raido links from Manila to Cagayan De Oro City;
development of existing toil switching for automatic direct
dialing and improvement of NTEI-I motorpool facilities;
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-Multipurpose fixed (multichannel) and mobile radio system for
local governments in Mindanao;
-Modernize and develop the facilities for the various cities,
provincial capitals and major towns in Mindanao and the Sulu
Archipelago: high quality multichannel radio equipment, auto-
matic telephone exchanges, and automatic telegraph switching
centers;
-Emergency mobile communications: 28 van trucks and 5 fixed
stations equipped with ISB/SSB transceivers and telegraph
carrier equipment;
-Nationwide rural telecommunication development: provision of
modern solid state HF/SSB or VHF/FM raido equipment to all
municipalities and barrios and 15 service vehicles for moni-
toring freauencies;
-Municipal telephane system; 85 transportation automatic tele-
phone exchanges; and
-Telecommunication interconnection Development Project; expand
the Bureau's telephone and telegraph local and overseas inter-
connection facilities increase telephone capacity for Metro-
Manila; procure trucks and other vehicles to improve maintenance
service.
Social Development
10. Social Services and Community Development
-Expansion and improvement of education facilities in the rural
areas and manpower training in 10 regional centers to upgrade
agricultural skills and to provide the manpower to complement
the industrial programs;
-Stregthening rural health unit including its family planning
service and construction of small station hospitals and first
aid units
-Relocate the squatter and slum population in urban centers
particularly those in Metro-Manila in more wholesome environ-
ment with complementary social and infrastructure facilities.
-Implementation of socio-economic advancement programs (i.e. cash
grants of Vl00-V300 to unemployed family heads); assistance to
families in distress; and day-care service centers; also of
cash grants V50-VlOO to disabled persons and establishment of
11 sheltered workshops; sill training; and rehabilitation ser-
vices;
-Conduct of ecducation, training, and information activities;
grants-in-aid to community projects; institution building (e.g.
barrio councils, citizen assemblies, bario associations, and
cooperatives); comprehansive planning and research programs.
11. Education and Manpower Development
-Establishment and/or operation of improvement of secondary schools
which may include provision for extension service, facilities
and equipment to allow use of expanded and improve curriculum;
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-Establishment and/or operation, upgrading of improvement tech-
nical institures, skills training centers and other non-formal
training programs and projects for the out-of-school youth
and in the unemployed in collaboration with the programs of
the National Manpower and Youth Council;
-Expansion of agricultural secondary and higher education pro-
grams and extension activities which may include raido braod-
casting and rural training services, and the provision of facili-
ties. including see capital and revolving funds;
-Design, utilization and improvement of instructional technology
and development production of textbooks and other instructional
materials; and
-Assistance and incentives, including loans and grants toward
the planned development and improvement of programs and facili-
ties in both public and private universities, colleges, and
schools.
12. Employment
-Vigorous implementation of the family planning program;
-Restructuting of the educational system, including upgrading
ane expansion of both secondary and post-secondary programs
with greater emphasis on technical and vocational training and
promotion of non-formal training program;
-Policy redirection: provision of incentives to labor-intensive
industries, for on-the-job training; and export producers;
indreased public works spending; integrated land reform; other
agriculture related activities (sea 1 above).
13. Population
-Clinical services thru the rural health unit of the Department
of Health, the private clinic, agroindustrial clinic of private
firms; and physicians in private practice;
-Training programs in family planning
-Information, dissemination programs
-Research and evaluation
14. Health and Nutrition
-Health development program; control of communicable and other
diseases through intensification of preventive measures, (e.g.,
health education, immunization and environmental sanitation);
strengthening of the rural health services; construction of
small station hospitals, first aid stations and the University
of the Philippine Health Sciences Complex;
-Hospitol development: more hospitals and facilities; more
clinics; and modernization of hospital systems;
-Hospital Administration Plan: training for general practice;
salary incentives, etc;
-Medicare Program: expansion of medical care facilities; repairs
expansion, and construction of new facilities for the rural
health units.
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-Medical Assistance Programs establishment of Community Hospital
and health centers; with 5 to 10 hospital beds for emergency
cases;
-National Nutrition Program: production of more highly nutritious
foods in schools or communities and continuation of the Green
Revolution; expansion of nutrition education; establishment of
feeding outlets in schools and other areas; researches in food
and nutrition.
16. Housing
-Gocial and Economic housing financed and build by the government;
-Privately owned housing sites only or sites and services financed
by the government;
-Relocation of squatter and slum population in urban centers (par-
ticularly Metro-Manila) in more wholesome environment with com-
plementary social and infrastructure facilities.
1978-1982
Economics
1. Agriculture, Agrian Reform and Coopetative Development
-Land transfer and distribution;
-Cooperative development: "Samahang Nayon", marketing coopera-
tive, cooperative rural banks;
-Increase food production: rice, corn and feedgrains, fruits
and vegetables, meat dairy, fish and marine products;
-Increase production of commercial crops: coconut (thru replant-
ing of high yielding hybrid), sugar, tobacco, abaca, cotton and
fruits (particularly banana and mangoes).
2. Natural Resource Management
-Integrated reforestration on some 210,000 has of denuded water-
shed areas; enrichment planting of low volume timber production
forests; esbablishment of communal tree farms and tree parks
within municipalities and cities; inventory of forest resources;
cultivation of grasses and forage in some 580,000 has. of ranges;
selective logging, forest protaction; investment incentives for
development of grazing areas, and tree farms;
-Land surveys in economically depressed areas; use of modern tech-
nology to support land resource management program;
-Mapping of rocks and search for economic minerals in promising
prosepct areas inland (in selective depressed provinces) and off
shore; more extensive exploration and evaluation of promising
mineral deposits by drilling, trenching, and test pitting;
grant tax exemption priveleges to operators on import equipment
and machineries for prospecting, explorating, and undertaking
metallutgical researches; and
-Intensified environmental protection and management; conserva-
tion program, pollution control (data gathering).
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3. Industry
-Establishemnt of cottage, small and medium industreis outside
Metropolitan Manila, and the setting up of a number of large
industreis to produce key commodities particularly those that
process domestic raw materials and enhance technological capa-
biliites (including transport manufacturing, shipbuilding,
electronic local content industreis, wage goods industries:
food and beverages, textile garment and related products, wood
and wood processing, construction material);
-Utilization of an increasing proportion of mineral resources
in domestic production of semifinished and finished products
for internal and external markets (e.g., integrated steel mill,
copper, gold, silver, sulfuric acid, and feed mills);
-Domestic production of presently intermediate goods or the se-
cond stage import substitutes (e.g., chemical industry: ammonia,
urea, oldfins, low density polyethelene, high density polyethy-
lene, vinal chloride monomer, poly-vinyl chloride monomer, poly-
vinyl chloride and caustic soda; machine tools eand engineering:
latches, drill presses, milling machines, radial drill, mechani-
cal press, grinding machine, shapers).
4. Foreign Trade N
-Direct market promotion: establishment of Philippine Trade
Houses, trade missions, international publicity, symposia
and seminars; supportive services to local exporters; export
markets and product researches, training and consultancey sources,
and trade information dissemination; marketing faciliteis and
infrastructures, shipping and prot, air transport; production
for export: export processing zones and industrial estates, ex-
port industry Authorities, economic sector development programs;
fiscal and financial support; incentives to export-oriented in-
dustreis; financing and guarantees; and
-Evaluation of tariff concessions granted; domestic production
of critical import substitutes.
5. Tourism
-Intensive promotional thrust: information and awareness campaign
-Convention tourism promotion
-Restoration, cultural development and beautification
-Regional dispersal of tourism facilities and services through
incentives and government investment in public works;
-Manpower development
-Support of small and medium scale industries related to tourism
espceially those that use indigenous resources; and
-INtensive research in international and domestic markets
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Infrastructure and Utilities
6. Transportation
-Intensive construction of feeder and farm-to-market roads which
will branch out from highways; priority is given to depressed
areas like Samar; improvement of traffic management, provision
of higher occupancy vehicles, and construction of selected high-
way projects in urban areas;
-Completion, rehabilition, and upgrading of roads connecting
primary and secondary centers, particularly the Visayan grids,
and highway linking major Mindanao urban areas; rehabilitation
of the main South and North railway lines;
-Construction, of national and regional seaports and trunkline,
secondary airports, complementary ferry services, and access
roads; building and replacement of interisland vessels;
-Impovement of the cureent conditions of international seaports
and airports.
7. Water Resources
-Irrigation of 1.4. million has and rehbilitation of 254,903
has.:
-Increase the proportion of the population with sewerage facili-
ties from 42% in 1977 to 46% by 1982; for water supply from 42%
to 62%;
-Provision of flood control infrastructure in 1.07 million has.;
-Development of major river basis; and
-Data systemization program: data back with 679 hydrometric
stations and 200 climactic observations stations by 1982.
8. Energy
-Incremental generating capacity of 2690 NW between 1978-82;
-Oil exploration and development: 209 exploratory wells between
1978 and 1987; coal exploration and development in 5 main and
6 secondary coal areas;
-Aeothermal field exploration and development: 265 production
and 85 reinfection wells; hydroresources development: "micro-
hydro" generation stations and larger hydropower plants: urani-
um exploration and development: larap Mines, etc;
-Nonconventional energy program: biogas from wasts, marshes
utilization, woodmills, solar water heating alcohol from waste.
9. Communication
-Establishemnt of rural telephone exchange: 75 municipalities;
-Establishment to Radio Telegraph station: improve or established
422 stations and modernize 896 town/cities stations
-Establish 1400 lines and 1400 telprinter stations.
-Telecommunication regulatory networks;
-Construction of 11 earth station facilities and installation of
11 meter diameter antennai with ground communication equipment
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in 9 provincial areas with control station in Metro Manila;
-Establishment of mechanized regional distribution centers: im-
provement of postal transport capabilities.
Social Development
10. -Social Service and Community Development
-For urban and rural communities: self help project assistance,
organization of planning and development bodies; and traing
programs
-For the most disadvantaged group: self-emploument assistance
program, practical skills development and job placement, day
care and supplemental feeding emergency assistance; family plan-
ning motivation; special social services and child youth wel-
fare;
-For the Working Group: workers welfare program, etc.
11. Education and Manpower
-Upgrading school facilities, training and retraing of teachers;
-Provision of better quality tertiary education; development of
middle and high-level manpower; and the intensificaiton of re-
search and extension services;
-Developing an effective labor market information system; spe-
cific regional manpower training and placement facilities;
-Identifying, preserving, and restoring cultural properties;
-Development and maintenance of recreational facilities, play-
grounds, and sports centers in strategic place in the contry;
construction of a modern sports complex adequate for international
sports competion;
12. Health, Nutrition, and Family Planning
-Family planning program;
-Philippine Nutrition Program;
-Health programs including expansion of rural health services and
establishment of management information system;
-Support program: infrastructure (incentives for private hospital
construction; construction and renovation of rural facilities);
pertinent manpower development program; research program.
13. Housing
-Direct housing: construction of new units and sites and ser-
vices development for low and middle income households;
-Upgrading of sites and service (urban and rural);
-Corollary programs-: development of economic opportunities;
socioeconomic programs, relief and rehavilitation; and
-Technical assistance and research on housing and envrionment.
Sources:
Republic of the Philippines. Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77.
Republic of the Philippines. Five-Year Philippine Development Plan,
FY 1978-82.
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APPENThDIX D
SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS'
INVESTMENT AND EXPORT INCENTIVE SYSTELS
1. Evaluation of Application for Incentives
1.1 Administrative Requirements
The BOI issuances to operationalize the provisions of
the Investment and Export Incentives Acts specify the adminis-
trative requirements with respect to applications for BOI re-.
gistration. These requirements include the submission of docu-
ments showing that the applicant meets the basic requirements
for registration as discussed below. Furthermore, four copies
of the complete project study showing that the project applied
for under the IIA is economically, technically, and financially
sound are also required. For projects being applied with the
EIA the following rules applf*- Service exporters engaged in
motion pictures, television, musical recordings and tourism
projects or requiring imported capital equipment as well as
export producers are required complete project feasibility
reports which also show that the project would not affect the
viability of other preferred export investments. Export traders
and export producers which would not require capital outlays
have to submit five-year projections of the marketing and
financial aspects.
1.2. Qualification of Applicants
The applicant carries the burden of proving that it
meets the basic-criteria for registration with the BOI. The
most essential requirement is that the project being proposed
be listed as a preferred activity iider the priorities plan
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prevailing during the period of ppiction .
Under the IIA, the applicanlt --must also be corporation
recognized under Philippine laws and satisfy the debt-equity
and participation requirements. Foreign-owned and controlled
corporations that are registered with the (Philippine) Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission are allowed to engage in pio-
neer projects not reserved for and not to be engaged in by
Filipino-owned and controlled corporations.
Under the EIA, the same ownership requirement has to
be met. In addition, at least 50% of the firm's sales must
come frDm exports. Philippine-recognized Foreign corporations
are allowed if they engage in a pioneer activity, cater to
foreign tourists and travellers, or export 70% of their out-
puts.
1.3.Overall Appraisal of Applicants
Applications for 301 incentives are analyzed in terms
of management, market, technical, financial, and economic
feasibility. The specific areas are summarized on Table 3.1.
1.4.BOI Guidelines on the Analysis of the Economic Aspect'
1.4.1 Foreign Exchange Reserves
Three indicators to measure the foreign exchange reserve
2
contribution of the project:
1 Project project.o
Extracted from 3oard of Investments, Prject Evalaton a-
nul 1971 pp.III1.6.1-III.6.8.
2 The Manual does noz tprovide guidelines as to how these indi-
cators are to be evaluated.
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Table D.1
FORMAT FOR PRELIMINARY SCREENING REPORT
FOR APPLICATIONS UNDER R.A. 5186 AND
R.A. 6135 (LIST A EXPANSION AND LIST B)
GENERAL
i. Give name, address (plant and office) of applicant and application number.
z. Detail type of registration applied for.
3. List the product(s) and product(s) uses.
4. Indicate capacity applied for, available measured capacity
and % of capacity applied for to available measured capacity.
Summarize the corporate structure of the enterprise, outlining special feature.
LEGAL, CORPORATE AND MANAGEMENT ASPECTS
i. Determine whether the enterprise is incorporated, organized and existing under
Philippine laws.
2. Check whether the area of investment applied for is within the applicant's corporate
powers. (Compare pertinent portions of the Articles of Incorporation and
Capital Structure).
3. List the major stockholders of the firm. State general business standing of the
applicant company and its major stockholders.
4. Check whether the proposed capital structure meets the BOI law requirements.
5. Appraise the capabilities of the management and the characteristics of the owners.
Determine whether the management proposed for each stage appears to have the
experience and ability for the type of activities proposed.
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MARKET ASPECTS
i. Review demand projections
a. BOI projection during the preparation of IPP, EPP, etc.
b. Proponent's projection
Each projection must indicate growth rate. If no production in the past and at present,
get past importations.
2. Determine available supply.
a. Present supply
b. Future sources of supply
3. Check selling prices for both domestic and export sales. Indicate how realistic.
For exports, compare with a competitor country.
4. Projected sales volume-,show how reasonable.
a. Local
b. Export
5. Determine whether there are substitute products in the local and target
export markets.
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
1. Determine the specific products and specifications of products to suit the markets.
2. Determine plant size and compare with the minimum economic size plant for the
product.
3. Describe the production process or method and indicate whether or not it is technically
suitable for Philippine conditions.
4. Determine what machinery, equipment, etc. with the right characteristics are needed.
The evaluator must indicate whether or not there is a necessity for the importation
of capital equipment. Checks must be made to see if local suppliers/manufacturers could
supply any of the equipment and supplies contemplated to be imported.
5. Determine the raw materials needed. Show source and material balances.
6. Indicate whether plant location is rightly chosen and show alternatives considered.
7. Show whether labor requirements and costs are reasonable.
8. If there is any process licensing agreement, give a short account of it.
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FINANCIAL ASPECTS
i. Compute production cost and itemize total project cost, showing estimates without BOI
registration and with BOI registration.
. Determine whether production, sales and operating cost estimates tie in with details
given under the technical aspects heading.
3. Check factors considered in selecting proposed sources of financing.
Determine amounts from different sources. A
4. Compute the following financial ratios:
a. Internal rate of return on equity
b. Internal rate of return on total investment
c. Net income to net sales
d. Net income to stockholders' equity
e. Debt-equity ratio
f. Current ratio
5. Break-even analysis
ECONOMIC ASPECTS
i. Determine foreign exchange reserves contribution of the project.
2. Check employment generation. Apply labor-intensity criterion.
3. Determine value added of the project.
4. Check usage of indigenous raw materials.
5. Determine linkages.
6. Determine social rate of return.
RECOMMENDATION
State whether or not the application may now be given due course for final evaluation.
Section Head
Directo
Source: Board of Investments, .roject Evaluation Mvanuai, L971.
a. Foreign Exchange Benefit-Cost Ratio (FE3CR)
n
Gross Foreign Exchange Earn-i
Foreign Exchange Outflow
whee j = years 1,2,.c., 10
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gs/Savings
b. Foreign Exchange Benefit/Imported Raw MaterialI
FEBIRM = Gross Foreian Exchanle Earni s/Saving
Imported-Raw Material Cost
c. Discounted Rate of Return on Foreign Exchange
ments (DRRFEI)
DRRFE I:
Foreign exchange _ Foreign Exchange
Outflows Inflows
(1+i)n
Initial
Cost of
Imported
Equipment
where i= interest rate
j= number of years (1,2,. . ., n)
1.4.2 Employment Generation
The Manual states: "A project is socially desirable
because it will give better opportunities to those currently
employed, reduce the ranks of the unemployed, properly com-
pensate the employees and train them." 2
The Manual suggests that the distinction between Filipino
and foreign workers be made to determine the extent to which
the former is given preference. If practical, the labor pool
will be broken down into types of skills (e.g.,factory workers:
skilled, unskilled: office workers; clerical, professional).
This is the discounted cash flow concept adopted to foreign
exchange investment. The DRRFEI is the discount.~ factor at
which the present value of net foreign exchange inflow is
equal to the present value of the initial cost of imported
equipment.
2 Ibid. R.A. No. 5186, III. 6.3.
Invest-
231
1.4.3 Labor-Intensity Criterion (L1)
LI=Imported Canital" As.-ets-LI  __
M4an Year Direct Employment
Provided: LI < $4,000 at the time of evaluation
Projects can be exemupted from ,the LI criterion if they:
a) are entirely export-oriented;
b) can generate in 5 years of commercial operation
an amount at least equal to:
ICE - (LE X $4,000)
where ICE = total cost of project's imported capital
equipment
LE = Number of man-years of labor employed
c) are included in. sector programs or which have justi-
ficably stroggreasons for being included among the exceptions.
Other measurements of employment:
1) Fixed Asset Per Worker (FAPW) 4
FAPW = Fixed Asset Excluding Land
Number of Workers
This criterion is expected to encourage capital-intensive
projects to engage partly in exports, to avoid the overpricing
of equipment, to give "concrete expression of the lOI policy
to gyenerate emolovment because by adopting a cut-off figure,
employment is guaranteed, "and to provide a built in inducement
for utilization of domestically manufactured equipment. ibd.
Assess with at least 75i of its "free trade" value (i.e., the
.C.I.F. value of equivalent imported equipment ) represents
imported components.
Include all personnel to be hired by the firm. The number
of workshifts is based on industry practice in the Philippines,
or, if new industry, is decided upon by the technical staff.
This measure is comparable to Capital-Labor Ratio.
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2) Fixed Assets Per Peso V!age/ Salary (FAPPWS)
FAPPWS = Fixed Assets Excluding Land
Total Payroll
1.4.4,Value-Added of the Project 2
The main indicator is the Value-Added Coefficient (VAC):3
VAC Value of Output - (Raw Materials+Utilities+Supplies
Value of Output
Another indicator is:
Fixed Assets-Value Added Ratio = Fixed Assets Excluding Land
Value of Output-(R.M.+U+S)
1.4.5 Usage of Indigenous Raw Materials (UIRM)4
UIRM Cost of Local Raw Materials
Total Raw Materials Sold
A lower FAPPWs denotes higher skill intensiveness.
2 The share of factor payments in the total value of output
is a measure of the degree of processing -,or manufacture
involved in a project.
Two methods are being used: One method uses domestic prices;
the other one, world prices. The former is typically higher
because of tariff protection which then results in higher
value-added contribution. To correct this, import substitutes
are valued at C.I.F. cost of their imported counterpart or
its price in the producing country, whichever is higher, while
the raw material costs are net of tariff duties and taxes.
The importance of this measure is "an increase in the inter-
national reserves through the non-usage of imported raw ma-
terials, the development bf related industries which supply
the raw materials and the employment of more workers."
ibid. 111.6.7.
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1.4.6 Related Industries or Linkages
This is concerned about the forward and backward linkage;
effects of a proposed project. The sectoral programs are expected
to reveal these linkages. The Manual did not elaborate as to
how this aspect would be analyzed.
1.4.7 Raising of the Standards of Living
The Manual speaks of achieving this welfare objective
through the provisions of goods to the consumer at lower cost
or through the increase in the purchasing poweraof the employees.
1.4.8 Social Rate of Return
This is one way of consolidating the social (as against
market priced) benefits and social costs of a project.2 This
is the discounting rate at which the present value of the aggre-
gate social net benefits is equal to zero. 3
There are other economic dimensions that are not ade-
quately dealt with in these eight aforementioned areas. For
example, are incentives really necessary? These and other
questions are summarized in Table D.2.
The Manual categorically states that the evaluation must
see to it that this price effect occurs.
2 Other approaches include the present value of net aggregate
benefits an-d also the benefit cost ratio (i.e., the present
values of total benefits divided by the present value of total
costs.
It is similar to the internal rate of return concept in the
commercial profitability appraisal, except that in the social-
rate of return we use the orixe that reflect the relative
scarcities of resources (i.e. shadow price).
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Table D.2 LUST OU QUILSTIONS RELATING
TO EVALUATIN( , ICONOMIC ASPECTS
(Evaluated by lkcononowst Im, Indust ry (Proup or Task Force)
I. Overall has the project been carefully conceived ? Is it a good sound project?
2. a. Is it viable without incentives? Are incentives of various types really
required?
b. Are tariffs required? Should both tariff protection and taxation incentives be
given or -not? What level of tariffs?
c. Has enough consideration been given to local purchases and is it necessary for
tax exemption of imports of either capital goods or regular inputs?
Are the gains sufficient to compensate for such incentives?
c. Do you think the proponent would still go ahead with the project if no
tariff protection and/or other incentives are given?
:3. Does the project aid, or show promise of aiding, the economic development of
the country? What overall national programs or objectives does the project
cotribute towards? What benefits? What costs? What roughly would be the
social rate of return? Is pollution a problem to be accounted for?
4. Does the project-
* alleviate the conditions of the farmer?
* provide for comprehensive training of local citizens at all levels?
* induce or establish backward or forward linkages with other activities?
* contribute to foreign exchange generation or saving,,
* aid in regional dispersal?
* aid in development of small scale industry?
* promote employment generalization?
* increase local value added?
* raise living standards'
5. Does the project contradict government policy? Are there any indications that
there may be changes in this respect?
6. If substantial foreign investment is involved, does it contribute:
* technology transfer or know-how which would not otherwise be available?
* substantial technology or know-how?
* development of export markets?
* finance?
* others?
What is the "cost" of foreign involvement in the project? Is the foreign
involvement necessary for the project to be successful
7. How does the project fit in with the sector plat: Would it require any changes
in the plan? To what extent will it assist in the implementation of the plan?
8. a. What proportion of the measured capacity does the project take up? Does it
allow an economic size unit to take tip the remainder?
b. Is the scale the most suitable? Could advantages of the export market be taken
to operate on a more suitable scale
Source: Board of Investments, vr t 7 nlu ion Manual,
1971.
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2. Incentives Granted
2.1 Investment Incentives Act
The incentives bene-efits that are granted under the
IIA by BOI -,are of two kinds. One set of incentives is awarded
to investors in BOI-registered enterprises. Another set is for
in
the preferred activity engaged by registered enterprises..
2.1.1 Investors in a BOI registered enterprise are entitled
the following incentive benefits under the IIA: 2
a. Protection of patents and other proprietory rights
(e.g. trademarks, copyrights, tradenames);
b. Exemption from income tax of capital gains that
are invested within 6 months in new issue of capital
stock of a registered enterprise;3 and
c. Preference in the granting of government's financial
assistance.
These are in addition to the basic rights and guarantees pro-
vided in the Constitution subject to the provision of Section
74 of R.A. No. 265: a) repatriation of investment ; b remit-
tance of earnings; c) foreign loans and contracts; d) free-
dom fron exDropriation (except for public use or in the in-
terest of National Welfare and Defense and upon payment ofjust compensation); and e) no requisition of investment
(except in extraordinary cases but wJth just compensation).
For- more details see, RH.A. Nos. 5186 and 6135 and also, the
BOI issuances to i-olement the intents and provisions of these
Acts, as amended.
2 Sections 5 and 10 R.A. No. 5186.
Provided: a)that said sale is registered with the Board and
the Bureau of Intern1 valRvne (I-); and b) that tne shares
or stock representing the investment are not disposed of for a
period of 5 years
4 Regardless of the financial assistance: equity participation or
in loans and guarantees.
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2.1.2 Registered Einterprises
The types of the incentive benefits that can be availed
of by enterprises registered under the IPP are dependent on
the nature of the preferred activity of such firms. Extra
incentives are available for additional features of the preferred
project. Accordingly, the "pioneer" status and the export of
registered commodities of registered enterprises accord them
corresponding special incentives.
A. Preferred Activities
The minimum set of benefits that can be availed of by
registered corporations is as follows:1
1. Deductions from Taxable income:
a) Organizational and pre-operating expenses; 2
b) Accelerated depreciation;3
c) Net operating loss carry-over;4
1 Section 6 I.A. No. 5286, as amended.
Within 10 years from the month of operation, provided the
taxpayer indicate tIe desired amortization period during
the first year income tax payment; covers pre-investment
studies, start up costs, cost of initial recruitment and
training, and similar expenses.
Provided it is no mo-re thn twice as fast the normal depre-
ciation rate if expected life is 10 years and less; between
5 and expected life if the latter is over 10 years.
Net operating loss incurred ini any of the firSt 10 years of
operation maybe carried over as a deduction from taxable
income.
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d) Expansion of reinvestment;
2
e) Labor training expenses;
2. Tax credits from capital equipment and interests:
f) Tax exemption on imported capital equipment;3
g) Tax credit on domestic capital equipment to user
and manufacturer;4
To the extent of 25%, 37%, or 50% for non-pioneer projects
and to the extent of 50A, 75", or 100% for pioneer projects,
to be determined by the Board for each industry taking into
account: the relative risk, technology transfer and fallout,
-export potential, incremental labor, use of locally manufac-
tured machinery and equipment and domestic raw materials,
provided: a) that-the enterprise does not reduce its capital
stock represented by the reinvestment within 7 years from
date of reinvestment and b) that prior approval of the Board
is, obtained.
2 Equal to - the value of labor training expenses not exceeding
10% of direct labor wage for upgrading the productivity and
efficiency of unskilled labor, provided such program is duly
approved by the appropriate government agency.
3 If purchase is made within 7 years of registration, provided:
that the machinery, equipment and spare parts purchased:
a') are not manufactured domestically in reasonable quantity
and quality at reasonable prices: b) are directly and actually
needed and will be used exclusively by the registered enter-
prise in the manufacture of its procucts, unless with prior
BOI permission to maximize usage thereof; c) are shipped direct-
ly and in the name of the registered enterprise; and d) prior
BOI approval is obtained. For replacement or modernization
of registered enterprises, or for expansion of projects with
20% or greater return on equity, mere deferment in payment
of taxes and duties.
4 Tax credit is equivalent to 100% for the user and 50% for the
domestic manufacturer, of the value of compensating tax and
Qustom duties that would have been paid on the machinery,
equipment or spare parts had these items been imported: provided
that the sale is made within 7 years from registration date
and the same provisions as (b) and (d) in footnote 3 above.
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h) Tax credit:interest payments on foreign loans
withheld.
3. Non-fiscal incentives:
i) Employment of foreign nationals;~
44j) AntiL-dumping, protection' and
k) Protection from government corporation.4
B. Pioneer Activities
Over and above these incentives just cited, pioneer
enterprises are granted the following incentives benefits: 5
a) Exemptions from all taxes under the Internal Revenue
Code, except income tax, on a gradually diminishing
percentage from the date of registration up to
December 1981;6
1 When: a) no such credit is enjoyed by the lender-remittee in
his country; and 2) the registered enterprise has assumed the
liability for payment of the tax due from the lender-remittee.
2 Within five years from registration, registered enterprises
may employ foreign natures in supervisory, technical or advi-
sory positions not in excess of 5%, of its total personnel
in each such category, provided that employment exceeling
5 years shall be governed by Sec. 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 613 as amended.
Banning for a limited period of the importation of commodities
which unfairly or unnecessarily compete with that produced
by registered enterprises, provided: a) that the commodities
produced have satisfactory quality or are manufactured by the
registered enterprises, and b) that the enterprises agree not
to increase the price of these goods during this period, unless
allowed by the Board.
The government shall not allow duty-free import of products
being produced, by registered enterprises, except when the
President deels it for the national interest or when inter-
national commitments require inteinational comoetitive bidding.
Section 8, R.A. No. 5186.
6 100% for first 5 years; 75% for 6th to 8th year; 17% for 9th
to 12th years; 20% for 11th to 12th years; and 10% for 13th
to 15th years.
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b) Employment of Foreign Nationals; 1
c) Post-operative tariff protection;2
Philippine Nationals3 with investments in a pioneer'
activity are granted the following incentive benefits in addi-
tion to these three basic incentives:4
a) Income Tax deduction not exceeding 10% of invest-
-5ments;
b) Exemptions from income tax of capital gains that
were invested within 6 months in new issues of
capital stock of, or in the purchase of foreign-
owned stocks in, pioneer industries; 6
c) Income tax exemption on sale of stock dividends
received from a pioneer enterprise.7
1 Subject to Section 29 of C.A. No. 613 as amended, to employ
foreign nationals under the following conditions:a all such
foreign nationals shall register with the Board: b such emp-
loyment is only for 5 years o-1 less, provided that when the
foreign nationals are the majority stock holders, positions
of president, treasurers and general manager, or their equiva-
lents, may be retained by foreign nationals.
2 Upon the recommendation of the Board, the President shall
permit post-operative tariff protection which shall not exceed
50% of dutiable value of imported items similar to those being
manufactured by a pioneer enterprise (unless a higher rate or
amount is provided by the Tariff Code or pertinent laws).
3 A Philippine National refers to a "citizen of the Philippines;
or a partnership or association wholly owned by (Filipino
citizens); corporations organized under (Philippine Laws with)
60% of its capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by (Filipino citizens); or a trustee of funds
for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits
where the trustee is a Philippine National and at least 60'. of
the funds will acrue to the benefit of Philippine Nationals."
Section 3 '(f) R.A. No.5186.
4 Section 6, R.A. No.5186
5 Provided that the investment is made within 7 years of the
registration date and that the shares be held for 3 years.
6 The shares of stock should not be disposed of for 3 years.
7 The transfer should occur within 7 years from date of investment.
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C. Exports
Special incentives can also be availed of by registered
establishments for exports of their registered products.1
2
They are: a) Special tax credit ; and
b) Reduced income tax3
2.2 Export Incentives Act
Under the EIA, the incentives provided are very sirni-
lar to those of the IIA except for a few which are designed
to meet the particular need of the export industry.
A. Investors
All the basic incentives benfits which are granted to
investors under the IIA are also available to all investors
in "registered" export producers, export traders and service
exports.
Philippine Nationals with investments in registered
export producers that are pioneer enterprises are also entitledV
to the corresponding incentives under the IIA.5
1 Section 9, R.A. No. 5186.
2 Equivalent to the sales, compensating and specific taxes and
duties on supplies and materials used in the manufacture of
its export products; the tax credit accrues only after actual
export of the products.
3 For the first 5 years from registration, deduction equivalent
to the sum of the direct labor cost and local raw materials
utilized in the manufactures of its completely finished export
products, not exceeding 25% of total export revenue; in the
case of traditional exports, the local raw material component
is excluded in the computation.
See 2.1.1. above.Section 5, R.A. No. 6135.
5 See 2.1.1. above.Section 5, R.A. No. 6135.
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B. Registered Export Producer
Under the LIA, 7i regiseeod export produc ers -are en-
titled to some incentives alloed under the II-A, specifically
those described in (d), (e),(i), (j), and (k) in 2.1.2.A. above
(unless they already enjoy the same priveleges under the other
laws). 1 Furthermore, registered export producers that are pio-
neer enterprises can also avail of the incentives being enjoyed
by registered pioneer enterprises under the IIA. 2
In addition to these, registered export producers are
also granted the following incentives benefits:3
a) Tax credit;4
b) Reduced income tax;5
c) Tax exemption on imported capital equipment ;6
d) Tax exemption on domestic capital equipment; 7 and
e) Exemption from export tax8
Section 5, R.A. No. 6135
2 Ibid.
Section 7. R.A. No. 6135
4 Same as 2.1.2.,. (a).
5 Same as 2.1.2.C. (b).
6 Same as 2.1.2.A (f) above except for a shorter effectivity
of 5 years and for list A, capacity exoangion is liriied to
meeting an exportu con"rae t i arovision designed to prevent
further overcrowding of industries with excess capacity).
7 Same as 2.1.2.A. (g).
8 Including impost or fee (e.g., stabilization tax under R.A.
No. 6125.
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C. Registered Export Traders
For registered export traders, the following incentives
benefits are available:
a) Exemption from export tax;2
b) Tax credit; 3
c) Additional income tax deduction4
Furthermore, a registered export trader, who extends
financial assistance to a registered export producer(s) amounting
to at least 20% of the trader's total income for the year in
which the incentive is claimed, is also allowed an additional
income tax deduction of 1% of its total export revenues.5
D. Registered Service Exporters
A different set of incentives is lined up for registered
service exporters. All registerei.service exporters are entitled
to an income tax deduction of 50% of tis export fees for the
year in which such incentive is claimed.6 Extra incentives are
granted to registered service exporters of television and motion
pictures, or musical recordings produced in the country, to wit:
tax credit; and tax exemption on imported capital equipment.8
1
'Section 8, R.A. No. 6135.
2 For export commodities purchased from registered export pro-
ducers which can avail of such exemption; same as that for
registered export producers.
3 Equivalent to 100% of specific and sales taxes on registered
export commodity bought by it and subsequently exported.
4 10% of its total export sales.
5 Ibid.
6 Provided that the export fees earned are totally remitted to
the Philippines; for first 5 years form registration
Same as 2.2.C.(b) above except only for 5 years from registratioi.
8 Same as 2.1.2..,(f) above except only for 5 years from registration.
M
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A duty free importation of capital equipment is also
allowJed, to registered service exporters catering primarily to
foreign tourist and foreign travellers in the preferred areas
spelled out in the TpPP and subject to the guidelines of the
PTC and the Board.
E. Special Incentives
The EIA allows two special incentives for registered
export producers or export traded. One has spatial underpinnings
while the other is related to the brand name used.1
A registered export producer who established its
manufacturing establishment in a location that the Board desig-
nates as necessary for industrial dispersal or considers to have
inadequate infrastructure, public utilities ard other facilities,
are allowed extra incentives as follows:
a) Income tax deduction of 200% of direct labor cost
usingr th-ie formula in 2.1.2.C.(b) above;2
b) Income tax credits for cost of infr-astructure work
undertaken' and henceforth maintained.
Meanwhile, the use of a new brand name for an export
product (that distinguished it from foreign products) by a
registered export producer or export trader is also granted
special incentives in the form of either of net operating loss
carry over 4 or additional income tax deduction of 1% of the
annual increment of its export revenue. 5
Section 9, R.A. No. 6135.
2 Still not exceeding 25% of total export sales.
Require prior approval of the Board or any appropriate agency.
Same as 2.1.2.A.(c)
The base period is the year prior to the application period.
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